

**History, Politics, and Security in Northeast Asia:
Implications for Peace and Conflict**

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Opening Remarks by Kim Hosup

Ladies and Gentlemen, I am Hosup Kim, president of the Northeast Asian History Foundation. On behalf of the foundation, I am delighted to be able to attend today's seminar on "History and Security in Northeast Asia." I believe that the seminar will be an occasion for experts to discuss matters involving history and security in Northeast Asia and search for policy alternatives to such issues.

I would like to take this opportunity to talk about the background to establishing the Northeast Asian History Foundation in September 2006, and the issues the Foundation has been trying to resolve.

September 21, 2016 marks the 10th anniversary for the foundation. In September 2006 the Chinese government actively promoted the Northeast Project lasting for five years from 2002 to 2007. The project centered on an argument that the history of nations within the current borders of China had all belonged to Chinese history. This study assertion that the history of Koguryo, and related historical sites and relics in the region of Manchuria were part of the history of one local government of China. Koreans would not accept this historical interpretation as we believe Koguryo is an integral part of the history of Korean nation and have been educating our younger generation with this historical identity.

The Foundation was established mainly for responding to the domestic need to educate and research the historical evidence of Koguryo as Korean history. It also works to deny the interpretation that Koguryo in part of the past of Chinese local government. Another task of the Foundation is academic research on Dokdo, well-known as a key element of historical conflicts between Korea and Japan, and on history textbooks of contemporary Japan in regard to militarism. In other words, the essential assignment of the Foundation is to research and study current historical issues inseparable from diplomatic conflict.

Conflicts over history have become prevailing issues between countries in Northeast Asia including Korea, China, and Japan. In fact, international conflicts due to differing perceptions and interpretations of history have always been present around the world. And such historical conflicts sometimes turn into diplomatic or domestic political issues.

In East Asia, historical conflicts have long gone beyond the realm of academia and into diplomacy. Coupled with matters of territory and security, they have emerged as critical factors that either threaten regional order or hinder the formation of regionalism. There are several explanations for these developments.

One aspect would be the source of historical conflicts in East Asia. Such conflicts seem to have been caused by diverging views about Japan's past. From the viewpoint of countries like Korea and China, which fell victim to Japan's militarism, Japan has not yet sufficiently apologized for or cleared up after the inhumane crimes it committed against East Asian countries and their people during World War II. The same can be said for the territorial disputes over Dokdo. The Korean often look at the Japanese claim over Dokdo as continuation and

manifestation of history that modern Japan established in the process of its imperialist expansion. Koreans also look at China's attempt through its Northeast Project to incorporate the history of the ancient Korean kingdom of Koguryo into its own history as the same expansionistic understanding of history.

Despite different historical experiences, Korea, China, and Japan share a very similar paradigm in which to systemize their own history by placing their nation at the center of their history and focusing on the nation's origin, formation, and development. Such a historiography usually portrays the invasion of a neighboring nation or country as progress or advancement whereas the process of founding a nation-state in modern times tends to be described as honorable resistance against foreign power. This implies that historical conflicts in East Asia need to be understood as outcomes of a modern transition that East Asian countries, obsessed with "dreams of becoming powerful," that occurred as they built nation-states. Therefore, resolutions to those historical conflicts need to begin with a comprehensive examination of such understandings.

Another aspect has to do with the political use of history in domestic politics. As is well known, the peace and order of a region can be threatened by promotion of popular nationalism, which is usually fueled by the nationalist historiography prevalent in the three countries. China and Japan have already deviated from their course to the point of projecting their future regional strategies into an arrangement of their national history. An example would be the historical perception behind China's Northeast Project, not to mention Japan's *Uyoku* interpretation of militaristic history. In particular, the rationale that Northeast Asia has traditionally belonged to China is widely interpreted in Korea not only as an excuse for taking the Chinese nation's expansion for granted within the region, but also as a response to the rapidly changing current situation in the region including the Korean Peninsula. Besides projects on the histories of Mongolia or the Qing dynasty, which extend beyond China's current borders, can be considered to be examples in which China tries to establish its future regional policies based on a new paradigm of history. These are identified by South Korean scholars as a form of the Chinese strategy based on territorial expansionism.

Koreans are especially concerned about the political and diplomatic implications of issues involving history. That may be due to the geopolitical circumstances where Korea has been situated. With the rise of China, East Asia now witnesses a power transition at the regional level. Due to its geopolitical location, Korea is concerned about being sandwiched by the conflict between China's strategy of expansion and Japan's self-centered regional strategy. Korea is now facing the dual challenge of stopping the state of deterioration, which has led the different historical understandings of the three countries immediately into diplomatic conflict, while seeking a formula for regional order that ensures peace and prosperity in East Asia. I believe that overcoming the challenge will be a common goal of specialists on Northeast Asia, whatever their nationality.

The Northeast Asia History Foundation has strived to create an atmosphere of mutual respect and tolerance, predicated on a historical reflection of 'the modern' plagued with imperialist aggression and nationalist resistance. This effort will contribute to pave the way toward regional peace in East Asia in a true sense.

I expect that today's conference will touch on a variety of current issues in this area, to be discussed by eminent Northeast Asia specialists, and serve the objective of the Foundation with constructive outcomes.

Why and how history matters

Keynote speech by Han Sung-Joo

First, there is the issue of how we handle history today

We ask the Japanese to have regret (反省 *banseong*) on their past. The fact is that there is no adequate translation of that word, *banseong*, – in English dictionary translation will tell us it means self-reflecting, self-examination, or introspection. But to Koreans or Chinese, that is too weak and insufficient. They would like it to mean more like atonement or expiation. But it has far too much religious connotation and voluntary acceptance of guilt which the descendants of perpetrators do not feel. In any case, the victims and their descendants want the perpetrators and their descendants to admit their guilt and recompense for it.

There is the second issue of how history (the past) affects the present and the future. When history is not handled well, there will continue to exist the basis and seeds of conflict and antagonism, mutual distrust and even hatred. The German and Polish handling of territorial issues related to Silesia and east of the Oder-Niesse Line is a case in point. In 1990, the newly reunified Germany and the Republic of Poland signed a treaty accepting the post-World War II arrangement by which the Soviets compensated the Poles for the east Polish territories that it annexed by establishing the Polish western borders on the Oder-Neisse Line. We are not 100 percent certain that this issue will not be reopened, but for the moment we can be at least 99 percent sure that the issue is pretty much settled.

Japan-Korea relations present a contrast in how they have handled history. They have not settled historical issues to the satisfaction of both sides and continue to have disputes on such issues as textbooks, Yasukuni Shrine, comfort women, and Dokto-Takeshima. The interesting thing about Yasukuni Shrine is that Koreans and Chinese object more vociferously than the Americans to Japanese prime ministers visiting the Shrine because there are 14 A-Class war criminals enshrined in it. The war in which they are supposed to have committed crimes is the Second World War, which the Japanese call the Great East Asian War, and where Japan's main enemy was the United States.

Regarding the territorial issues, Japan tends to lump together the Dokto, Senkaku/Diaoyutao, and Northern Territory issues and treat them as if they are disputes of the same nature. In fact, they are quite different nature from one another. The Northern Territory is a case where the Soviet Union took over what were clearly Japanese islands after World War II. The Dokto/Takeshima case is quite different. Japan incorporated it as its territory when Japan was usurping Korea's sovereign rights. If anything, it is more similar to the Senkaku/Diaoyutao case, the difference being that Japan is the current possessor and is trying to ward off challenges by China. Dokto is currently possessed by South Korea, a status quo that Japan is challenging, claiming that Korea is unlawfully occupying what is rightfully Japan's territory.

Next, let me briefly touch upon how each of the Northeast Asian countries is handling the issue of what to do with the past or history. In the case of Japan, the continuation and preservation of the Emperor system makes it difficult for the Japanese to make full and

unconditional apology and make amends for past deeds: By contrast, it is much easier for Germany to apologize for the deeds of the Nazi regime which became extinct.

Regarding recent history, China wishes to make up for the humiliation and losses it suffered before the war. Regarding the more ancient history, it wishes to reenact and restore the stature and territory of its old “empire” and regain respect and recognition. In East Asia, it wants to establish a G-2 by bringing about what it calls “big-power relationship” with the U.S. This is reflective of its “China-centeredness (中華 xionghua) of the past.

Korea, having been the victim of aggrandizement by its more powerful neighbors, has what I would call “Victim’s complex.” Koreans are suspicious of outsiders and seek their remorse, apology, compensation, and atonement.

For the United States it is probably difficult to understand Koreans’ attitude toward outsiders, friends, and adversaries alike, particularly of the fact that Koreans don’t seem to let go of grievances related to the past, demanding restitution for too long and perhaps too insistently.

How does the past affect the present? Regarding the more recent past of what happened in the first half of the 20th century, China, having suffered indignity and humiliation, tends to be assertive and self-righteous.

Japan is understandably defensive, sometimes reacts with antagonism (expressed in *Kenkan* “Korea-hating”); tends to be inward-looking and seeks big-brother the US, which Japan hopes will side with it in its disputes with victimized neighbors in return for its support of US security interest and effort in the region.

Korea shows suspicion, vilification, paranoia and a “Fluctuation between, and mixture of, flunkeyism and xenophobia.” As a result, Koreans tend to have difficulty accepting compromise and an equal relationship between nations.

The US after World War II moved from being pro-China to pro-Japan. In terms of security interests and personal relationships, from MacArthur (pro-Consul of Japan) to Dean Rusk to George Bush and Barack Obama, Americans demonstrated sympathy for Japan in its handling of history and its troubled relationship with its neighbors. Clearly there were strategic and geo-political reasons. Japan has been a loyal ally. Is there some sense of guilt regarding Hiroshima/Nagasaki? Obama’s visit to Hiroshima, although quite recent, seems to be reflective of such guilty feelings.

First, there was the Soviet Union to contend with, and now there is China vis-à-vis which Japan has become even more invaluable. As for South Korea, the North Korean threat (nuclear weapons, missiles, etc.) and extensive, if not lopsided, economic relations with China make it difficult for it to tilt 100 percent toward the United States as Japan does. This sometimes places Korea in a difficult position as shown in making decisions on the deployment of the THAAD system and on other disputes between the United States and China such as the South China Sea.

Regarding politics and history, I would like to posit three ways in which one is related to the other.

First, there is the political use of history. Politicians whip up nationalism or do things to emphasize nationalism to garner and increase popular support. (e.g., Koizumi, Abe, visiting Yasukuni.) Second, there is history as constraint. In this case, a Korean president finds it difficult to seek a compromise solution with Japan (on the Comfort woman issue, for example) or has to do it (as did President Park Chung Hee when pushing Korea-Japan normalization) with considerable political cost and risk.

Third, there is politics as constraint. The fact that President Park Geun-hye's father was an officer in the Japanese Army and later signed the normalization agreement makes it difficult for her to act more magnanimously toward Japan. The fact that Abe's maternal grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, was an accomplice of the Second World War, makes it more difficult for him to freely apologize to Korea and China.

Uneasy triangle: China, Japan, and Korea

Now I would like to talk about the triangular relationship in Northeast Asia among China, Japan, and Korea, with a particular focus on Korea's tightrope-walking relationships with the two bigger powers, China and Japan. In the second decade of the 21st century, the three countries, close both in geography and cultural legacy, are moving in opposite directions: toward cooperation and integration on the one hand, but toward conflict and a disintegration of cooperative links on the other. The move toward integration is aided by increasing economic interdependence, the accompanying imperative to cooperate, and the expansion of social networks and person-to-person exchanges among the three countries.

Unfortunately, the push to unravel regional ties is abetted by even stronger forces: nationalistic sentiment, historical baggage, opportunistic and politically driven policies, and contending territorial claims.

The changing power configuration among the three countries requires greater cooperation among the three countries and, at the same time, fosters greater suspicion and a perceived need to counter and check the others. China is in the process of surpassing Japan in national power and international standing, and Korea is trying to move from a distant third in the pecking order to a position closer to that of a coequal. China's support for and shielding of North Korea, a country that threatens the rest of the region with nuclear weapons, long-range missiles, provocative behavior, and socioeconomic insolvency, leads to concern and frustration in South Korea and Japan.

China once considered Japan's and South Korea's alliances with the United States to be a necessary evil to maintain regional stability and to prevent Japan's rearmament. Now, however, China regards the US alliance system as mainly aimed at containing and encircling it, not at contributing to regional integration in Northeast Asia. China disparages US alliances as a legacy of the Cold War. Therefore, in the absence of a viable security structure in this region, the alliances and alignments have strained relationships among Northeast Asian countries in recent years as much as they have stabilized them.

Nationalism and territorial claims

The divergent perspectives and interests of the three Northeast Asian countries make cooperation difficult. Sixty-seven years after the end of World War II, why are we suddenly witnessing an outburst of nationalistic sentiment piled on top of a spate of territorial claims and disputes? I can offer a few explanations.

First, China's drive for economic development forced its leaders to focus first on reform, internal cohesion, and management of an economy that was growing explosively. Assertion of historical territorial claims took a back seat to those other tasks. China now feels ready to retrieve what it considers territories it should own but which were lost during the period of weakness and underdevelopment. But as it focuses belatedly on those claims, China sees Japan contesting them and the United States checking and encircling it with regional alliances and alignments. Despite Tokyo's explanation that the nationalization of Senkaku/Diaoyutao was intended to pre-empt a move by ultranationalists in Japan to purchase the islands, China regards the move as a direct and unambiguous challenge to its claims.

