

Globalization from Below

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Transnationalism and the Making of (post)Modern Citizens in East Asia

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玉不琢，不成器；人不學，不知道。是故，古之王者，建國君民，教學為先
If jade is not carved, it cannot be a tool, if people do not study, they cannot know the Way. Thus,
when state-building and ruling the people, the ancient kings began with education. (*Xueji*, verse 2).

‘To destroy a state, first you must destroy its history’ wrote Qing dynasty scholar-official Gong Zizhen, and although in recent years we have been more likely to hear how nations and nationalisms are ‘invented’, ‘constructed’ or ‘imagined’ (mainly from above and occasionally from below), the basic thesis - that collective identities and a sense of communal duty and responsibility are built in large part on collective memories of real or imagined pasts - remains the same. Indeed, even those who insist that nations are organically discrete entities born of unique and pure ethno-cultural essences tend to assume that in order to propagate the national essence and ensure the longevity, and preferably immortality, of the nation, collective memories and adherence to nationally prescribed social norms and morality should be constantly reinforced. Unsurprisingly, mass education systems the world over have been the principal conduit for disseminating official narratives of the past and teaching captive audiences of citizens-to-be not simply to distinguish good from bad, right from wrong and self from other, but to ignore or disdain nuanced understandings of the continuum that frequently exists between such apparently incommensurable opposites. Humanities curricula have been central to this endeavour and although, in most societies over the past century, humanistic education for elites (whether secular or religious) has been rapidly replaced by a basic literacy-, numeracy- and science and technology-oriented curriculum designed to produce more efficient workers who can contribute to national modernisation projects, humanities have retained a key place (diminished in size if

not in symbolism) in the curriculum for citizen-making, expected to promote love for and devotion to what is claimed to be the national territory, past, language and culture.

In many East Asian societies, highly developed traditional uses of education for promoting the values and *Weltanschauung* of the state have melded with modern ideas of the school as a training camp for citizenship and transferable skills to form a seemingly unassailable nationalist pedagogical ideal. Recent domestic and international controversies over textbook content and other public sites of collective commemoration are perhaps the most obvious example of the tenacity of the national paradigm. Yet, it would be erroneous to deny the various internationalist and trans-national ideas and ideologies that have informed the conceptualisation of model citizens, the curricula and textbooks that seek to nurture them, or the ways in which content is taught and learnt; after all, the nation and the mechanisms designed to create and sustain attachment to it are themselves global(ised) constructs. It has of course been argued that this kind of 'transnationalism' or 'globalisation' is in reality little more than a hegemonic industrialised 'West' exporting the telos of modernity and the blueprints for the nation-state, mass education systems and contemporary pedagogical theories and practices to the rest of the world in a form of continuing imperialist domination. While this is certainly a logical interpretation, it overestimates the novelty and cultural specificity of national forms of institutional organisation and social reproduction, and underestimates the extent to which the blueprints for them were actively sought, and, more importantly, appropriated and adapted for various purposes in diverse settings. It should also be remembered that modern education systems in East Asia - as elsewhere - have not always been regarded as a production-line for manufacturing model citizens, but have also been influenced by liberal pedagogical theories that call for the nurturing of the

individual so that he/she might, through self-actualisation, better serve mankind. Both views have historical antecedents at home and abroad, and both have had their adherents in positions of power at various times.

