

THE WARTIME HISTORY FACTOR IN U.S. POLICY TOWARDS NORTHEAST ASIA

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The ongoing impact of unresolved wartime history issues on relations in Northeast Asia has been painfully evident in recent years. Less obvious has been the manner in which wartime history shapes the role of the United States in this region, particularly its relations with its two principal security allies, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan. The place of wartime history in United States policy has been obscured by several myths.

The first myth is that the U.S. is not involved in the disputes over wartime history, that these are issues that lie solely between Japan and its wartime victims in Asia, such as China and Korea. The second myth is that the U.S. has played no role in trying to solve these issues in the past, that the U.S. has essentially stayed out of these disputes. The third myth is that history issues are not important to the U.S., that our interests are defined principally by security and by economy.

The December 2015 agreement between Japan and the ROK to try to settle one of the most neuralgic issues arising out of their wartime past, the treatment of the Korean women coerced into sexual service by the Japanese Imperial Army during the wartime era, the so-called "comfort women," provides a glimpse behind this wall of myths. The agreement is the product first and foremost of the determination of the leadership of both countries to try to remove a major obstacle to cooperation, after several years of a near freeze in high-level relations. North Korea's increasingly belligerent pursuit of nuclear and missile weapons, combined with China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea, clearly reinforced a sense of shared security threats. But, as this paper will argue below, the agreement also owes a great deal to the direct involvement of the U.S. government, both in public and in quiet diplomacy, to encourage steps toward settling history issues.

The American involvement was based in part on the grudging acceptance in Washington that history issues are a significant threat to U.S. strategic interests. Even if Americans wish to ignore the problems of the past, officials understood that ongoing disputes undermined cooperation in the region that is essential to U.S.

national security. While U.S. officials remain reluctant to admit any historical responsibility for wartime history disputes, the U.S. has in fact been deeply involved in these issues, not only as a combatant in the war but also as the main architect of a postwar settlement that left many of these problems, from territory to compensation for war crimes, unresolved.¹ The U.S. has compounded that responsibility by legally insisting that the San Francisco Peace Treaty marked a final settlement of all claims to compensation for war crimes and resolved the questions of ongoing legal responsibility of Japan. Finally, as we will briefly discuss below, the claim that the U.S. has not been involved in these issues after the treaty settlement is simply not true, particularly as regards its very direct involvement in relations between the ROK and Japan.

The December “comfort women” agreement marks a significant step in Korea-Japan relations, and in the U.S. readiness to confront the wartime historical legacy. But it would be naïve to see the December agreement as anything other than a fragile step forward. The gaps in strategic understanding and the willingness to confront the history problem remain daunting. The history wars are deeply rooted in the politics of identity in both countries. And security perceptions are hardly identical, dictated as they are by geography and, for Koreans, by the unresolved Cold War division of the peninsula. Most importantly, the ability of Koreans and Japanese to bridge these gaps without the help of the United States has been, and remains limited.

The danger for American policy makers is to believe that the history issues can indeed now be put aside, in favor of a shared understanding of the strategic situation in the region. That would be dangerous because it can lead both Korea and Japan to fail to take needed steps to secure the progress that has been made and to move ahead on both the security and history fronts to create the basis for genuine trilateral cooperation.

In order to understand the American role in the pursuit of trilateral cooperation and partnership in Northeast Asia, it is important to look at the historical process that led to this moment.

Trilateral Cooperation: A historical perspective

The construction of trilateral partnership between the United States and its two allies in the region, Japan and the ROK, has long been a strategic goal of American foreign policy.² As the Korean conflict made clear to American policy makers, our

¹ Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel Sneider, “History Wars in Northeast Asia: The United States Helped Spark the Battles. Now It Must End Them,” *Foreign Affairs*, April 10, 2014.

² This paper draws upon ongoing work by the author on trilateral cooperation for the “Pacific Trilateralism” project being carried out by the National Bureau of Asian ResearchResearchResearch.

security commitments to the ROK and Japan are interlinked, both conceptually and operationally. The American defense of Korea depends on the infrastructure of U.S. bases and other rear-area support in Japan. And Korea is the de facto front line, the strategic buffer, for the security of Japan.