Another element in Chinese behavior on this issue is its penchant to "teach a lesson" to its adversaries now and potential adversaries in the future. Just as it went to war against India (in 1962) and Vietnam (in 1979), to teach them a lesson about the costs of offending China, it now wishes to send a signal to Japan and others with which it has territorial disputes. It will not tread softly in asserting its territorial claims. Chalmers Johnson, an American political scientist, argued in his 1962 book *Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power* that Mao Zedong's Communist movement succeeded because of the strength of peasant nationalism in China. The current Chinese leadership (the fifth generation since 1949) seems to be carrying on the tradition of legitimizing its rule on the basis of nationalist credentials. Nationalism continues to be a potent force in Chinese politics, as shown by the fact that demonstrators in the recent Senkaku/Diaoyutao dispute were seen carrying Chairman Mao's portrait.

China also seems to see a hidden US hand in the vigorous territorial claims of Japan (and for that matter those of Vietnam and the Philippines in the South and East China seas). It sees US support to those nations and the "pivot (or rebalance) to Asia" as encouragement to defy China. China's leadership, now in the midst of a transition, has the political motivation to take a strong stand on territorial issues. The United States, for its part, appears to be confirming China's fears and suspicions by actions such as the dispatch of aircraft carriers to the South China Sea and the East China Sea.

Second, sentiment is rising in Japan that the deal it made after World War II as a defeated power, including the Peace Constitution and the renunciation of military forces, is an anomaly that should be corrected. Japan, this argument goes, must again become a "normal state" with the right to a military and to the exercise of collective self-defense. The slowdown of the Japanese economy for more than two decades has caused the Japanese people to develop a sense of relative decline vis-à-vis the other Northeast Asian countries, a sense that seemed to have been given further impetus as a result of the great tsunami-related disasters of March 2011. Such sentiments can easily stimulate a more nationalistic and assertive posture.

Japan's feeling that its neighbors are attempting to take advantage of its relative decline and are beginning to look down on Japan is seen not only among ultranationalists but also among the larger population, especially younger people. They question why those generations of Japanese who had nothing to do with pre-war Japan's imperialistic and militaristic behavior should feel responsible for things that happened more than 70 years ago. They claim that Japan has issued numerous apologies and sufficient financial compensation for its past misdeeds. They ask: How much longer should apologies and financial compensation continue? Why should Japan continue to maintain a constitution that hinders, if not prohibits, it from maintaining regular defense forces and exercising normal collective self-defense? Why should Japan feel guilty about possessing and wanting to possess territories that it considers rightfully its own? It is, however, to the credit of the maturity and openness of Japan that even in Japan, dissenting voices on the territorial issues are expressed and heard.

Even as Japan pushes back against the territorial challenges that China and Russia present, its government recognizes that there are limits to what it can do. Russia is still a military superpower and China is becoming an economic superpower. Russia has resumed its extensive sea and air military exercises around the Japanese archipelago, an act that Japan tends to downplay as being aimed primarily at China. Pressed at home by nationalistic sentiment in the general public and among some politicians, Japan's leaders find it politically useful to hammer on what it claims is a territorial dispute with Korea, a country that is neither militarily nor economically as formidable as China or Russia.

Third, Japan's immediate neighbors, which were victims of Japanese imperialism and militarism, believe that despite expressions of regret and apology, expressions they see as superficial and lacking in sincerity, Japan has not fully accounted for its misdeeds and the damage it caused. Koreans are particularly upset by Japan's refusal to acknowledge officially its wartime sex slavery and to apologize to and compensate the victims, who are euphemistically called "comfort women." The South Korean Constitutional Court ruled in 2010 that the South Korean government was negligent in implementing the relevant provisions of the constitution to protect the rights of its citizens. The court criticized the administration for not pressing the Japanese government more vigorously for apologies and compensation. In the Korean view, the territorial dispute over the island of Dokdo (which Japan calls Takeshima) is not so much an issue of territorial claims as it is a problem of historical records, because the island had been incorporated into Shimane-ken in 1905 in the course of Japan's colonization of Korea and as a result of Japan's imperialistic designs. The 2015 agreement between Japan and Korea on the comfort women issue has helped to go over one hurdle, but the issue continues to play havoc on more cordial relations between the two countries.

Fourth, the disposition of territories occupied by Japan before World War II remained ambiguous after the end of the war. For strategic and geopolitical reasons, the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 that officially concluded the war failed to settle territorial issues between China and Japan and between Korea and Japan that plague regional relations today. Thus, both the historical and territorial issues that were swept under the rug in the interest of US-Japan cooperation against the Soviet threat and expansionism in the post-World War II years, never went away, giving reasons and bases for today's claims and counter-claims.

The problem is that these trends toward nationalism and conflict often reinforce one another and appear simultaneously. Furthermore, no leadership is found in Northeast Asia, least of all in Japan, that can and will transcend the current territorial and nationalistic disputes and guide the region to a more constructive and future-oriented relationships.

Needless to say, in each of the three countries, there are many different views about regional relations. Some are nationalistic and some are chauvinistic, but I think the larger number of people share more internationalist, moderate, and pragmatic views that can be harnessed in the interest of regional cooperation. So, one should not say that the outlook is grim. As the old American pop song goes, we have to accentuate the positive and eliminate the negative.

It is most important that the three countries take care that emotional and thorny territorial and nationalistic issues do not spill over to trade, investment, finance, and other areas where pragmatism should rule. Leaders in all three countries must act with enlightened self-interest to keep tempers cool.

Commenting on the Sino-Japan territorial feud, Yan Lianke, a Chinese writer, said in a column for the *International Herald Tribune* that “Cultural bonds between China and Japan must be used to calm the outbursts that inflame territorial disputes.” Cultural bonds, commercial incentives, security imperatives, a sense of shared regional destiny, and sheer reason – all these factors can hamper or promote regional peace and cooperation. We have to make them work for regional peace and cooperation rather than for conflict and disunity.

History and Security Issues in Northeast Asia

Chaesung Chun(Seoul National University)

I. History makes Northeast Asian International Relations different

Northeast Asian international system is special in several aspects. First, global great powers reside in the region, making Northeast Asian international system porous to global system. Changes in distribution of power at the global level such as the end of the Cold War directly affect the security landscape of Northeast Asia.

Second, hegemonic rivalry defines the regional system increasingly from the 21st century. The rise of China and China's effort to compete with the United States at the levels of hard and soft power elicit the logic of power transition to this region.

Third, the outcomes of globalization or more arguably post-modern or post-Westphalian transition come to wield influence on regional governance. As Dani Rodrik indicates, there is a globalization paradox, meaning the "unholy trinity" or incompatibility among globalization, state sovereignty, and democracy,¹ various domestic problems originating from globalization complicate governments' level to control the effects of globalization. It is open to question how the impact of globalization will change domestic politics of Northeast Asian countries, and security relations among them. Recent trends of American retrenchment and rising tides of nationalism in Northeast Asian countries seem to gain momentum from this logic.

Fourth, and most importantly for this project, international history differentiates this region from others. China was the first country in Northeast Asia which concluded modern treaty relations with Western powers after the Opium War in 1840. Japan followed China by opening its ports to the United States, and then forced Korea to undergo the same path. It took almost three hundred years for modern international system to take roots in Europe. The advent of territorial, sovereign state and the establishment of the Westphalian system were rendered through a long and violent path. The construction of the modern states system or the organizing principle of "anarchy" entailed both material and ideational changes, resulting in mutual recognition of sovereignty among states. By contrast, non-western region which preserved their own regional system was forced to import the Western logic and had hard times to internalize the principle. Northeast Asia was not an exception and this article will delve into the impact of history on current security relations among Northeast Asian countries.

II. Incomplete sovereignty and embedded imperialism in Northeast Asia

¹ "we cannot simultaneously pursue democracy, national determination and economic globalisation. If we want to push globalisation further, we have to give up either the nation state or democratic politics"

1. Requirements for modern states system

The basic requirements for sovereign states system is that 1) legal sovereignty should be based upon domestic consensus on the territorial border, the boundary of nation shared by the members of the state; 2) individual sovereignty should be recognized by other states and their territorial integrity, domestic independence should be protected. Imbalances between the nature of legal sovereignty of a states and the conception of the components of sovereignty among peoples may be the source of the conflict. For example, the disagreement on the boundaries of territory among states is the source of conflict among states. Divided nations claiming exclusive sovereign rights will generate the struggle for the rightful status as the representative of the nation. The debate on the legal sovereignty relates to the boundary of the nation, or people when the traditional concept of nation is not fully realized in the form of modern state.

When the foundation of states sovereignty is weak, there is the problem of the revival of imperialism. Looking back upon the history of the formation modern European states system, it is concurrent with the process of giving up the desire to build up empires. Since the end of the medieval times, main European actors tried to expand their own empires, only to give up permanently the possibility to maintain the empire. Mutual renunciation of imperial status resulted in mutual recognition of sovereign status of all states, and this should be permanent. When fears of embedded imperialism exist, states' sovereignty will be open to serious challenge. In most non-Western regions, different forms of empire governed the region, and equal states' sovereignty was not the rule. With relative short period of time, non-Western units tried to transform themselves into sovereign units, but how deeply the sovereignty principles took roots differs according to regions. The existence of strong empires in the traditional system, and relatively unequal distribution of power may weaken the foundation of modern states system.

2. Incomplete modern transition of Northeast Asian countries

Against this theoretical backdrop, one significant factor is that countries like Korea, China, and Japan have not completed modern transition, in the sense that three countries could not accomplish their long-cherished goals of realizing normal, modern states with their traditional concept of people, nation, territory and sovereign rights. Both China and Korea are divided, failing to establish a unified modern state based on the traditional concept of one nation. Japan also failed to normalize itself having a constitutional restraint in wielding sovereign rights.²

² As three countries still have the accomplishment of complete modern states as national goals such as reunification or normalization preserving traditionally cherished concept of territory and nation, sources of conflict are fundamentally deep. It is true that as of now these countries are recognized as complete modern states by international society, yet these countries still want to complete the modern transition by integrating traditionally conceived nation, territory, and sovereign rights. As these countries behave as normal modern states, this poses theoretical challenge how to deal with this composite situation in terms of organizing principle in international relations and the conception of units. For the concept of incomplete sovereignty, see Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), David Lake, *Hierarchy in*

The evolution of the East Asian regional order can be divided into four periods: 1) the traditional order before 1840, when the Opium War occurred; 2) a transitional era from 1840-1951, ending with the San Francisco Peace Treaty; 3) the Cold War era from 1951 to 1991, when the former Soviet Union collapsed; and 4) the contemporary era from 1991 to the present. What distinguishes the modern state system from the traditional order is state sovereignty. State sovereignty, which originated in Europe, is composed of exclusive territoriality and clear demarcation of citizenship. East Asian traditional order can be defined by imperial sovereignty reaching out to the whole region, and blurring any concept of territoriality and citizenship. Dynasties occupying the Chinese center claimed ideational sovereignty over the whole region, while local polities observed the sino-centric order when the center displayed its material power and cultural superiority.³

At the end of the first period, the constitutive principle of the modern state system, which is based upon state sovereignty, was imported from the West. But the 19th century Western states system presupposed the rightful existence of empires. Japan, the most successfully transformed modern state, soon colonized Korea and invaded China. The modern transition, at this moment, did not result in mutual recognition of multiple sovereign units. The second Sino-Japanese war (July 7, 1937 – September 9, 1945) leading to the Pacific War contributed to the strengthening of imperialism, and the modern state system could not be established.

The postwar arrangement to conclude a century-long transformation of the East Asian traditional order to a modern order was at hand when representatives from 48 countries met at the San Francisco Peace Conference in September 1951. They were supposed to define who are the recognized players and what are the basic rules and organizing principles, of which the most fundamental function was to discourage any attempt to build an empire. Unfortunately, the new system failed to achieve the aims of the post-imperial/colonial, postwar arrangement. It was not regional; neither the two Koreas nor the two Chinas both participated, and the USSR did not consent to the outcome. Only the United States and Japan worked out the terms of the negotiations and concluded a bilateral defense treaty.

Deficiencies of the San Francisco system produced the situation under which countries in East Asia begin to play sovereignty games, in the sense that they struggled to achieve full sovereign status, as all players tried to maximize their national interests by exploiting other countries' sovereignty games. Both sides in Korea and China claimed exclusive domestic

International Relations(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), Siba N. Grovogui, *Sovereigns, Quasi-Sovereigns, and Africans: Race and Self-Determination in International Law*(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Robert H. Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

³ David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security*, Vol. 27. No. 4 (Spring 2003); David C. Kang, *East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade and Tribute* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, "Toward a Dynamic Theory of International Politics: Insights from Comparing the Ancient Chinese and Early Modern European Systems," *International Organization*, Vol. 58. No. 1 (Winter 2004); Feng Zhang, "Rethinking the 'Tribute System': Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics," *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, Vol. 2, No. 4 (2009), pp. 545-74; John, K. Fairbank, ed., *The Chinese World Order* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970); Thomas J. Barfield, *The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China* (Cambridge: B. Blackwell, 1989).

sovereignty. Each tried to get external recognition from international society. Japan, as a defeated power with constitutional constraints, also tried to achieve full sovereignty depending on its alliance relationship with the United States.⁴

3. Fears about embedded imperialism and mutual discord

1) Fear of China

As three countries in this process have no experience of mutually recognizing each other as normal, modern state, each still preserves serious doubt that other actors may strive for revisionist policies. Korea and Japan fears of the revival of traditional Chinese hegemonic expansion, whereas Korea and China fear the return of Japanese imperialism in some forms. These fears historically produced, make these states over-balance against each other, and become highly sensitive to each other's interpretation of history. They assume that historical consciousness may reflect each other's future strategic intention, thereby feeling needs to perform soft balancing against each other. These fears have been frequently aggravated by the element of domestic politics, in which some politicians make full use of these matters for the benefit of political calculation.

One example is Japanese conceptions of the rise of China. Frequently Japan remembers the traditional regional order under Sino-centric world view. With the worsening of the relationship between South Korea and Japan, Japanese also uses the history as one of the grounds to argue that South Korea's traditional affinity with China will be revived in projecting the future regional order in the 21st century. This means that the traditional regional order still looms large in the perception of East Asians.