A basic premise of this paper, therefore, is that (national) citizen-making in East Asia has in fact, in many ways, been a transnational pedagogical experiment. Since much of the cross-cultural transfer has occurred through imperialist and colonialist encounters, and since education in the region has mostly been tightly controlled in top-down fashion by the state, it would be a stretch to claim that this transnationalism is in the strictest sense – per our conference theme – ‘globalisation from below’. The ruling regime, whether foreign or domestic, normally has a vested interest in providing education that will foster loyalty to the state and support for its causes. As discussed in more detail below, globalising educational models that have been introduced ‘from without’ by conquering powers have served a number of purposes more complex than merely instilling acceptance of colonial rule, and have had varying degrees of impact on subject populations. Where they have been adopted ‘from within and above’, they have been principally aimed at fortifying the nation-state in its ongoing competition with other nation-states. (Whether that has been the outcome is another matter). That is not to deny that much of the impetus for education reform with a transnational bias has come from public intellectuals, academics, and to a lesser extent teachers and parents, and although some have been similarly concerned to promote national rejuvenation through transnational curricula, others have cleaved to a less nation-centric view. I would perhaps suggest, therefore, a more tentative labelling of the transnational aspects of East Asian education as ‘globalisation from the middle’. The purpose of this paper, however, is not to attribute credit (or blame) for transnational

characteristics to any party or parties involved in education policy-making and implementation at any given historical juncture; rather, it analyses some of the transnational theories, ideologies, goals and methodologies that have informed curriculum and textbook development over the past century, and evaluates the ways in which they have challenged, been challenged by, undermined or reinforced the dominant nationalist paradigm. I will focus here on the late nineteenth – early twentieth century, a period which is traditionally considered to have witnessed the birth of East Asian nationalism. It was also, as shown below, a period in which internationalist ideologies and rapid transnational cultural and intellectual exchange occurred. It is thus a useful subject for the analysis of some of the questions outlined above, as well as providing the backdrop against which subsequent national and transnational developments in education can be examined.

Close encounters of the imperialist kind

While East Asia had had some early educational encounters with Europeans, learning aspects of mathematics and astronomy from the Jesuits, only in Japan, where a school of ‘Dutch studies’ (*rangaku*) focusing on Western science had been established at Nagasaki, had any substantial efforts been made to learn anything about the ideas or cultures of the barbarians.¹ Not until after Europe, and later the USA, brought the might of their national militaries to bear in the name of free trade (which interestingly enough was viewed by some European thinkers as a form of peace-promoting ‘internationalism’), were foreign ideas widely deemed worthy of serious consideration. Even then, the initial educational enterprises established were limited solely to science, technology and foreign languages. As succinctly expressed in Zhang Zhidong’s famous dictum, ‘Chinese learning as the essence, Western learning for practical application’ (*Zhongti, xiyong*) and its Japanese and Korean equivalents (‘Eastern morality, Western techniques’), the

¹ Sugita and Ogata, *Dawn of Western Science in Japan*.

objective was to acquire the necessary components of Western knowledge to enrich and strengthen (J. *fukoku kyōhei*, Ch. *fuqiang*) the country so as better to resist foreign encroachment, while retaining the core principles of a humanistic education rooted in the Confucian Classics.²

While both Japan and Korea had been open to trans-cultural educational content and practices for much of their histories (both in terms of ‘Chinese learning’ and Buddhist education), only Japan was initially willing to go to the extreme of completely overturning traditional educational models.³ The new education system was based on the highly regimented, nation-building Prussian model, which, in conjunction with the later development of an ultra-nationalist curriculum, has often led to an assumption that education in modernising Japan was simply a replication of European national citizenship training garnished with a few Japanese characteristics. As Lincicome has shown in great detail, however, both the goals and content of the new education were bitterly contested between those who favoured a basic, essentially unquestioning education to serve the purposes of the state, and those who advocated ‘developmental education’ (*kaihatsu-shugi*) which sought to break away from traditional ‘spoon-feeding’ (*chunyū*) and rote memorisation methods, towards a more participatory style of learning that would contribute to the holistic development of the individual child.⁴ Ultimately, this conflict between national and transnational understandings of the nature and meaning of civilisational enlightenment (which paralleled debates over the purposes of education in Europe and the USA) was won by the nationalist wing, and adopted as the state ideology as succinctly conveyed by Mori Arinori, Minister of Education.