2) US-China Relations

From the early 21st century, intensifying US-China rivalry began to overshadow the foreign policies of all regional powers. Obama pursued a strategy of Asian rebalancing and paid renewed attention to the importance of bilateral alliances. China, as an emerging power, challenged American hegemony in various ways. Unlike other cases of power transition in global history, the power shift in Northeast Asia is mixed with the sovereignty game. China still preserves the idea of a sovereign empire in imagining the ideal sovereignty of the Chinese people and tries to realize the so-called "China Dream." Debates are still going on whether China is a revisionist power or status quo power, whether China is being more assertive or not, or whether

⁴ For a critical review of the concept of sovereignty, see Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999); Stephen D. Krasner, "Sharing Sovereignty: New Institutions for Collapsed and Failing States," *International Security*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall, 2004); Jens Bartelson, *A Genealogy of Sovereignty* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); David Lake, "The New Sovereignty in International Relations," *International Studies Review* Vol. 5, No. 3 (2003), pp. 303–23; David Lake, *Hierarchy in International Relations* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

China will challenge American hegemony. Observers assuming a non-assertive or defensive strategy also take China's plan for establishing its own hegemony seriously. The point is that the power transition between the United States and China is intermingled with Chinese aspirations for full sovereignty. Here, the Chinese conception of full sovereignty reminds the United States and neighboring countries of the expansive nature of China's rise. Amid doubts about Chinese attempts to revive long-cherished sino-centrism, the security dilemma grows worse, and China has a hard time reassuring other powers of its defensive and benign intentions. Then, the question is not whether China is defensive or offensive, but whether China can reconceptualize national sovereignty not in imperialist terms and in a manner that gains recognition from other powers.

3) Fear of Japan

Augmented by this kind of fear, and also furnished by national aim to normalize itself, Japan has been taking steps to creating a stronger military. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, with the tenet of proactive pacifism, approved a new five-year defense plan, and the acquisition of drones and amphibious assault vehicles, and decided to reinterpret constitutional clause for collective self-defense. It comes from a prolonged rivalry with China over islands in the East China Sea, but reflects Japanese perception on the rise of China in general.

Efforts to achieve full sovereignty by both Koreas and Japan also give rise to peculiar phenomena in their bilateral relationship. The problem in the relations between South Korea and Japan is that both countries have never recognized the other as a full, modern sovereign unit. To South Korea, Japan is a safe partner when it remains an abnormal country with constitutional restraints in its military power. To a lesser degree, Japan is fearful of a unified Korea with stronger power, which may long for a great power status. Not sure of the future path of Japan as a normal country, South Korea wants Japan never returning to imperialist revisionism. Even though Prime Minister Abe defines Japanese strategy as "proactive pacifism," it seems that South Koreans are not reassured. One indicator of Japanese peaceful and non-expansive intentions is Japanese perceptions of their own imperialist history. Showing explicitly their regrets about past expansionism would be interpreted as a sign of peaceful intentions for the future. In contrast, a nostalgic attitude toward Japan's imperialist past combined with insincerity of apologies for past colonialization would raise doubts about future Japan. In this sense, the issue of apology between South Korea and Japan is an issue about the future. The worsening relationship between South Korea and Japan is not just a matter of identity politics, but a matter of a sovereignty game, whether each country can recognize the other as a full, modern state and still not feel threatened.

4) South Korea-Japan security relations vis-à-vis China

Why the two countries perceive the rise of China differently is linked to different needs for China related to their respective efforts to achieve full sovereignty. Each is seizing the opportunity of the period of a power shift between the United States and China as a favorable environment to accomplish its own full sovereignty. The critical agendas are reunification for Koreans and normalization for Japanese. The logic of balance of power would likely push both countries toward strategic cooperation to prevent the rise of hegemonic China. Yet, South Korea needs strategic cooperation with China in dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem and, ultimately, for reunification. In contrast, an aggressive China is helpful for conservative Japanese leaders to persuade their own people and international society of the need for military normalization. Here, the sovereignty game betrays the urgent need to balance against the rise of China.

5) Worse security dilemma between divided countries

Security dilemma arises even when two countries do not aspire to expansion or aggression. Under the conditions of incomplete information of the intention of the other, and with the possibility of changing intention of the other, peaceful intentions to coexist with the opponent does not guarantee the peace or the status quo. The factor of indistinguishability of offensive and defensive weapon system complicates the problem.

When a country is divided, and when two units claim full sovereignty to cover the territory and the people of the other, security dilemma tends to get worse. Albeit the peaceful intentions of two units, the prospect of unification will threaten the very existence of another unit. Lacking the vision of gradual, peaceful, and consensual unification, each party unsure of the peaceful intention of the other cannot help but prepare the aggression of the other, and increase the armed preparedness. It is true that there may be the chance for unification based on consensus, but fears and uncertainties aggravate the security dilemma.

Two Koreas, claiming full sovereignty for the whole Korean Peninsula, have tried to achieve unification on their own terms. Even when the process of reconciliation and cooperation took effects, underlying security dilemma persists between two Koreas.

Uses and Misuses of History in Current Conflicts in Northeast Asia

Denny Roy (Senior Fellow, East-West Center)

What we mean by “history”

- Definition, interpretations, distortion.

How history matters in international politics

- Materialistic and Ideational IR theory
- Concrete examples: rising China, Japanese rehabilitation.

Historical disputes at government level vs. societal level

Inherited vs. advocated interpretations:

The problem of “Patriotic education”: good for the country, bad for international relations?

Differing interpretations of history among countries can be dangerous

Did disputes over history cause current conflicts? Or reflect conflict?

1. China-Japan

2. Rise of China

3. Taiwan Strait

4. North Korea-South Korea

5. US strategic interventions in the region

Toward a consensual “correct” history?

Limited success in attempts at historical reconciliation:

1. Early postwar Japan-ROC relations

2. 1965 Japan-ROK normalization treaty

3. Obuchi Keizo – Kim Dae Jung joint statement of 1998

4. Statements of apology / regret by senior Japanese leaders

5. China-Japan Joint History Research Project, 2006—2010.

Exchange between history and security: Abe's strategy

Choi, Woon Do (NAHF)

1. Abe's Strategy on U.S.-Japan Alliance

Abe's called the goal of his national strategy "Departure from the Post-War Regime." What does that mean? If we evaluate it in comparison with previous strategies, it can be interpreted as a 'departure from Yoshida strategy.'

Prime Minister Yoshida maintained reliance on U.S. in security and focused the saved power on economic recovery and prosperity in exchange of the provision of military bases. After 20 years of institutionalization of Yoshida strategy, Nakasone proclaimed "reexamination of post-war politics" to invite changes especially in defense policy. However, he had to resign without much achievement in his goal. In the early 1990s, Ozawa set the guidepost for following cabinets by naming the direction of reform as 'Normal Country'. He suggested defense policy based upon UN-centered approach to global peace. His policy suggestions did not attract the support of people as much as the name did. Nakasone wrote a book on Japan's national strategy in 2000, and called for the effort for these goals: Revision of Constitution, revision of Fundamental Law of Education (FLE), Education of Japan's conservative values, global contribution, collective security, much of which are achieved by Prime Minister Abe.

Abe used to emphasize two policy directions as the major policy goals to achieve "Departure from the Post-War Regime": (1) recovery of U.S.-Japan alliance relationship and revision of constitution (from SDF to Self-Defense Army), and (2) educational regeneration based upon new FLE.

(1) U.S. Demand and Alliance

Under the National Security Strategy (NSS) which is supposed to mark the basic direction of Japan's defense policy reform at least for the coming 10 years, Japan's new security policy is called 'Pro-Active Pacifism'. Abe cabinet pursued the policies called 'Three arrows of Pro-Active Pacifism': Japan's right to participate in collective self-defense, extended economic assistance for partner capacity building and easing the nation's traditional arms exports ban.

- Japan's another answer to U.S. call for support to its rebalancing strategy was Japan's active negotiation to participate in TPP, which symbolizes an economic aspect of U.S.-Japan alliance relationship. Abe had to come over the adamant opposition of Japanese farmers.

(2) Educational regeneration

From the beginning of his second cabinet, Abe showed his intention to revise the existing historical interpretation on Japan's war time atrocities and colonial expansion of the early 20th century.

- His approaches to achieve this life-time goal can be grouped into two areas: i) review of existing interpretations and repentances (concept of invasion, enforced mobilization of comfort women, Kono statement, Nanjing massacre, etc.), ii) changes in regulations for narrative, screening, and selection of textbooks

Education and history issues are the core of Abe's politics of identity. Abe said "Let us together embark on the most drastic reforms since the end of World War II" calling for the efforts to revitalize the economy, fix the social security system and rebuild education. According to the right-wingers' world view, education is not simply a matter of learning and teaching but a matter of recovering Japanese national body and regenerating Japanese spirit which they believe are damaged and distorted unrighteously after the defeat at the war.

- NSS says that as long as national security is to protect national values as well as people and country, active diplomacy is necessary to spread Japanese view and Japanese policy. This is the point where Abe's education and history policy turns into the matter of diplomacy and security.

(3) Abe's optimization between the two goals

He knows that expansion in Japan's security and economic role does not improve Japan's autonomy in the context of U.S.-Japan alliance. He has overcome domestic opposition, using these effects of the policies as the reasons for the Pro-Active Pacifism: 1) balancing against Chinese threat, 2) active and influential policy initiative toward ASEAN countries, 3) recovering DPJ government policy failures on U.S.

- In return for Japan's active support for U.S. policy of rebalancing, Abe wanted to achieve his goal of historical revisionism. He should have thought that his goal of educational regeneration is not feasible without U.S. support or at least acquiescence. In retrospect, he separated Japanese history of atrocity under the colonial rule from the aggression in World War II.

- From his statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II, Abe acquired President Obama's support for his view of history. The statement atoned for Japan's aggression in making wars with U.S. and European countries and failing to follow international trend of peace and anti-colonialism in the late 1920s. It also emphasized that Japan succeeded in reconciliation with European countries with the help of their generosity. However, it did not express its apology or repentance for its annexation of Korea and suppressive policies on it.

- By providing full support for U.S. demands on alliance relationship, which do not necessarily contradict with its national goal, Abe partially succeeded in his goal of not bequeathing the burden of history to future generations.

- There are doubts on the possible future conflict between U.S. and Japan due to increased Japanese defense security. It is groundless because the development of U.S.-Japan security alliance is moving toward increased incorporation and integration

2. “Departure from the Post-War Regime” and Chinese Response

- Chinese charges Abe for his phrase of “Departure from the Post-War Regime” as trying to overturn the verdicts of Tokyo Tribune and the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which are the two pillars of the post-war international order. They condemned Abe for visiting Yasukuni Shrine which symbolizes his denial of Japan’s unlawful war criminal behaviors. China blamed Abe for not only reinterpreting but also trying to revise its ‘Peace Constitution’. They say Japan is trying to fabricate and minimize the obvious historical fact of Naging massacre by claiming for further academic investigation on the exact number of victims. China argues that Japan’s blame on China as a country trying to change status-quo is like placing cart before the horse.
- Since 2010, Japan had been criticizing China as the country that tries to change the *status-quo* by force, referring to Chinese coast guard’s maneuvering around the area of Senkaku islands and embedment of the coral reefs and rocks into a space for army and navy stations.⁵
- While answering questions at Diet Budget Committee, Abe said he meant it for domestic politics but not the kind that challenges to the post-war system.
- As long as Abe’s intention is not to change the post-war relations with U.S., his revisionism was acceptable to the U.S.
- Since the Abe’s return to power, the rallying around flag effect, especially of history was intensified. Chinese government used the effect to mobilize people’s support for Communist Party under the expected economic difficulties of low growth rate on domestic front. It also used history issue to bring Korea in its bilateral alignment against Japan. China sent to Korea signals of friendship, such as building new Ahn Joong Geun Memorial in Harbin, preserving the area around the building used for the Provisional Government of Korea in Shanghai, and joint-investigation of records on Comfort Women left in China. On the other hand, China has been keeping low-profile the history issue concerned with the Northeast Project, which China has been investing since late 1990s.

3. Korean Domestic Politics and its Dilemma

According to the Realist perspective, history issues are supposed to be towned down in front of security threat. Reality in Korea, Japan and China does not follow the Realist expectation. Korea, especially, is experiencing the dilemma between security and history not just in dealing with Japan, but also in dealing with China.

- Historical conflict between Korea and Japan began to surge during the 1990s when Rightist Historical View attracted support in Japan. Overlapping with the economic success and

⁵ “China, particularly over maritime issues where its interests conflict with others’, continues to act in an assertive manner, including attempts at changing the status quo by coercion based on its own assertions incompatible with the existing order of international law.” (Defense of Japan 2016)

democratization, bilateral conflict due to history issues came to an apex during the Rho Moo Hyun government. The worsening relations were mixed with improved images, which was possible because of the cultural exchange between the two countries. In retrospect, the bilateral friendship reached its peak in 2011, before the breakup of 2012.

A joint public opinion poll by the *Dong-A Ilbo* and the *Asahi Shinbun* newspapers illustrates this trend.

Koreans who	2005	2011
like Japanese	8%	12%
Hate Japanese	63%	50%
Like Chinese	20%	12%
Hate Chinese	24%	40%

Improvement in Japanese attitude accepting “Korean Wave” should have helped the improvement of mirror image in Korea. However, the rate of South Koreans who chose “hate” was 50%, which is still high compared to 40% toward China.