² Note the use of the ‘transnational’ term ‘Eastern’ in Korea and Japan vs. the use of ‘Chinese’ in China to refer to state-sponsored classical Confucian learning.

³ It should be noted that Japanese school-children had already been using translations of certain European texts on the sciences in domain schools (*hanko*) for some time before the advent of the modern education system (see Dore, *Education in Tokugawa Japan*).

⁴ Lincicome, *Principle, Praxis and the Politics of Educational Reform in Japan*.

Education in the Japanese State is not intended to create people accomplished in the techniques of the arts and sciences, but rather to manufacture the persons required by the State. Rather than proceeding in accord with Western principles and methods, we should carefully follow the rules developed in the schools for training arm officers.... In short education must be developed in accordance with the spirit of *chūkun aikoku* (loyalty and patriotism).⁵

Although academics and the educated elite remained relatively free to discuss and publicly express a range of opinions until the mid-1930s, education for the masses was strictly confined to serving the purposes of moral and patriotic education after 1890 (with a brief effort at resurgence by developmental educationalists again in the late 1910s - early 1920s). Thus, university students could learn about the historical origins of the Japanese state, while school students were taught the myths of Amaterasu and the divine ancestry of the imperial line and national polity (*kokutai*).⁶ [I am uncertain as to what extent the formulation of the distinct categories of ‘pure’ (*junsho*) and ‘applied’ (*otaku*) knowledge was original or was derived from similar objections to teaching critical thinking to the young in Europe and the USA.⁷]

Colonial Education

Most European imperialist powers played a rather passive role in the education of their colonial subjects, despite the professed concern to liberate inferior peoples from primitive darkness that

⁵ Cit. in Horio, *Educational Thought and Ideology in Modern Japan*, 100. Note the implicit conflation of ‘Western principles and methods’ at this juncture with the nationalists’ opponents in pedagogy, the advocates of developmental education. Western education was already being viewed as overly trans-nationalist and individualist at this time when a more liberal and global view of education was beginning to enjoy a considerable following in Europe and North America (see for example, Sellars and Yeatman, *1066 and All That*, a biting 1930 parody of early twentieth century ‘little Englander’ textbooks). As discussed briefly below and in more depth in the full version of this paper, these views also gained some currency in East Asia. (Needless to say, the idea that the textbooks of the time were ‘liberal’ or ‘globally minded’ is not what most of us educated in Western Europe since the 1960s would think. To us, the textbooks of the early twentieth century appear jingoistic and completely nation-centric).

⁶ Mehl, *History and the State in Nineteenth Century Japan*.

⁷ See, for example, Woodrow Wilson’s comments in Novick, *That Noble Dream*.

legitimised their colonial enterprises. Mostly they trained a small elite to serve as functionaries in the colonial administration, putting a local face on hostile foreign domination, and left the rest of the population to their own devices. This was especially true in the Dutch and French-held territories in Southeast Asia, where the education offered to a narrow elite was a replication of French and Dutch curricula almost on par with the education provided in the metropolitan centre; indeed, highly educated colonials could and did travel to the centre for further education. No efforts were made, however, to 'modernise' or 'liberate' the masses either for economic development or for enlightenment purposes. While the British colonial administrations did not provide quite such high-quality education to the elite, they did subsidise many private educational initiatives for mass education. Needless to say, this was in large part to ensure some limited control over curriculum content, especially in light of Chinese nationalism, then riding high among the Overseas Chinese population in Malaya and Hong Kong, which was feared both as a direct challenge to colonial rule and, through the tendency of the Chinese population to isolate itself from its non-Chinese fellow colonials, as an indirect threat that might undermine the harmony and stability of the multi-ethnic community.⁸ [Carnoy has argued that these differences in colonial education and administration may have contributed to the brutal civil wars fought soon after independence and ongoing troubles in the former French and Dutch colonies, despite the generally higher degree of ethnic diversity in the former British colonies]. Only the USA administration in the Philippines substantially re-invested its revenues in education for the locals, viewing it as a means of inculcating liberal values and preparing the populace for eventual democratic self-rule.