Another public opinion poll showed South Koreans’ threat perception toward its neighboring countries. The questionnaire asked South Koreans over 19 years of age which country is the military threat to your country. 1,010 Korean respondents are asked to identify up to two countries or areas among the list. The polls were conducted during March and April 2013, and April and May in 2015. (Genron NPO and EAI 2013, 2015).⁶ Table 1 shows the results comparing 3 years. Among the countries and areas, 43.9% was scored for Japan, while 86.7% for North Korea and 47.8% for China in 2013. We can tell that while North Korea is perceived as the primary threat, Japan and China also as threat at a certain level with a similar degree. The increase in the score for Japan in 2015 would be the effect of the security-related laws implementing the constitutional reinterpretation to allow the right for collective self-defense.

(Table 1) Countries Perceived as Military Threat

	Japan	China	North Korea
2013	43.9	47.8	86.7
2014	46.3	39.6	83.4
2015	58.1	36.8	83.4

⁶ The Genron NPO & East Asia Institute. The 1st Japan-South Korea Joint Public Opinion Poll (2013): Analysis Report on Comparative Report, and the 3rd (2015).

These opinion polls illustrate the dilemma that Korea and Korean leadership especially is experiencing now. North Korean nuclear and missile threat is clear and present danger for Korean security. To deal with it, security cooperation with Japan is inevitable. There is another unavoidable and obvious reality: public opinion. As long as Japan does not show its sincerity in apology on historical issues as much as acceptable to Korean public, it is not easy for Korean political leadership to overcome the opposition to security cooperation with Japan, as can be seen in GSOMIA case. If any bilateral cooperation is directed to China and invites Chinese protest, the leadership should face with the opposition of the pro-China groups.

As long as Japan is looking only to U.S. turning away from the country concerned, the possibility of reconciliation would be very limited. If skipped with temporary remedy to deal with current geopolitical cleavage, the issues will come back with a much stronger magnitude.

Squaring the Circle: Abe's efforts to reconcile his nationalist agenda with political sensitivities

Thomas U Berger (Professor, Boston University)

I. Introduction

1. Abe's Dilemma – on the one hand Abe is deeply committed to pursuing a classical, Japanese conservative nationalist agenda. This lies at the heart of his political program and is the guiding *leit motif* of his entire political career. On the other hand, Abe is confronted with a n array of powerful domestic and international political constraints on his ability to pursue that agenda.
2. This essay asks three questions: First, how has Abe managed to resolve that dilemma? Second, how is he likely to manage it in the future? And third, what can outside actors do to help the Japanese government resolve these issues in ways that are constructive for both Japan and the region?

II. Abe's Nationalist Agenda and historical revisionism

1. Japan as the wounded giant – a powerful nation that has lost its sense of unity and purpose as a result of the American occupation and the conspiracy of Japanese left wing politicians and intellectuals aided and abetted by foreign governments who wish to keep Japan weak
2. Historical revisionism – recovering a positive image of Japan's past – vital
3. Nationalism as a panacea for what troubles Japan – economic, social and political
4. Supported by a powerful array of domestic constituencies – conservative politicians (especially inside of Abe's own faction); a conservative commentariat (*Hyoronkai*) backed by media giant such as *Bungei shuju*, *Sankei Shimbun* and (with some reservations on the history issue) *Yomiuri*; powerful conservative lobbies assembled under the banner of the *Nihon Kaigii* – including the *Izokukai* and the *Shinsha Honcho*
5. Historical pattern of japan of historical revisionism coming to the fore whenever there is a perceived need for defense reform in the face of international security pressures – precisely the situation Japan faces today. In this sense, Japanese nationalism is a reactive nationalism.
6. Summary: Abe's commitment to the nationalist agenda is more than merely the produce of his personal biography – it is reinforced by a set of deeply held beliefs, powerful domestic constituencies and international pressures.

III. Domestic and International Political Sensitivities

1. The Japanese public – much of which is sympathetic with certain aspects of the nationalist agenda, but which is wary of nationalism as a whole and places a much higher priority on other, more mundane matters. The trauma of the 2007 upper house elections in which the LDP lost 27 seats and which triggered Abe's resignation.
2. Abe's coalition partners – especially the CGP, but also more quietly members of his own party. Have watered down various aspects of Abe's agenda.

3. Abe's most trusted foreign policy advisors in the new NSC – including Yachi Shotaro, Kitaoka Shichi and Takamizawa. Hard nosed pragmatists who have no time for the nationalist agenda.
4. Neighboring countries – China and Japan – which Abe tends to discount, but which certainly are a factor nonetheless. Japan and its strategy of isolating the ROK.
5. The United States under the Obama administration – change in US tone on ideological issues, beginning with the State department. Sea change in US attitudes on this issue, crossing Democratic-Republican line. Key role of the “alliance hands” who feel that historical revisionism creates unnecessary divisions between US allies and hands the PRC a cheap diplomatic victory. Steady pressure on Abe and his advisors.
6. Summary: The resistance to fully pursuing Abe's nationalist agenda is virtually insurmountable, even for a very powerful Japanese leader like Abe. While the most recent

IV. The outcome as of August 2016 –

1. Abe has not been Abe – the successful management of various flashpoints
2. No official visits to Yasukuni since 2013
3. The successful watering down of the 2015 statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war – While I initially was very critical of the statement, I think it was the best we could expect and far, far better than what might have been produced
4. Educational policy – the focus on moral education, not history.
5. The apparently successful implementation of the Comfort women deal
6. The focus has moved from historical revisionism to the other core issue at the heart of the nationalist agenda – pursuing Constitutional revision.

V. The Future

1. Managing the many potential flash points
 - a. . the new Minister of Education Matsuno Hirokazu, for instance, could easily reignite the history issue through the text book issue
 - b. Japan must be encouraged to keep Senkaku/Diayu and Dokdo/Takeshima separate
2. Positive feedback – a new model of friendly power relationships
 - a. Learning to stage manage the relationship – Hiroshima followed by Pearl harbor as a model to be extended to Japan-Australia and Japan-ROK.

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Future of History: Can We Prevent the Next Great War?

Kyu-dok HONG (Sookmyung Women's University)

How much will the future resemble the past? To what extent will three countries in Northeast Asia go back to the future? Many experts easily agree that East Asia would be the place where arms spending and muscle flexing among stake holders in the region are likely to increase in the near future. Will there be a war between the United States and China? Will there be the second Korean war that invites all neighboring states with potential use of nuclear bomb? With Tokyo's more permissive interpretation of constitutional limits on use of force and programmed improvements in military capabilities, can Japan be involved with war if her territory is attacked?

Theorists say that the bipolar world is over, yet it is not going to be replaced by a unipolar world of American hegemony nor by G2 powers, namely the United States and China. The world is multipolar, although it is quite different from a classical form of multi polarity we have seen in the 18th century Europe. Certainly, neo-isolationism has come back to the global politics. There will be a diffusion of power as nationalism grows, interdependence increases and a transnational actors will be even more influential. The world we are living is not clean and neat, but somehow we are able to manage the crises. I wonder whether we will be able to weathering the storms in the future as we have been successful after WW II.

Nothing is Changed Under the Sun

Robert Gilpin argues that international politics has not changed over two millennia, and that Thucydides would have little trouble understanding our world today. If Thucydides were plopped down the East Asia, he would probably recognize the situation quite quickly; the rising power of China and how the United States has concerned about China's ambition. As old dictum describes, "nothing is changed under the sun." To make things worse, there has been a technological revolution in the development of nuclear weapons, and North Korea has openly threatened to use their weapons preemptively against the United States and South Korea. Pyongyang recently fired upon its Rodong missile into EEZ of the Japanese territory by alarming the Japanese. After a successful launch of SLBM on August 24, 2016 Kim Jong-un said that strategic targets in the Pacific and the continental U.S. are finally within his reach. However, Chinese heavy criticism of President Park's decision to locate the U.S. THAAD battery to Seongju shows that China is viewing the situation on the Korean Peninsula from a perspective

based on its hegemonic competition with the United States, rather than security challenges faced by South Korea.

The information revolution reduces the role of geography and territory in the post-modern era but Kim Jong-un has carefully maintained his cult without having seriously influenced from abroad. North Korea has been isolated from an enormous growth in economic interdependence and it has miraculously maintained totalitarian way of governing its people despite international pressure and various UN Security Council's and individual countries's repeated sanctions. There has been increased consciousness of democratic values and human rights that cross national frontiers. However, the international society has not succeeded to change Kim Jong-un regime's behavior.

Elusive Quest for Seeking Alternatives

How can we recommend policy makers and security planners for shaping the future to avoid the next great war in the region?

Immanuel Kant once predicted that over the long run, human beings would evolve beyond war for peace for three reasons: the greater destructiveness of war, the growth of economic interdependence, and the development of what he called republican government and we call today liberal democracies. However, no one can be sure that Kant's liberal belief will be accomplished without solving the Korean question in this particular region.

The problem posed here is that whether we can find a new alternative rather than following the same path without creating severe political opposition at home. There is an old dictum that "man made mistakes in order to repeat themselves." It is always difficult to reject accepted ideas of the society whenever we are at the fork of roads. All of us grow up in society and are deeply influenced by the lessons learnt by predecessors based on historical wounds and their glorious moment of victories. To paraphrase Nietzsche, it is like untying the ropes, casting off, and sailing into an uncharted ocean without knowing the location of the other shore—if indeed, there is a shore—and what dangers it harbors.

Five Lessons from the Past

At least, five lessons we may highlight if we can learn anything from the past great wars and do not want to repeat same mistakes again.

First, profound change can happen suddenly. Peace can be erupted by the tyranny of small things. Currently, deep strategic factors are already at work across this region that are potentially destabilizing. Strategic distrust can hardly be reduced as long as Pyongyang maintains its nuclear ambition and Beijing prefers to have a buffer state in the North. Any tiny thing can escalate

quickly and the “escalation dominance” the United States still believes that it has hold may not fully sustain the momentum. Therefore, management of escalation is very much needed.

Second, searching for diplomatic solution has been elusive since the politics of confrontation and antagonism continues to exist. The problem is that things keep changing whether we want them to or not. As the ancient Greek philosopher Heraclites said, “One cannot bath in the same river twice.” Change, slow or fast, is inherent in human affairs. Perhaps that is because, to quote the seventeenth-century philosopher Pascal, the one thing we humans are incapable of is to sit alone in a room, doing nothing. At bottom, the reason why new thinking is needed is in order to cope with change and avoid being overwhelmed by it. To develop Heraclites’ metaphor, social life might be likened to a fast-flowing river. The question is who is in control? Shall we try to resist the current? To avoid the pitfall, dangers and misperception, it is essential that we find ways to respond to whatever the current may do to us and to wherever it may carry us. In other words, we must get out of our routine and innovate. Either innovate, or at least adapt to change, or perish.

Unfortunately, the China seems to behave according to old diplomatic playbook. They are threatening South Korea by hinting that they will retaliate in many different ways unless Seoul would give up U.S. THAAD battery on its soil.

Third, political leadership needs to assure people that peace is sustainable. Unfortunately, a long-term policy vision, driven by political leadership can hardly be found. Under these circumstances, people are now concerned of potential *Amexit* after *Brexit* and whether this would create power vacuum in the region.

It is understandable that “foreign policy begins at home”, and therefore, statesmen and political leaders of key countries in the region can hardly be ignorant of people’s concerns at home. It seems that political leaders do not want to alienate their strong supporting group and do not want to implement a drastic makeover of its policy. As a result, they tend not to be futuristic and inelastic in making decisions. This is why they failed to construct a grand design for contributing a regional peace. On the other hand, there exists a dangerous and distorted dynamics that may develop among decision makers. Group think is still evident in many cases. Focusing on shared images, perceptions, or mind sets, foreign policy making of three Northeast Asian countries have not changed over several decades. They are deeply rooted in common socialization processes of certain elites or opinion leaders that result in similar assumptions and outlooks on international affairs. The danger is that common perceptual lenses among key policy makers can cloud or foreclose the consideration of alternatives in foreign policy. Of course, examples of this actually happening in foreign policies are not germane to three countries only. However, in South Korea, Japan, and China, this would certainly be a danger, considering the very narrow socio-political

spectrum from which the principal policy formulations are drawn. As Larry Diamond said that successful reform requires a long-term policy vision, driven by political leadership.

Fourth, little has been done to achieve a substantial progress in the area of building security architecture. NACSI seems to be a good example. The concept has been brought up and emphasized by President Park for more than three years. However, little has been done and it definitely needs reality check. Three countries have sent their PKOs in South Sudan, but unfortunately, they do business independently without having consultations at the regional commander's level. China is still afraid that South Korea would be ended up with de-facto members of the United States-led TMD network, while South Korea is still afraid of saying that GSOMIA and ACSA with Japan is very much needed to deter North Korean nuclear and missile threats simply because this would touch the nerves of nationalistic feelings of people at home and create strong opposition to the government.

Finally, Unfortunately, hegemonic competition between Washington and Beijing increased the level of instability around the region. As Xi Jinping and Barrack Obama have maintained, The United States and China must show their combined resolve in avoiding the conflicts. The biggest challenge is managing escalation in the South China Sea. As we have observed the heating debates and major naval activities of both, South Korea has carefully supported the U.S. position by calling for free passage of navigation and maintaining that disputes must be solved in a peaceful manner. Seoul worries that how South China conflict will affect the North Korea issue on the Peninsula. The Park government has had a strong expectation that China would play a role in deterring the North but it turned into a huge disappointment since Beijing has openly threatened to retaliate if Seoul continues to have U.S. THAAD in its soil and it is highly likely that China would give up the geopolitical notion of having buffer state of North Korea in order to contain further American influences on the Korean Peninsula.

China argues that the deployment of THAAD would go far beyond the scope of defense required by South Korea. According to them, THAAD system in South Korea could be used to intercept ICBMs fired by China against the United States. China continues that the X-band radar that forms part of the THAAD system could be used to monitor military activities in inland areas of Chinese territory.

I believe that Chinese concerns are groundless. And we cannot afford to place too much weight on the political concerns of China since the deployment of THAAD is an issue that is related with the protection of the people of South Korea.