⁸ The British administration in Malaya banned a number of imported mainland Chinese history textbooks (which were fairly hostile to Britain) during the 1930s. The offending textbooks were revised to excise the anti-British passages and were subsequently allowed into Malaya (and Hong Kong) (Purcell, *Studies in the Social History of China and Southeast Asia*).

Unlike its territorially expansionist European counterparts, Japan quickly began to export its state- and modernisation-serving educational model almost wholesale to its newly acquired colonies: as a pragmatic means of enhancing worker productiveness and encouraging acceptance of colonial rule; and as an ideological push to deliver the kind of civilisation and enlightenment (*bunmei kaika*) to its ‘same culture, same race’ (*dobu, doshu*) fellow men still labouring under Confucian delusions of a Sinocentric world order and the backward mindset of Confucianism. This pan-Asian liberation movement was, of course, also designed to legitimise the Japanese imperialist project and reposition the nation ideologically and culturally (it had already done so militarily) at the centre of a new East Asian pecking order. This caused a great deal of consternation in Japan, however, since the transnational pan-Asianist ideal unavoidably collided with notions of a pure and unique Japanese race, upon which Japanese nationalism had in large part been constructed. This desire to maintain a hierarchy within the common race was reflected in slight modifications to textbook and curriculum content for colonials; for example, a number of persons of humble origin who had risen to prominence and appeared in Japanese history, language and moral education textbooks to model the potential rewards (in terms of social and political advancement) of hard-work and dedication to national causes, were excised from textbooks used in Taiwan over concerns that Taiwanese might seek to rise above their designated stations.⁹

Among colonials, meanwhile, there were also mixed feelings about the Japanese imposition of its brand of modernisation. For Korea, the loss of sovereignty was, of course, an unparalleled humiliation, and although some of the ideas and resources cultivated by Japan’s modernisation project were welcomed as an extension of existing overtures to modernisation made in the final

⁹ Tsurumi, *Japanese Colonial Education in Taiwan*, 216.

years before annexation (such as schools teaching a modern curriculum in the vernacular), the overall climate was one of widespread resistance. For many years after Korea's annexation, the modern Japanese schools competed with private academies still teaching a predominantly Confucian curriculum. Ultimately, however, the pull of Japanese secondary and tertiary education that offered a route to professional and financial success combined with the 'Cultural Policy's' moderate relaxation of earlier restrictions imposed under the 'Military Policy' on teaching Korean history and geography to co-opt many Koreans into the colonial education system.¹⁰

Resistance to Japanese education in Taiwan was far less strident. Although the majority of the population consisted of migrants from the mainland provinces of Fujian and Guangdong, Taiwan was barely part of China, having been added to the list of Chinese territories only in 1683, and since then viewed by the metropolitan power in Beijing largely as a barbarian outpost, home to primitive Austronesian aboriginals, pirates and other lowlifes. Only when other foreign powers came calling, did Beijing suddenly assert its authority over Taiwan, bringing it into the national fold as a full province in 1886. Less than ten years later, it was ceded to Japan. Under Japanese rule, education provision dramatically expanded. Initially, it was limited to elementary education with a much diluted version of Japanese curricula being taught in local vernaculars (mainly Hoklo, the language of the Hokkien/Fujian immigrants). The Taiwanese hunger for education grew rapidly and in part to placate the locals, and in part because the growing literacy of the population was aiding Japanese industrialisation, greater concessions were made to Taiwanese demands, with locals first permitted to study in Japanese schools, then to travel to Japan for tertiary education and eventually granted their own university, Taihoku Imperial University, re-

¹⁰ Lee, *The Politics of Korean Nationalism*, 1963.

named National Taiwan University in 1945.¹¹ As Tsurumi has put it, opposition to Japanese colonial policies in Taiwan was largely because locals wanted ‘a bigger slice of the colonial pie, rather than the destruction of the pie itself’. While the majority of those seeking a bigger slice of the proverbial pie were from the more prosperous classes, cries for equal access to the new learning were also made from below. Indeed, it was demand from below as much as the wartime drive from above to implement the *kominka* policy of making colonial subjects into imperial citizens that eventually pushed Japan to legislate compulsory education in Taiwan.