Making a More Secure Regional Order: Concerns & Opportunities

On the other hand, South Korean security planners need to worry about the possibility that North Korea will come to believe--mistakenly--that the United States will not readily involve itself in a contingency on the Korean Peninsula in consideration of the risk of a military clash with China.

South Korean security planners have often faced with dilemma whenever some of the American colleagues argue that “Thucydides Trap” must be avoided by all means and the United States needs to consult with China in order to seek modest and reasonable ways to avoid huge cost and catastrophic war.

Many in defense circle in Korea believe that China will likely to intervene and the United States would find a compromising solution which may not be likened by South Korea.

The question needs to be raised is: whether China will be satisfied with American concession or a compromised solution? History has taught us that Munich Syndrome must not be forgotten. Like Adolph Hitler had never satisfied with Sudetenland in 1939, China will likely to exert its influences over the Korean Peninsula down the load to the Pacific. Yet, as dictum goes, “generals fight their last wars.” Ever since the United States had been shocked with the magnitude of Chinese invasion during the Korean War, the tragic memory dies hard. General Marshall who fought in the Korean war once described the Chinese Army as “invisible ghost.” The security planners of Eisenhower Administration voluntarily limited themselves beneath the seventeenth parallel when they fought against the Vietnamese in the very next war in order to avoid the potential clash with the Chinese. While keeping in mind the potentially huge costs of preparing comprehensively for a low-probability war with China, the United States security planners still concern that their rhetoric and heavy investment in counter A2/AD capabilities could be interpreted as hostile by the Chinese. They continue to emphasize that the U.S. should expand and deepen Sino-U.S. military-to-military understanding and measure to reduce risks of misperception and miscalculation. How are we account for this puzzle of ambiguity? Can the United States be fully agreeable with the Chinese regarding Pyongyang’s dangerous plan to preempt strategic targets in the South and the Pacific theatre with nuclear weapons? Is there any conflict or disagreement in terms of how to assist each other in coping with a new challenge regarding third party intervention between the United States and Korea? How we can fix the loopholes and reduce the gap in shaping new game plan.

Very Recently, David Compert and his colleagues of Rand pointed out that the military advantage declines and the United States will be less confident that the war with China will conform to its existing war plan. They argue that the support of Washington’s East Asian allies could hurt China’s military chances while hoping that Japan’s entry could make a difference by 2025. The group concludes that the United States should make sensible preparations to wage a long and fierce war with China, while developing plans to limit the scope, intensity, and duration

of a war; tightening up its system of civilian control and expanding communication with China in times of peace, crisis, and war.

On the other hand, Robert Martinage finds that crafting an offset strategy may be a more daunting task than it was during the late 1970s and calls for taking advantage of alliance relationships to gain positional advantages and, in some cases, share financial burdens.

It is important to increase level of cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and South Korea if the U.S. military overmatch is no longer guaranteed. Three allies must coordinate closely in order to maintain escalation dominance. As Deputy Secretary Work urged his European allies in Brussel on April 2016, the U.S. needs to restore a healthy margin of technological superiority. I think he is right and allies in East Asia would contribute to overcome crisis instability by enhancing conventional deterrence against the increasing threats from North Korea and persuade China that U.S. military role has a stabilizing effect in the region.

Therefore, team efforts need to be further encouraged in offsetting the gains made by China and North Korea. At the same time, the Korean role is more clearly defined in the process of making a more secure regional order.

Misuse of History

Having said that Robert May provides us with an insight that we can keep in mind.

First, framers of foreign policy are often influenced about what history teaches or portends. Sometimes, they perceive problems in terms of analogies from the past. Sometimes, they envision the future either as foreshadowed by historical parallels or as following a straight line from what has recently gone before. This has been repeated from the American involvement of World War II, the opening phase of the Cold War, the Korean intervention of 1950s, and the entanglement in Vietnam.

Second, policy makers ordinarily use history badly. When resorting to an analogy, they tend to seize upon the first that comes to mind. They do not search more widely. Nor do they pause to analyse the case, test its fitness, or even ask in what ways it might be misleading. Seeing a trend running toward the present, they tend to assume that it will continue into the future, not stopping to consider what produced it or why a linear projection might prove to be mistaken. These habits have important consequences, for they can affect the way statesmen understand their situations and problems. The “cognitive dissonance” is still working since policy makers are easily overlook, reject, or actually change to suit their expectations. May admits that some American policy-makers whose thinking was thus narrowed and confined. And he continues that this has often been the cases and that it will continue to be so.

Third, policy makers can, if they will, use history more discriminatingly. They can seek alternative analogies and parallels and in doing so reflect on whether a moral seen in one case is a principle exemplified in many. Instead of merely projecting a trend, they can dissect the forces produced it and ask whether or not those forces will persist with the same vectors.

Concluding Remarks

I would like to conclude with two observations:

First, insofar as the public as well as elites are occupied with the perceived (and real) threats from the North, maintaining the strength of the United Forces in South Korea and acquiring U.S. commitments to South Korea security became absolute objectives Korean foreign policy toward the United States. Hence, Korean leaders tried hard to influence the U.S. to preserve what they thought crucial for the ROK security. However, with growing influence of China's power, many in Korea believes that South Korea should seek to maintain good relations with China, while planning ahead for contingencies that may arise from North Korea's implosion or North Korea's inadvertant mistakes of firing upon nuclear weapons. The situation is extremely difficult since we must use all available means to suppress the North's temptation to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. We need to be fully prepared to move ahead in order to avoid mass killings in the South. Can this option agreeable to the United States? Washington may not support the ROK's position because such preventive strike is likely to increase the risk of clashing with the China.

Second, small powers often look for ways to be helpful to the great powers, being fully aware of how the great power can do for them. Therefore, the more the convergence of interests between the U.S. and South Korea, the more the degree of compliance from South Korea toward the U.S.

What seems to be the winning combinations for the alliance for the future? Certainly, Seoul and Washington will find ways to help each other as long as North Korea threatens both countries. To what extent the Seoul and Washington overcomes the Chinese objections?

History taught us that misperception has paid high price in many cases. Imperial Japanese Army had ridiculed the Chinese military and called them idiots and pigs. After liberation, the U.S. Army intelligence heavily relied upon tactical informations produced by those retired Japanese G2 officers who were misperceived and full of prejudice on the Chinese. Seventy years have passed since then, we are now facing again the Chinese and North Korean military that are much different in terms of their capability, training, and equipment. They are compact, mobile, highly trained, and well-equipped professional units that can quickly respond to our military offensive. But there are those who still believe that North Korean troops do not possess the ability to combine tactical skills into the performance of more complex modern military operations.

Maintaining the U.S. military dominance is very important in the region to prevent crises taking place on the Korean Peninsula and other flash points. But we have not fully agreed upon how we can deny the Chinese and North Korean confidence.

Thinking through the unthinkable is likely to be difficult. Finding a reliable alternative is equally difficult job for the security planners and decision makers, to say the least.

Therefore, given the speed with which change proceeds all around us, we need to encourage our key decision makers to keep up with such changes for managing them with more innovative tools to solve the problems. It takes courage and wisdom to initiate with the new course of action without relying too much upon familiar lessons from the history.

Is there a pathway toward reconciliation on history issues in Northeast Asia?

Dan Sneider

(Associate Director for Research, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center, Stanford University)

The myth of the failure of reconciliation

While it is true that reconciliation efforts in Northeast Asia have lagged behind those of Europe and had limited impact, it is a myth that they have failed. This is important to understand what the prospects are for reconciliation in the future.

Reconciliation is shaped by the strategic environment but not determined by it

As in Europe, the pressures for regional integration, for the facilitation of economic and security cooperation, create the environment for reconciliation. This includes the process of regionalization from below. But as we have seen clearly (including in Europe), those factors do not negate the power of historical memory and identity, and the role of civil society and political leadership, especially in democratic societies but also in China where history issues have become highly politicized.

Political leaders in Northeast Asia have taken practical steps toward reconciliation when they are compelled to find ways to ease tensions

Asian political leaders have sought to foster efforts at historical reconciliation as a means of resolving disputes and lowering tensions. Examples include the Miyazawa Neighboring Countries clause to resolve textbook disputes in early 1980s; the Japan-Korea joint history research committee formed in 2001 (and the parallel private Japan-Korea and Japan-China-Korea common history committees); the Japan-China joint history committee formed in 2006; and the Asian Women's Fund. All had very limited success but also created a basis for future progress and to manage crises. Networks of policy intellectuals were created that remain useful.

The December 2015 Comfort Women agreement between Japan and Korea rests on the previous progress that was made, including the Asian Women's Fund and the failed negotiations between the LMB and Noda governments. The added element in the new agreement was the decision of the US Government to intervene more actively, through both the public statements of President Obama and VP Biden and the quiet diplomacy carried out by the State Department with the Korean and Japanese foreign ministries. The strategic situation – particularly the North Korean threat and unease regarding China's more assertive role – helped to propel the political leadership in both countries to make this compromise.

The recent progress on implementation of the agreement – the creation of the Reconciliation and Healing Foundation and the expected allocation of the 1 billion yen in funding in the supplemental budget to be adopted in September – is a good sign of the ongoing commitment of the two leaders to carrying out the agreement. The issue of the statue remains to be resolved but that may take some time.

Democracy and the role of civil society

Prospects for reconciliation may be greater in the case of Japan and Korea, though democratic societies are also more difficult to manage. In China, history issues are used almost entirely, and often cynically, by the state as leverage against Japan, to drive a wedge between Korea and Japan, or as means of distracting the population from other issues. In Japan and Korea, in contrast, history issues are often driven by civil society and by political organizations that act beyond and outside the influence of the state. While this can be problematic, it also offers the potential for civil society to be a force for promoting reconciliation.

Reconciliation requires patient and extended efforts. It can draw upon the past efforts that have created useful resources of academics and civil society organizers who are communicate well with their counterparts in China, Japan and South Korea. For example, the official history dialogues between Japan and China and Korea rested on the experience of non-government efforts among more like-minded civil society activists. Those dialogues created examples of joint history textbooks and created networks of academics who later led or participated in the official dialogues, such as China's Bu Ping, Korea's Chung Jae-jeong and Japan's Kawashima Shin.

Practical pathways to reconciliation exist

The limits of formal apology and of all forms of 'thin' reconciliation have been pointed out. They are real and cannot be easily overcome. But there are ways to foster 'thicker' engagement (see European examples) that can lay the groundwork for moments when political leadership is ready to make more dramatic gestures. In a Track II dialogue that we carried out with the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat, we discussed a number of such measures.

First, it is vital to conclude the steps to implement the Comfort Women agreement. On an official level, the next issue that should be tackled – hopefully based on the successful implementation of the CW agreement – is the broader problem of forced laborers and their compensation. The Korean court decisions on this problem, and the decision of some Japanese companies to seek to resolve these claims in both Korea and China, creates some pressure to move ahead on this problem. The model for resolution is the German Fund for the Future (the Foundation "Remembrance, Responsibility and the Future") and the partner organizations created in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Ukraine, Russia, the Czech republic, and Poland, along with the International Organization for Migration and the Conference on Jewish Material Claims against Germany. I believe it is possible, perhaps again with some US role justified by the problem of former POWs used as forced laborers, to consider the creation of a similar structure in Northeast Asia. It may make sense to ask the Europeans to play a role as consultants for this project.

At the governmental and civil society level, there are many good ideas, some which we discussed in our meeting with TCS that would aim to 'thicken' the reconciliation process. TCS could be a convener/organizer of such projects. It is likely that the greatest obstacle to this will come from China. Such ideas include:

- Rather than a joint textbook, which is a bridge too far, create supplementary teaching materials that can draw on the one we created at Stanford based on our textbook comparison research. These supplemental materials aim at showing students how the same history is taught differently in different countries – it is in use in American high schools now;

- Renewed academic exchanges that could focus on specific historical events or a theater of the war, with possible European and American participation (see the Harvard project on the Sino-Japanese war as an example);
- Exchanges and forums among select groups, such as members of parliaments, textbook writers, museum directors and museum curators, and most importantly the media. Regarding the last, I believe it would be beneficial to bring historians and media together. The media in all these countries is heavily responsible for the disinformation that tends to shape public opinion and make reconciliation more difficult;
- Large-scale student exchanges, modeled on the Franco-German exchanges, with summer programs that bring students from the three countries together, possibly with Europeans and Americans, and include some history dialogue, visits to museums, etc.

Leadership is essential

To state the obvious, none of this can happen without leadership at the highest political level. This leadership needs to come from not only China, Korea and Japan but also the United States. President Obama's visit to Hiroshima was a breakthrough and an act of moral leadership. But it cannot be said to have fostered, yet, a reverberation effect in the region. That would require Prime Minister Abe to take up the challenge implicitly posed by the President's visit and go to both Korea and China and make similar public gestures of contrition and remembrance.