The birth of (trans)nationalist education in China

China’s mass education system was officially inaugurated with the last-ditch reforms of the Qing dynasty from 1901-1910. As already noted, the existing education system in China was systematically oriented to serving the state. It was not much of a stretch, therefore, to re-imagine an education system that would mould new citizens and mobilise them in defence of the realm. It was, however, revolutionary to re-imagine a curriculum that did not have Confucian ideology at its core. The earliest modern curricula, which were modelled on Japan’s, thus devoted almost 50% of the curriculum to directly or indirectly Confucian subjects: the Classics, Chinese and history. As students progressed through the education system, the proportion of new subjects increased, clearly indicating that Western techniques should only be taught to young minds once a sound Confucian foundation had been established. It was not long, however, before science and technology began to feature more prominently in the curriculum, especially after the 1911 Revolution overthrew the Qing dynasty and established a republic. Confucianism had been the ideology of the Chinese empire, and the new nation-state, it was thought, needed a new

¹¹ The establishment of the university was also, as Chang has shown, part of the Japanese institutionalisation of research on Taiwan that sought to reinforce the claims of the centre over the periphery (‘Re-imagining Community from Different Shores’).

education system to create new citizens. Concepts such as ‘loyalty to the ruler’ (*zhong jun*) and ‘respecting Confucius’ (*zun kong*), and the ‘backward’ ethics of the patriarchal social hierarchy were thus to be replaced by the ‘bourgeois morality of *liberté, égalité, fraternité*,’¹² more suitable for a republic with democratic aspirations. In a wholesale rejection of 1,300 years of Confucian education, the Classics were removed from the curriculum altogether and science declared the new ‘omnipotent’ (*wanneng*) universal, and Classical Chinese replaced by the vernacular.¹³ Unlike Japan, however, the new state was weak and quickly fell into an undeclared civil war. Implementing the new educational ideology and producing the new national citizens, therefore, was next to impossible.

That is not to say, however, that this was an infertile period for pedagogical thinking and reform. The first modern Chinese textbooks had been translated or adapted from their Japanese predecessors and until the early 1920s served as the blueprint for the style and structural organisation of the syllabus. Japan had not only exported its adapted model of European education to China, but also served as a destination for Chinese seeking to learn about the West and modernisation, the majority of whom either did not have the funds, the language skills or the willingness to travel to the US or Europe. Thus, numerous concepts and ideas about education and citizenship adopted in China, as elsewhere in East Asia, were first filtered by Japan’s own concerns to retain its ‘Eastern essence’ while racing towards a foreign-designed modernity; indeed, most of the words associated with new concepts were Japanese interpretations of foreign terms rendered in kanji and transmitted unaltered to China. The national-transnational debates on

¹² Xiong, *Zhongguo jinxindai jiaoxue gaige shi*, p79.

¹³ The Classics were temporarily restored by Yuan Shikai in his bid for the monarchy (‘Guomin xuexiao ling’, ‘Gaodeng xiaoxuexiao ling’ [July 1915], ‘Guomin xuexiao shixing xize’, ‘Gaodeng xiaoxuexiao ling shixing xize’ [January 1916], COCP, pp77-101). These documents were revised in October 1916, after his death, and the Classics were permanently removed.

pedagogy and educational content in Japan were also mirrored in China. As with textbooks, for many years most articles on educational thought and pedagogical praxis were translations of Japanese writings, and Chinese educators and academics were thus well acquainted with the different models of citizenship being contested in Japan and elsewhere. During this time, increasing numbers of Chinese also began to travel to Columbia University's Teachers' College in the USA and returned with Deweyan ideas, and later with Dewey himself, who toured China, lecturing on, among other things, education and its relationship to social and political life.

By the early 1920s, the US educational model had supplanted the Japanese model; in part, because those appointed to office (however nominal the positions may have been given the political chaos of the times) were mostly returned Columbia Teachers' College graduates, but also because Japan's imperialist exigencies were heightening resistance to things Japanese. The 1922 Decree on education reform affirmed the transition with a restructuring of the schooling system and the issuing of individual curricula for all subjects. The new curricula reflected the ideological ascendancy of scientific universalism and democratic citizenship, which, while clearly aimed at strengthening a sense of national belonging and participation and pursuing modernisation, also contained a powerful element of global citizenship. History, for example, was to avoid traditional moralising and describe how 'human lives have changed over time, so as to nurture students' ability to adapt to their environment and subdue nature.' It was also to 'awaken their sympathy with all humanity in order to cultivate a spirit of fraternalism and mutual assistance,' and to help them 'discover the origins of things so they may understand the true nature of present issues.' To elucidate the 'common development of human society throughout the world,' and 'eradicate the narrow conception of dynasties as the basic historical unit,'

Chinese and non-Chinese history were merged, with Chinese history simply to be 'described in added detail' within the 'framework of world history.'¹⁴

It should be noted at this point that these views not only reflected the concerns of liberal thinkers in the USA and Europe, but also those of the growing socialist movement which was taking hold in China, many members of which taught in China's new universities, and were intimately involved in the promotion of mass education and the use of the vernacular language, as well as writing powerful iconoclastic critiques of Chinese tradition and spear-heading the anti-imperialist movement. Their interest in socialism was whetted in the early twentieth century when historians sought linear, scientific explanations of the past, China's present predicament and guides to building the future. They found inspiration in the international socialist movement, which had enjoyed much momentum before the Depression but which did not - despite the global crisis that overwhelmed capitalist democracies - lead to successful socialist revolutions in Europe, and was largely discredited in Western Europe by the early 1930s and subsequently crushed by fascist regimes. This allowed Comintern to become completely dominated by the USSR as the only exemplar of living 'Marxism' (Mongolia did not really count, and was anyway still technically subject to Chinese suzerainty according to a 1924 Sino-Soviet treaty), now modified to Marxism-Leninism in keeping with the theoretically rather unorthodox nature of the Bolshevik revolution in which the stage of capitalism in the process of historical materialist evolution had been largely bypassed. The apparent success of the revolution, however, appealed in much of agrarian Asia, where the perceived opportunity to effect a rapid transformation that would bring the modernity desired to resist imperialist encroachment and throw off the yoke of

¹⁴ 'Chuji zhongxue lishi kecheng gangyao' [1923], COH, p14.

foreign imperialism/colonialism offered a new solution for their frustrating experiences with modernisation.

In practice, however, the internationalist views and transnational ideologies of both the liberal and socialist modernisers were barely implemented in education. Although following promulgation of the 1922 curriculum, textbook production began to develop, with commercial publishers eyeing the potentially lucrative market,¹⁵ and the new textbooks produced by China's professional historians transmitted the new learning, many teachers were classically trained, had little knowledge of non-Chinese history and found it difficult to move towards the less text-centred, more interactive learning style advocated in the curriculum guidelines.¹⁶ The new curriculum, furthermore, was barely implemented beyond wealthy urban centres, primarily because local education bureaux did not usually have the funds or the political will to implement the costly new programme (especially at secondary level). It was also, however, because many people, particularly in rural areas, were still hostile to the new learning, which, as in the past, represented attempts by educated elites to 'transform the (common) people and change their (crude) customs' (*huamin yisu*). Although individual educators outside the parameters of formal education and some local warlords tried to improve literacy and/or develop genuinely mass education,¹⁷ most people remained illiterate, and many rural schools simply evaded the new regulations and continued to teach the Confucian canon from ancient character primers.