2016 U.S. Presidential Election and the Challenges for the New Korean and U.S.'s Leadership

Byoung Kwon Sohn(ChungAng University)

I. US Presidential Election and Its Repercussion to Korea

* the repercussion of the 2016 U.S. presidential election

- already heavily felt in Korea, particularly since the emergence of Donald Trump as the strongest Republican candidate and now as the Republican nominee

* Trump's non-diplomatic and straightforward remarks about the Korea-US military alliance and free trade agreement makes the Korean government and the Korean sensible public worried

- His exaggerated remarks on Korea's military free-riding, the threat of drawdown of US forces in Korea, and his statement such as "You can go nuclear when US withdraw forces," and "Korea-US FTA only cost US blue collar workers" -> many foreign policy pundits and experts in Korea are gravely concerned about two nations' future relationship if he is elected

- Trump's campaign pledges with strong isolationist tinge("America First") and Trump's(and Sanders') emphasis on protecting US workers and their strong reservation on globalization -> Korea worries about the possibility of the post-election US request for revision of the Korea-US FTA, and about possible US protectionist measures against the Korean goods imported into the US market

* besides, both Clinton's and Trump's strong and assertive rhetoric against China, particularly on the South China Sea issue, puts Korea in dilemma in its search for appropriate positioning with respect to that issue

- the dilemma seems real given the pressure from the US toward Korea to take more tough stance vis-a-vis China on the one hand, and Korea's geo-economic ties with China which now more upset with the Hague Court ruling and Korea's decision to install THAAD

II. Post-2016 US Administration and Its Possible Requests to Korea

* due to the momentum and development in the 2016 US presidential election, and due to the the general US domestic mood having sustained the Trump and Sanders phenomena, Korea is right to worry about the huge potential requests from the US whoever is elected new president in US

* items in the possible list of requests from the US can include:

- more Korean spending to share the military burden for the US forces stationed in Korea
- wider opening of the Korean market for US goods
- quick implementation of THAAD installation
- stronger support for the US position on the South China Sea issue, which is reinforced due to the Hague Court decision in July, 2016
- more constructive and active cooperation with Japan, including military one
- more active and wider contribution to Korea-US global partnership, such as anti-terrorism, climate change, development assistance
- > Simply put, the US will ask for "Korea's wider cooperation with the US and more contribution to the US's East Asia and global project" by emphasizing that the Korea-US alliance cannot simply confined to deterring the North Korean military provocation

* The problem is that the Korean side, in its turn, does not have that bright picture, either

III. Troubled Korean Domestic Situation

* recent gloomy economic developments and dark syndromes in Korea

- endemic economic recession continues
- export of Korean goods is stalled for months
- shipping and maritime businesses are almost bankrupt
- unemployment rate of college graduates is still high -> young generation's "Hell-Korea" shouts are increasingly worrisome

* Korean domestic and electoral politics only seems to make matters worse

- Saenuri Party's defeat in the parliamentary election in April, 2016, drove President Park into rapid and steep lame-duck
- President's grip on the Korean politics in general is rapidly slipping -> leadership vacuum is worried about
- popular sentiment is negative toward the Blue House and the pro-Park faction in both the Saeunri Party and the National Assembly
- President's positioning on THAAD, the public may sense, was not untimely, and is not assuring

* the approaching black hole of the 2017 Korea presidential election may put the Korea-US alliance into another round of trouble

- sensational partisan electoral politics is just coming around again, and the foreign policy issues, including the Korea-US relationship, can be good fodder for partisan electoral bickering

- almost every foreign policy issue will be politicized in the presidential electoral season, which is just beginning to fold: THAAD installation, inter-Korean relationship, Korea's position on the South China Sea, Korea-Japan relationship, Korea-Kapan compromise on the comfort girl issue, and other issue such as whether Korea should pursue pro-US or more balanced foreign policy

- anti-Americanism can also rise in this electoral season, depending on campaign issues and contingencies

(- for attention, all major candidates of the opposition The Minju party presidential race, which closed on August 27, 2016, were in one voice in opposing the THAAD installation in one sense or another)

IV. Challenges for Future Korean and US Leadership

* given what has been said above, there are many potential of conflict and discord between the two allies in the midst of the US and Korean presidential elections and afterward during 2017-2018

- Korea may not be able to meet all of US demands coming from the charged atmosphere of the post-election US landscape due to Korean domestic economic difficulties, the lame-ducked president in the divided Korean government, and the approaching electoral partisan politics

* inordinate demands from the US may trigger another round anti-Americanism amid the 2017 Korean presidential campaign, similar to that during the 2002 Korean presidential election

- currently, the popularity of the conservative Saenuri Party is not that high

- THAAD, further opening of the Korean market to US products, foreign policy positioning between pro-US line and more balanced one can become campaign issues of high profile during the presidential campaign

V. Some Suggestions for Minimizing the Potential Korea-US Conflict

* reducing potential of conflict and distrust between Korea and the US is crucial during the leadership transition period around 2017 through 2018

- Korea-U.S alliance has already experienced tough times during the Roh Moohyun and the Bush(43) administrations
- revisionist foreign policies of the past two administrations across the Pacific caused repeated discord and severely damaged the alliance relationship
- so we need to be prepared to prevent recurrence of the deterioration of the alliance relationship, or if that happens again, to minimize the damage

* among other things, the conflict and discord can be caused by both the clash of elite-preferences between the allies on the one hand, and the misguided processional (or interactional) management on the other hand

- political trust depletion and policy discord between allies can be caused by the conflict of beliefs or policy preferences held by each nation's political elites
- conflict and policy discord can be also caused by the processional factors such as politically motivated inter-state bargaining and mutual communication management
- > for the purpose of electoral gain or foreign policy negotiations, political elites may take advantage of controversial foreign policy issues of great public concern
- > miscommunication and misperception can damage alliance relationship

* suggestions for both nations' new leadership during 2017-2018

1. foreign policy elites of both nations should be aware that policy preference of leaders of Korea and the US can diverge, sometimes widely(ex: if Trump wins, the divergence can be great, at least at the start of the new US administration; if a progressive-leaning, North-Korea sympathetic, balancer role-preferring president is elected in Korea, the divergence can be also large in the early transition period); and that the appropriate processional adaptation through timely and enough communication can get their positions to converge where it is necessary
2. they should be well and correctly informed of each other's foreign policy positions in advance so that troubles between the allies caused by processional misperception and maladaptation can be minimized
3. they should develop a spectrum of communication channels with each other for the purpose of coordinating policies
4. they should constantly consult each other lest one nation should unilaterally announce or implement the alliance-related measures -> sensible communication will help to reduce the potential of distrust and conflict despite the policy preference divergence during the transition period
4. the media and the opinion leaders should watch their leaders and be ready to criticize them, particularly when they attempt to manipulate foreign policy issues for domestic political purposes

Leadership and National Identity in Northeast Asia: Viability of the Comfort Women Agreement and North Korea's Nuclear Threat

Scott Snyder

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Park Geun-hye's Asia Paradox implicitly linked three sources that have traditionally defined South Korea's national identity as challenges to be overcome in a regional security context: anti-communism with North Korea via Trustpolitik, anti-colonialism with Japan, and the "shrimp among whales" paradigm which categorizes South Korea's relationship to prospects for major power rivalry, especially between China and the United States.

By late 2015, one might have argued that all of Park's primary initiatives: Trustpolitik, Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative, and the Eurasian Initiative were stalled, and that identity politics with Japan had particularly mired the Japan-South Korea relationship, with no leader level summit in the first three years despite six summits between Park and Xi Jinping. In addition, South Korea has not found a foothold to play any particular role to date in the context of Sino-US relations, despite Park's interest in promoting both Sino-ROK-US trilateralism and the Korean desire to promote a framework for cooperative Sino-US relations.

However, a surprise breakthrough occurred in Japan-South Korea relations on December 28, 2015, while the prospects for Trustpolitik officially could be said to have died a week later with North Korea's fourth nuclear test on January 6, 2016. The timing of these two incidents served as an inflection point that marked dramatically different trajectories for Japan-South Korea relations and for Trustpolitik that also carried implications for Park's China outreach as part of her efforts to induce Beijing's cooperation on North Korea policy. This paper will outline the coincidence of timing between these two events, their interactions and interrelationship, and their implications for the Park administration and its foreign policy legacy.

Ironically, the implication may prove to be that Park's primary legacy comes in the form of an attempt to reframe Korean identity politics toward Japan away from a reflexive anti-colonial policy toward a working partnership, while the prospects for an inter-Korean relationship based on trust as well as for the development of trust-based Sino-Korean relations has faced serious setbacks. This would mean that Korea has more flexibility to shift away from anti-Japanism than to overcome the inter-Korean conflict, despite the dual identity narratives of enemy and brother that have characterized Korean discussion since 2000.

The timing of these two unanticipated events coincided in such a way that the initial unpopularity of the Comfort Woman agreement, opposed by the majority of South Koreans, was overcome by the effects on South Korean public opinion of the North Korean nuclear test, which became the primary focus for both the Korean public and for President Park Geun-hye. The

coincidence of timing has had the following effects that have proved beneficial for Japan-South Korea relations and for Park's ironic legacy, given the negative atmosphere at the outset of her administration in Japan-South Korea relations.

Park Geun-hye's inauguration in 2013 marked hope for inter-Korean relations under Park Geun-hye and Kim Jong-un, while the Japan-South Korea relationship got off on the wrong foot under Park and Abe.

- 1) Taro Aso's failing grade at Park's inauguration. Aso's visit to Yasukuni in May 2013, Hagel's visit to Seoul and Park's negative attitude toward Japan revealed in October of 2013, and Abe's visit to Yasukuni in Dec. 2013 as catalysts for worsening of relations.
- 2) By contrast, rapid exchange of ROK-PRC envoys and hopes for inter-Korean dialogue. Perceptions of Sino-ROK rapprochement and on-again, off-again inter-Korean dialogue. Marked by top NK leaders' presence at Incheon games closing ceremonies in Oct. 2014 and inter-Korean mini-crisis and resolution in Aug. 2015. But NK nuke test dramatically changed relations both with NK and indirectly with China.
- 3) Park's approach to NK required Pyongyang's leadership to show itself trustworthy to justify inter-Korean dialogue and cooperation. This meant that engagement was not accompanied by South Korean incentives or concessions, but rather higher demands, ending the attractions of inter-Korean cooperation on both sides and leading to a rupture with NK's 4th nuclear test and Park's demands for denuclearization.

These intertwined relationships interacted with each other in the following ways that have influenced the direction and public opinion among South Koreans in ways that have an impact on South Korean perceptions of self and others.

Park has pursued stylistically parallel conditional and issue-oriented, principled approaches toward North Korea and Japan, including the necessity of the negotiating counterpart to show itself trustworthy on a single issue as a prerequisite to opening a wider relationship. Abe made limited concessions toward Park on comfort women, while North Korea doubled down on the nuclear program rather than cooperating on denuclearization.

The Korean public despite low expectations desired an improvement in dialogue with both Japan and North Korea regardless of performance on specific issues. The US facilitated and supported an improvement in relations with Japan but held fast to conditional diplomacy toward North Korea that prioritized denuclearization, meaning Park had no external pressure, only internal pressure, to resume dialogue with North Korea.

North Korean intransigence in the form of the fourth nuclear test overshadowed South Korean mixed public reaction to the comfort woman agreement, taking the pressure off and allowing time for incremental improvement in Japan-ROK relations.

North Korea also generated opportunities for cooperation among US, Japan, and South Korea and ameliorated the perception in Japan that South Korea was tilting closer to Beijing, as Xi Jinping's failure to pursue strategic communication with Park Geun-hye following North Korea's fourth nuclear test suggested that the South Korean diplomatic investment in China had

not yielded desired returns in terms of greater willingness by China to fully side with Seoul over Pyongyang.

Although it is impossible to disaggregate trends in South Korean public opinion of Park Geun-hye's leadership based on her handling of the Japan vs. the North Korea issues, it is clear that the South Korean public was initially skeptical of the 12.28 Comfort Woman agreement, while Park's handling of North Korea during her term has generally helped her popularity.

A close analysis of Park Geun-hye's approval rating suggests that disapproval rose sharply in the week between the comfort woman agreement and NK's 4th nuclear test, then dropped; started to grow again until the passage of the UNSC resolution which again helped Park's approval ratings. The North Korea issue overshadowed handling of the Comfort Woman agreement in the South Korean media and the media handling of the comfort woman agreement and its aftermath suggests that the sensitivity of Japan-South Korea relations in South Korean media may have reduced in light of the focus on North Korea.

Public opinion polling surveys show that support for the Comfort Woman agreement is higher among older Park supporters and lower among younger opposition supporters. The April National Assembly election result, therefore, revealed vulnerability of the Park administration to potential criticisms by the opposition party over handling of Japan policy, but these concerns were ameliorated when interim Teo Minjoo party leader Kim Jong-in met with the Jpn Amb to Korea Koro Bessho and praised the agreement. However, the agreement could become a point of contention again as the leadership of the party shifts to Choo Mi-ae, who is closer to Moon Jae-in and associated with Roh/386 views. How the opposition party handles this issue in the next year will test the salience of anti-Japan identity and whether it has really subsided as a component of Korean national identity.

NPO Forum polling conducted in June/July suggest an improvement in Japanese and Korean views of each other compared to summer of 2015:

- Japanese impressions of South Korea improved to 44 percent unfavorable from 52 percent unfavorable, while ROK views of Japan improved to 61 percent unfavorable from 72.5 percent unfavorable.
- South Korean assessments of current relations with Japan improved to 62 percent unfavorable from 78 percent unfavorable, while Japanese assessments improved to 50 percent from 65 percent.
- South Koreans still feel relative affinity toward China (34 percent, down from 41 percent) vs. Japan (13 percent, up from 11 percent), but on the other hand ROK anxieties toward China are parallel to improved ROK support for the alliance with the United States.
- Only 16 percent of South Koreans associate US security ties with attempts to check China's influence while 29 percent of Japanese associate US security ties with attempts to check China's influence.
- On comfort woman agreement, 37 percent of South Koreans were dissatisfied while 28 percent welcomed the decision, suggesting incremental improvement from the initial reaction of January 2016 where a majority of Koreans opposed the agreement. 30 percent of Japanese thought historical issues will be gradually resolved as bilateral relationship improves, up ten percent from 2015.

In conclusion, Park's main legacy will lie with Japan-ROK relations despite inter-Korean relations.



**History, Politics, and Security in Northeast Asia:
Implications for Peace and Conflict**

A Conference Report

By
Brad Glosserman

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Northeast Asian History Foundation (NAHF) is a government-affiliated organization established in 2006. NAHF seeks to contribute to peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia by clarifying historical facts in Northeast Asia that are often misinterpreted and misrepresented. To achieve this goal, the NAHF focuses on conducting long-term and comprehensive research on Northeast Asian history, establishing systematic and strategic policies, and supporting promotion and education activities. The particular research focuses of the NAHF are Korea-China relations, Korea-Japan relations, and Dokdo-related issues.