¹⁵ As Reed has shown this resulted in an outbreak of 'textbook wars' between the major publishers, Zhonghua and Shanghai Commercial Press and World Books (Reed, *Gutenberg in Shanghai*).

¹⁶ At least two textbooks were required as the 'starting point of study,' on which other methods such as lectures and discussion could build ('Gaoji zhongxue gongong bixiu de wenhua shixue gangyao' [1923], COH, p17).

¹⁷ Most notable among these educators are probably Tao Xingzhi, James Yen and Liang Shuming. Liang is particularly interesting, for he believed China's problem was not a lack of modernity and 'Western' knowledge and institutions, but was caused by their corrosive effect on traditional values. (Alitto, *The Last Confucian*).

This began to change under the Nationalist government which took control in 1927 and instituted an education system (with varying degrees of success) which reversed the liberalism of the 1922 curriculum and reoriented Chinese education firmly towards the nationalist track, enforcing wherever possible Party Principles classes and cadet drills, the curricula for which were not issued by the MOE but by the Party Central Office.¹⁸ As Harrison has shown, despite the continued difficulties of the state in ensuring implementation of its education policies, the practices of singing the national anthem, raising the flag and adopting the insignia of the nation and Party (which drew on the Japanese, and later the Nazi Germany models) went a long way to creating a tangible basis for the nationalist conception of citizenship.¹⁹ The nationalist paradigm was most explicit in history and other humanities subjects, and although as in the 1923 curriculum international ‘sympathy’ and ‘a spirit of fraternal co-operation, justice and tolerance’²⁰ were still to be cultivated, they were now to be moderated to ‘appropriate’ levels to prevent students from developing ‘excessively lofty ideals’ which might lead them to ‘neglect the necessity of revitalising and protecting the Chinese *minzu*.’ For the first time, an anti-imperialist victim narrative also began to emerge, with world history to teach students that

Capitalist imperialism in recent history has led to the oppression of workers and weak *minzu*.

Since the First World War, these weak *minzu* have risen up to oppose imperialism and demand independence ... China is an important member of this group. Thus when teaching foreign history in China, special attention must be paid to the development of imperialism and independence movements so as to inspire citizens with the courage and diligence to cast off the bonds of imperialism and achieve liberation.²¹

¹⁸ ‘Chuji zhongxue zanxing kecheng biao zhun shuoming’ [1929], COCP, p119.

¹⁹ Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen*.

²⁰ ‘Gaoji zhongxue putongke waiguoshi zanxing kecheng biao zhun’ [1929], COH, p37.

²¹ Ibid.

The example of the imperialist powers, however, was also to motivate the Chinese *minzu* to strive for similar greatness, although China would not, of course, ‘imitate imperialist policies..... The post-war world is, nonetheless, one in which might prevails, and thus [China] must not be seduced by ideals of Universal Harmony (*datong shijie*)’.²²

Conclusion

The widespread retreat from internationalism and the intensification of nationalist ideologies, especially in education, during the 1930s did not, of course, prevent the continued transmission of ideas across East Asia or with other parts of the world, nor did the increasingly authoritarian regimes in the region successfully stifle transnational ideals even while they abandoned their own professions to the pursuit of them. As shown by the ongoing tensions in education since World War II, between efforts to deconstruct nationalist mythologies and build a sense of global citizenship and community so that future generations might avoid the horrors of world war (hot or cold), on the one hand, and countervailing tendencies that highlight the continued resilience of the nationalist paradigm on the other, what kind of future we should build is still deeply contested. Curricula, textbooks and pedagogy, are thus likely to remain one of the principal battlegrounds on which national and transnational ideologies will be fought.

²² Ibid.