Based in Honolulu, the Pacific Forum CSIS operates as the autonomous Asia-Pacific arm of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. The Forum's programs encompass current and emerging political, security, economic, business, and oceans policy issues through analysis and dialogue undertaken with the region's leaders in the academic, government, and corporate areas. Founded in 1975, it collaborates with a broad network of research institutes from around the Pacific Rim, drawing on Asian perspectives and disseminating project findings and recommendations to opinion leaders, governments, and members of the public throughout the region.

History, National Security, and Northeast Asia: A Conference Report

By Brad Glosserman*

The problems triggered by divergent interpretations of history are by no means unique to Northeast Asia, but they have a special intensity and resonance in that part of the world. They have assumed a prominent role in domestic politics and frequently top the diplomatic agenda. The past is increasingly present in Northeast Asia and its impact – both positive and negative – is growing. As Kim Hosup, president of The Northeast Asia History Foundation (NAHF), argues, “conflicts over history have become prevailing issues between countries in Northeast Asia. ... Coupled with matters of territory and security, they have emerged as critical factors that either threaten regional order or hinder the formation of regionalism.” Cognizant of that trend, NAHF and the Pacific Forum CSIS, with support from the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Korea, convened in September 2016 a small group of historians, foreign policy specialists, and former government officials to explore the relationship between history and national security in Northeast Asia. As we tried to unravel the tangled threads that confound an accurate assessment of the roots, meaning, and impact of those issues, we encountered few surprises. Yet while we should be accustomed to the power of history to continue to influence developments in Northeast Asia, we may be entering a period of flux that magnifies their influence. It is therefore incumbent on all supporters of the US-ROK alliance, as well as those who believe that positive and supportive Korea-Japan relations are also important to regional security and stability, to strive to better understand both history and contemporary politics and ensure that the forces of disruption are contained and channeled to constructive ends.

History and Northeast Asia

What explains history’s virulence in Northeast Asia? There are a number of variables, ranging from the structural to the ephemera of politics. A Korean speaker outlined the structural factors. First among them is the presence of global powers in the region. The United States, the world’s only remaining superpower, and China and Russia, two regional powers with global ambitions, are all present and active in Northeast Asia. They have important interests in the region and keep a close on developments and their impact on them. Second, and related to this first feature, is a competition for power – if not hegemony – among those countries. Washington and Beijing, in particular, and Moscow to a lesser degree, seek to be the most important outside power in the minds of regional decisionmakers, and hope to use their power and influence to shape actions and outcomes among smaller countries in Northeast Asia. A third structural factor is globalization which magnifies the influence of external forces on domestic decision making. Understanding the impact of globalization is vital because it is complex and creates competing tensions: while it increases openness to foreign forces, and in theory at least, should increase tolerance of differences and promote cooperation, it at the same time nourishes resistance to intrusions on national sovereignty because it appears to undercut the authority and legitimacy of domestic decision making.

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All these factors reflect a larger process and phenomenon: the incomplete transition to modernity among the societies of Northeast Asia. As one Korean speaker explained, “historical conflicts in East Asia need to be understood as outcomes of a modern transition that East Asian countries, obsessed with ‘dreams of becoming powerful,’ underwent as they built nation-states.” History is central to this process because it explains how countries were – or are being – made. It is the foundation of the narrative of national modernization and realization as conscious, competent, and coherent states. These structural factors shape the telling of those narratives and the way that sovereignty is achieved. And significantly, as a Korean speaker added, the prevailing logic in Northeast Asia is Western – that is to say, it was imposed by external powers during the 19th and early 20th centuries, and rests heavily, if not uneasily, upon the indigenous logic and order of Northeast Asia. In other words, there is an inherent tension (some might say weakness) in the historical foundation of contemporary Northeast Asian societies.

A US participant identified two other, inter-related, factors that contribute to the contemporary salience of history issues. The first is the spread of democracy, which dilutes the authority and influence of elites in managing foreign relations. Traditionally, bureaucracies and political alliance managers have been able to diminish the weight afforded historical concerns and focus on issues of national security as they have defined them. The empowerment of ordinary citizens (and their opinions) offers the opportunity to rewrite national narratives and the identification of heroes and villains within them. Second, and similarly, the articulation and proliferation of human rights norms provide a new baseline to evaluate state behavior. These new standards subvert conventional historiography, often validating longstanding complaints that have traditionally been marginalized or dismissed. While it is tempting to dismiss charges of historical wrongdoing as politically correct hindsight -- taking contemporary standards out of context – the sense of grievance is nevertheless real.

These structural factors and ideational factors assume additional weight and significance as the countries of Northeast Asia consider regional integration. The geography, resources, and interests of four key actors – South Korea, Japan, China, and Russia – give those governments ample reason to pursue deep forms of cooperation to promote economic development and regional stability. Such thinking was impossible during the superpower standoff of the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the ideological conflict between communism and capitalism would seem to have eliminated one critical obstacle to such cooperation. Yet the end of that faceoff and tentative steps toward integration instead prompted politicians and societies throughout the region to look backward, not forward, to focus on history rather than the future. Historical resentments rose to the surface and politicians proved eager to exploit them for partisan and narrowly defined – rather than national – advantage.

This relationship between politics and history, reported another Korean speaker, manifests in three distinct ways. First, there is the political use of history. In this case, politicians whip up or emphasize nationalism to win or grow their popular support. Examples of this type of behavior are legion: Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo visiting Yasukuni Shrine or President Lee Myung Bak flying over Dokdo island. Second, history itself can serve as a constraint. For example, President Park Geun-hye has difficulty compromising with Japan on some issues because the historical acts of Imperial Japan have considerable weight within South Korean

consciousness (and public opinion). The third way in which history matters is as a political constraint. In other words, acts by Korean political figures to address historical concerns assume a substance of their own. An example of this is the way that President Park is limited in her room for political maneuver because she must contend with the legacy of her father, Park Chung Hee, who as president of Korea normalized relations with Japan. In this case, history is instrumentalized as the specific acts of contemporary political figures. In each case, a US speaker noted, history limits the scope of political action. Frequently, these decisions are beholden to short-term interests; when mishandled, they make relations between countries worse.

Today, the scars of history on Northeast Asia are deep and instantly recognizable. As one South Korean speaker explained, “China, having suffered indignity and humiliation, tends to be assertive and self-righteous.” Japan is “understandably defensive” and “sometimes reacts with antagonism,” which can be expressed as *Kenkan* or Korea-hating. At the same time, it is inward-looking and seeks the support of its “big brother (the United States), which Japan hopes will side with it in disputes with neighbors” in return for support for US security interests and efforts. Finally, Koreans manifest “suspicion, vilification, paranoia,” which results in “fluctuation between, and mixture of, flunkeyism and xenophobia.” As a result, “Koreans tend to have difficulty to accept compromise and equal relationship between nations.” This, a US participant agreed, reflected Korea’s geopolitical position – “hemmed in,” and forced to “tightrope walk” between two bigger regional powers, China and Japan.

Nevertheless, insisted another US participant, Korea can and should expect more from Japan. Japan is a democracy, and thus values human rights and the individual. It should therefore be sensitive to and accepting of historical interpretations that hold regimes accountable for violations of human rights. Moral pressure can then play a larger role in domestic assessments of behavior, past and present.

Discussion raised several important questions. First, we challenged the premise that history in Northeast Asia has a “unique” resonance and virulence. Similar issues dog relations between Israelis and Palestinians, Turks and Armenians, or, closer to home, between Indonesians and Papua New Guineans, as well as Indians and Pakistanis. The assertion that Northeast Asian history is singular – in ways that go beyond the singularity of all historical experiences – may not be helpful if it does not permit the import or application of lessons learned elsewhere.

Second, we probed the difficulty in distinguishing between cause and effect in the relationship between history and conflict. Do historical disputes cause conflict between countries or do they reflect conflicts? Are they the tinder that sustains a fire or the spark of confrontation? Within politics, these questions take another, considerably simpler form, namely, do leaders follow public opinion or do they lead it? Are politicians “pushed” by history to take particular stands, or do they exploit history to justify their actions. The answers are rarely clear cut and often depend on very particular circumstances. What is clear, however, is the centrality of history and patriotic education to national security narratives and that fact that competing narratives create or fuel tension, if not conflict, between countries.

This notion of history as narrative is central to the problem of history more generally. Narratives make sense of the world, explaining (if not creating) national interests and the

appropriate accounting of costs and benefits that derive from political decisions. But a narrative is invariably artificial. It is story created and told from a particular perspective that uses some facts and discards or ignores other. In other words, it is socially constructed, the product as much of the larger social context within which a story is told as it is a factor that shapes that same social context. Since such tales are derivative, they can change, and indeed, historical context, if not history itself, is not fixed: it ebbs and flows. This holds out some hope for retelling history in ways the “fix” “bad” interpretations of history. Unfortunately, this process takes time and risks a passivity in addressing historical problems, letting them burn out over a generation rather than taking aggressive action to fix them now.

History and Japan

Historical issues are at the heart of Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo’s agenda. As our Korean speaker noted, Abe seeks the “departure from the postwar regime.” By that, he means in general terms rethinking the meaning of patriotism and the nature of national and civic virtue in Japan – ultimately, giving more respect to “traditional” Japanese values and revising conventional interpretations of the behavior (and culpability) of Imperial Japan – and specifically, revising the constitution, in particular Article 9 which restricts Japan’s ability to possess the instruments of war and use force in its foreign and security policies. This approach would also manifest in the creation of new symbols of the state – a flag and national anthem – along with rewriting historical narratives in textbooks and reassessing national declarations, such as the 1993 Kono Statement on Comfort Women or the 1995 statement by then Prime Minister Murayama Tomoiichi to mark the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II.

“Education and history issues are at the core of Abe’s politics of identity,” explained our Korean speaker. For Abe, like other Japanese conservatives, “education is not simply a matter of learning and teaching but a matter of recovering Japanese national body and regenerating Japanese spirit which they believe were damaged and distorted” after defeat in World War II. A National Security Strategy that prioritizes national values along with national interests infuses education and history into national diplomacy and security. This thinking, warned our Korean speaker, threatens to undermine the basis of Japan’s relations with neighboring countries, and is responsible for the deterioration in relations between Japan and South Korea since 2011. Moreover, he continued, Japan’s focus on courting US support and opinions, rather than that of its neighbors and regional partners as well, will render impossible long-term and enduring reconciliation with those countries. To accomplish this, Tokyo must address South Korean concerns directly and “must show sincerity.”

Our US speaker agreed that Abe and fellow conservatives are attempting to push a nationalist agenda, but he emphasized the powerful constraints the prime minister and his supporters face as they pursue that goal. Japanese leaders seek a renewed sense of national purpose to rally the country to address threats posed by China and North Korea, as well as domestic problems, in particular to rebuild and re-energize the economy after two “lost decades.” External challenges blunt some of the public’s concerns about nationalism – a genuine security threat validates calls for a strengthened defense posture -- but the majority of Japanese do not share the conservative belief in the magical power of nationalism to remedy all the nation’s ills. The power of these constraints has been evident throughout the second Abe administration (since

he and his Liberal Democratic Party returned to power in December 2012). Constitutional revision has been relegated to a secondary priority and the debate over national security reform has focused more on the limits of change rather than breaking new ground. After much handwringing by commentators, both foreign and Japanese, Abe's remarks to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the end of World War II were generally applauded and many were relieved that they hewed as closely as they did to traditional sentiments. Finally, the December 2015 Comfort Women agreement demonstrates a commitment to finding common ground to resolve contentious issues between the two governments rather than the renunciation of formerly agreed compromises. But while Abe has shown a penchant for pragmatism over a stubborn commitment to conservative principles, it will take, our US speaker concluded, a more moderate Japanese politician to forge an enduring relationship with South Korea.

There was little dissent from these broad principles during our discussion. It was noted that the LDP was, from its inception, a revisionist party dedicated to constitutional revision and education reform to instill more patriotism among Japanese. Significantly, several speakers highlighted the longstanding consistency in Japanese public opinion on matters of national security and constitutional revision, even after the recent spirited public debate on defense policy and the rising sense of threat from China and North Korea. The most notable change in recent years has been growing acceptance of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) among the public, but this reflects the SDF's heroic performance during the March 11, 2011 triple catastrophe – earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant – more than anything else. And, most importantly, as a Korean participant added, North Korean nuclear and missile developments appear to suggest a fundamental change in the regional security environment. As he explained, “we can no longer indulge in history histrionics when it comes to protecting the national interest.” Consistent with that logic, another Korean participant applauded the changes in Japan's interpretation of the exercise of the right of collective self-defense, noting that they are good for Korean security and should not be directly opposed.

History and the future

Security concerns, and the argument that they must take precedence over history issues, dominated our discussion of history and the future. The most striking feature of the Asian security environment is the absence of a regional architecture, a void that is striking given the speed with which profound change can occur, the tensions, along with “the politics of confrontation and antagonism” that persist, and the lack of any long-term vision for East and Northeast Asia. The competition between the US and China for regional leadership (if not domination) compounds the pressures and magnifies the impact of instability. Analysts and policy makers worry about the growing power of China's military and fear that the US military edge is eroding.

This structural problem is troubling enough, but there is also mounting concern among regional security planners that North Korea mistakenly doubts the US commitment to South Korea's defense or regional stability and security more generally, and will provoke a conflict. To ensure that it does not, the US, Japan, and South Korea must cooperate and coordinate closely to maintain escalation dominance.

This assignment takes on new challenges as Korea is forced to navigate between Washington and Beijing. South Korea must, our speaker argued, use all available means – diplomatic and military – to deal with and contain the North Korean threat. Many Koreans believe China has influence over Pyongyang and thus Seoul must maintain a good relationship with Beijing to ensure that China is ready to work on behalf of South Korean interests when dealing with the North. But if many in the US worry that Seoul has gone too far to accommodate China, our speaker worried about US reluctance to back South Korea if Seoul feels compelled to launch a preemptive strike against the North. Essential to the credibility of the US deterrent and peninsular (and regional) stability is US military dominance.

Our discussion then expanded to take on the question of historical reconciliation, with our US speaker cautioning that there is a “myth of the failure of reconciliation” in Northeast Asia. He had a definitive answer to the causation question raised earlier, concluding that the prospects for reconciliation are shaped by the strategic environment, but not determined by it. When they are compelled to do so, Northeast Asian regional leaders have taken practical steps to overcome historical problems. He credited the rise of democratization and civil society for the improvement of relations; extensive contacts at the grassroots level promote a better understanding of each country within the other and afford calmer, more rational voices an opportunity to be heard. (Of course, democratization can also empower more extreme views, but the experience of South Korea and Japan reveals that grassroots contacts and activism have promoted good bilateral relations rather than inhibited them. The independence of such groups and the vibrancy of civil society within democracies suggest that the odds are better for improved relations between the ROK and Japan than they are for Japan and China. Still, he warned, there are a number of issues that can undermine any attempt at reconciliation between Seoul and Tokyo, the forced labor issue topping his list.

Central to the effort to dampen historical tensions is addressing inconsistencies, contradictions, and misunderstandings in national education systems. Considerable time and energy have been devoted to efforts to draft mutually agreed-upon history textbooks; unfortunately, those projects have had little success in lowering tensions. Too often, the process is politicized, with governments denouncing the teams working (ostensibly) on their behalf for being insufficiently rigorous in defense of the prevailing national narrative. (It is worth pondering the degree to which any such effort will fail to win approval from conservatives; is a mere readiness to discuss compromise of a historical narrative disqualifying?) Several participants argued that writing a national textbook is too ambitious; instead, the goal should be creation of acceptable supplemental texts that add color and nuance to nationally produced volumes. Such texts are in use in South Korea, but not in Japan. This can be complemented by academic and student exchanges that give educators and their charges a richer understanding of the issues that are the source of bilateral tension. Equally valuable are exchanges among museum directors, culture creators, the media, and other individuals who can play an outsized role in shaping, in subtle but important ways, perception of “the other” in Northeast Asia. Most attention is devoted to politicians and other acknowledged opinion leaders, but there is much that can be done indirectly to shape views of neighbors. Ultimately, and invariably, however, political leaders must lead. It is their duty to develop and sustain a national narrative that transcends narrowly defined political interests and serves those of the nation as a whole.

Finally, it was explained that a call for acts of remembrance is more easily accepted than demands for apologies. The difference is subtle, but important. Remembrance may seem to be more passive than an actual apology, but it suggests a permanence and continuity insofar as remembering is ongoing; an apology can be “one and done.”

Current issues and Northeast Asia

Topping the list of current Korean concerns is the US election campaign. Republican Party nominee Donald Trump’s remarks on the campaign trail about the Korea-US military alliance and the Korea-US free trade agreement (KORUS) and his thinking about trade in general are generating anxieties throughout the Korean government and the Korean public. His claim that Korea is “free-riding” on the alliance with the US, his threat to draw down US forces in Korea, and statements encouraging the ROK to go nuclear have sparked “grave concerns” about the two nations’ relationship if he is elected. Koreans also worry that the assertive posture against China adopted by both Trump and Democratic nominee Hillary Clinton will pose a dilemma for Seoul as it searches for ways to navigate between Washington and Seoul and advance and protect its own national interests, especially when dealing with North Korea.

If that balancing act is not already difficult enough, a number of other domestic developments complicate the efforts of Korean politicians and bureaucrats to walk that tightrope. One list of worries includes continuing economic weakness, a slowdown in exports, bankruptcies (or near bankruptcies) in shipping and maritime businesses, and a high unemployment rate among college graduates. The political situation is only compounding those concerns. President Park is entering the last year of her presidency, and her low approval ratings spark fears that she is already a lame duck. The ruling Saenuri Party's defeat in the April 2016 parliamentary election has deprived her of important support in the National Assembly and has empowered the opposition as a presidential campaign approaches. Popular sentiment is negative toward the Blue House and the pro-Park faction in both the Saenuri Party and the National Assembly. The debate over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system has compounded public anger and uncertainty. (It does not help that all major presidential candidates from the opposition Minju party oppose THAAD in one sense or another.)

The result is a leadership vacuum as South Korea descends into the blood sport of a presidential campaign. Our Korean speaker warned that “almost every foreign policy issue will be politicized in the presidential election: THAAD, inter-Korean relations, Korea’s position on the South China Sea, Korea-Japan relations, the Korea-Japan compromise on comfort women, and other issues such as whether Korea should pursue a pro-US or more balanced foreign policy.”

These two developments – a US presidential campaign followed by a similar election in the ROK – are each potentially troubling on their own. As a one-two punch, however, they could do serious damage to the bilateral relationship. As our speaker noted, “Korea may not be able to meet all US demands coming from the charged atmosphere of the post-election US landscape.” Frustration in the US could easily be matched by anger and anxiety in Korea as well. “Inordinate demands from the US may trigger another round of anti-Americanism amid the 2017 Korean presidential campaign, similar to that during the 2002 Korean presidential election.”

Our US speaker widened the aperture and tried to tie those developments to questions of national identity and history. As he explained, President Park's "Asia Paradox implicitly linked three sources that have traditionally defined South Korea's national identity as challenges to be overcome in a regional security context: anticommunism with North Korea via Trustpolitik, anti-colonialism with Japan, and the 'shrimp among whales' paradigm, which categorizes South Korea's relationship to prospects for major power rivalry, especially between China and the United States." Unfortunately, however, the major initiatives that she launched all stalled, the victim of larger geopolitical trends and trajectories.

The December 2015 Comfort Women deal broke the deadlock, however, and the fourth North Korean fourth nuclear test that was held only days later managed to overshadow domestic resistance to the agreement and raised yet more doubts about the triangulation strategy that Seoul pursued to win Chinese support for dealing with Pyongyang. With considerable assistance from the United States, Seoul and Tokyo have restored a positive trajectory to their relationship and now seem to prioritize the security concerns over issues of history and identity. That may not last, however.

Doubts about the wisdom of the Comfort Women agreement persist. Surveys show support for the deal is higher among the older supporters of President Park and is lower among the younger voters that back the opposition parties. The April 2016 National Assembly elections confirmed the vulnerability of the Park administration to attacks on its policy toward Japan, a vulnerability evident in subsequent public opinion surveys. According to the 2016 Genron NPO/East Asia Institute poll of attitudes in Korea and Japan, Japanese impressions of South Korea dropped to 44 percent unfavorable (from 52 percent the previous year), while ROK views of Japan "improved" to 61 percent unfavorable (from 72.5 percent unfavorable in 2015). Similarly, South Korean assessments of current relations with Japan improved to 62 percent unfavorable (dropping 16 percent from 2015), while Japanese assessments improved to 50 percent from 65 percent. Our US speaker was as anxious as his Korean counterpart when considering the impact of the 2017 Korean presidential campaign on the US-ROK relationship, but he argued that Park's legacy, ironically after three years of little and mostly begrudging contact with her Japanese counterpart, is likely to be an improvement in Seoul-Tokyo relations.

There was little dissent from either country about the potentially deleterious impact of the back to back campaigns. One worry was the prospect of a split between Seoul and Washington if a progressive reclaims the Blue House in 2017. While the uncertainties surrounding a Trump presidency are too many to systematically contemplate, it is possible to envision a Trump administration, skeptical of entanglement with the ROK, indifferent to the resumption of a "Sunshine like" policy in North-South relations. For a Clinton administration, however, which would likely be more hawkish in its policy toward Pyongyang, an accommodative stance in Seoul toward the North could create a rift in the alliance.

US participants also worried that even a Clinton victory would have a hard time restoring Korean (and other allies') faith in US commitments. Skeptics can point to opinion polls that show a growing US weariness with and wariness of foreign intervention, a concern about being "the world's policeman" as domestic problems fester, and a similar resentment or suspicion of

foreign engagement among their own publics. Public disillusionment with the political establishment is a real phenomenon throughout the developed world and a problem that both countries (and others) must address and correct in a meaningful way. The next US president will need to do more to quell foreign doubts about US credibility but the likely continuation of political gridlock in Washington even after a Clinton victory will make any new initiatives difficult to establish or sustain.

What is emerging, however, is a growing sense of security interdependence among South Korea and Japan, a development for which North Korea can take credit. It is noteworthy too that Japan has been a strong advocate of ROK positions in matters of regional diplomacy and security policy and there are no apparent gaps between Seoul and Tokyo on issues regarding the Korean Peninsula. Japan has been a vocal supporter of the unification of the Korean Peninsula under Seoul, prompting one participant to note that South Korea needs to start thinking now about one critical choice to be faced when unification occurs: will it prefer to rebuild the northern part of the country with Chinese money or Japanese money?

Once again, the problem of China presented itself. Even though there is growing anger at Beijing in South Korea, there remains a belief among Koreans – moreso so than Americans or Japanese – that good relations with China are critical to the realization of South Korean interests and ambitions. Currently, the three allies are more closely aligned in their thinking about North Korea than any of them is with China, but there is a potential for divergence that will pose problems for bilateral cooperation (with both Japan and the US) as well as trilateral cooperation among the three. Currently, historical concerns are being subsumed by anger and fear, but one ROK participant warned that Koreans cannot see the end state of US-China relations. With China becoming ever more central to regional economies, Korea cannot afford to antagonize Beijing or ignore its concerns. Thus, he continued, “if the US expects some degree of balancing against China from the ROK, we have a problem.” Worse, after unification there will be no reason to hedge and policy makers in Seoul need to begin to contemplate their reaction when forced to “choose” between the US and China.

That fateful decision is likely years in the future. More immediately, however, there are several pressing tasks for supporters of the US-ROK alliance. First, there is the need to make more strongly the case for the alliance and to counter the charges made by Donald Trump about Korean free- or cheap-riding. Americans need to better understand the reality of our partnership and Koreans need to know that Trump does not speak for a majority of Americans when he makes his fact-free claims. Second, Koreans who back a strong relationship with the United States and a forward-looking partnership with Japan must be ready during the upcoming ROK presidential election campaign to challenge those who seek to misuse history for their political ends. This will not be easy given the emotions and the stakes that are involved, but serious historians must be prepared to counter opportunistic and unfounded assertions about Korea and its historical relations with neighbors. Third, there should be more systematic and unflinching efforts to study past efforts at historical reconciliation between Korea and Japan to gain a crystal-clear understanding of successes and, most importantly, failures. Fourth, similar studies should be conducted to see if there are examples of reconciliation elsewhere in the world to emulate or apply in Northeast Asia. This must be a discriminating and detailed assessment, as the particularities of any historical relationship are vital. Nevertheless, there may be projects and

programs that have been tried in other parts of the world that can offer lessons in what to do, or what to avoid.

Finally, it is especially important to bring young experts, scholars, decisionmakers, and opinion shapers into this dialogue. Too often, these discussions are dominated by the older generation, who have long track records working on these issues and have shown commitment to reconciliation. Their record is mixed, however: after all, we still see this as a problem. Ultimately, success depends on building a cadre of young professionals committed to reconciliation. Also, ironically, it may be important to bring dissenting voices into the dialogue, to ensure that the most important arguments are addressed and the widest possible constituency be established. This is likely to complicate the already difficult process of reaching consensus, but these views must be addressed eventually. As the record makes plain, hoping that time will heal all wounds is a fantasy. Historical reconciliation demands active efforts and the potential security consequences of inaction are dire.

APPENDIX A



**History, Politics, and Security in Northeast Asia:
Implications for Peace and Conflict
Royal Lahaina Resort ♦ Maui ♦ September 1-2, 2016**

AGENDA

Thursday, September 1, 2016

5:00 PM **Welcome and Keynote**

Welcoming Remarks: *Jim KELLY*

Opening Remarks: *KIM Hosup*

Keynote Speech: "Why and How History Matters" *HAN Sung-Joo*

7:00 PM **Dinner**

Friday, September 2, 2016

8:00 AM **Breakfast**

9:30 AM **Session 1: History and Current Implications: Temporal Perspective
Moderator: Ralph COSSA**

"Northeast Asian security architecture and historical origins of discord"
CHUN Chaesung

"Uses and misuses of history in current conflicts in Northeast Asia"
Denny ROY

10:50 AM **Coffee break**

11:00 AM **Session 2: Historical Issues and International Relations: Spatial Perspective
Moderator: Ralph COSSA**

"Trade-off between history and security: Abe's strategy"
CHOI Woondo

"Squaring the Circle: Abe's efforts to reconcile his domestic ideological agenda
with external sensitivities"
Thomas BERGER

12:30 PM **Lunch**

2:00 PM **Session 3: History and Future**

Moderator: HYUN In-taek

“Future of history: How to avoid the next great war?”

HONG Kyu-Dok

“Is there a pathway toward reconciliation on history issues in Northeast Asia?”

Daniel SNEIDER

3:20 PM **Coffee break**

3:40 PM **Session 4: Current Issues and Northeast Asia**

Moderator: HYUN In-taek

“2016 US presidential election and challenges for the Korean and US leadership”

SOHN Byoung-kwon

“Leadership and national identity in Northeast Asia: viability of the comfort women agreement and North Korea's nuclear threat”

Scott SNYDER

5:00 PM **Discussion**

Moderator: HYUN In-taek

5:50 PM **Meeting adjourns**

APPENDIX B



**History, Politics, and Security in Northeast Asia:
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PARTICIPANT LIST

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18. Wonil NOH

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19. Shelley BRANDT

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20. Jesslyn CHEONG

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