In the wake of the Korean War, the U.S. seriously explored the creation of a regional security structure that would parallel the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and even include elements of regional economic association. The goal of collective defense was enshrined in the mutual defense treaty signed in 1953 with the ROK that declares a goal to build a "more comprehensive and effective system of regional security in the Pacific area."³ The security treaty signed with Japan in 1951 referred more vaguely to the role of American forces based in Japan to "be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East."⁴ As has been subsequently revealed, a then secret minute to the treaty allowed American forces in Japan, nominally under the United Nations Command, to respond to an attack on Korea without prior consultation with the government of Japan.⁵

American policymakers soon discovered, however, that what made sense in the minds of strategists foundered on the rocky realities of the region. Asian nationalism, particularly the still powerful mistrust of Japan and opposition to any revival of a regional Japanese security role, was the most powerful obstacle. Also, the Japanese people themselves were reluctant to take a greater security role, preferring to outsource their security to the United States while they focused on postwar economic reconstruction. The official Japanese interpretation of the constitutional prohibitions on the use of force, which were American-imposed, clearly ruled out any collective security agreement that went beyond a narrow definition of self-defense.

Early American efforts to press Japan and the ROK to normalize relations and settle their outstanding issues from the war and Japanese colonial rule met a brick wall. Talks carried out to normalize relations in 1953 broke down, in part because Japanese foreign ministry official Kubota Kanichiro insisted on discussing the

³ See treaty text, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/kor001.asp

⁴ Treaty text available at https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_Treaty_Between_the_United_States_and_Japan

⁵ http://www.hiroshimapeacemedia.jp/mediacenter/article.php?story=20100104161701339_en

beneficial role of Japanese colonial rule in the development of Korea. ⁶ As a 1954 U.S. National Security Council Report wrote frankly: “Underlying this failure and the chronic tension between the two countries is the deeply ingrained Korean fear and suspicion of Japan, and the equally fundamental Japanese sense of superiority over the Koreans.”¹⁷

Despite the abortive attempts to create a regional security structure in the wake of the Korean War, the United States persisted in efforts to bring its two allies together. The normalization of diplomatic relations between the ROK and Japan in 1965 was a milestone, accomplished due to the efforts of Korean and Japanese leaders but not without behind the scenes American mediation. Korea had sought an explicit apology from Japan for its colonial rule and reparations payments as part of any normalization of relations. The United States orchestrated a compromise in which Japan offered indirect compensation to Korea in the form of economic aid and loans that were vital to Korea’s modernization, without labeling it as reparations for wartime and colonial rule.

A memo to President Lyndon Johnson in 1965, advising him on an upcoming meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, argued:

“State calculates that a Japan-ROK settlement will save us \$1 billion over the next ten years (\$600 million in Japanese grants and loans, the rest in anticipated private investment). We are once again at a point where a settlement is within reach. If we miss this time, it will be very hard to get negotiations started again...

[Sato] needs a real push by you, perhaps along the following lines: We fought the Korean War in the interest of Japan’s security as well as our own. A viable Korea is an essential buffer to us, doubly essential to Japan. Nothing the Japanese can do right now, in 1965, would advance the Free World’s interests more successfully than a settlement.”⁸

Korea’s military-led governments were largely content with this approach. There were, however, serious moments of ROK-Japan tension, such as after the attempted assassination of Park Chung-hee in 1974 by a North Korean resident of Japan, which

⁶ “Japanese official calls Seoul ‘arrogant’ in 1953 official document,” *Asahi Shimbun*, June 19, 2013, http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201306190011

⁷ Cited in Daniel Sneider, “The United States and Northeast Asia: The Cold War Legacy,” published in *Cross Currents: Regionalism and Nationalism in Northeast Asia*, Gi-Wook Shin and Daniel C. Sneider, eds, Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center Books, Stanford, 2007, pg 269.

⁸ *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXIX, Part 2*, page 65. For fuller documentation of U.S. efforts to mediate differences between Japan and the ROK, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968, Volume XXIX Part 1*.

again required informal American mediation. But Korea's democratization of Korea in 1987 unleashed powerful civic forces that raised the visibility of painful historical issues, including Korean collaboration with Japanese colonial rule, the "comfort women," and the territorial dispute over the rocky islets that the Koreans call Dokdo and Japanese Takeshima. The legacy of Japanese colonial rule re-emerged in Korean life, from academia to politics.

During the 1990s, progress was made toward reconciliation on wartime and colonial history issues, without an American role, largely due to political changes in both countries. In Japan, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party in Japan, which had resisted moves to confront unfinished history issues, lost power in 1993. It was only able to return to power the following year by aligning with its archrival, the Japan Socialist Party and later formed the now ruling coalition with the pacifist Komei party and other minor parties. The breakthrough "Kono statement," issued in 1993 after revelations by Japanese historians and the public emergence of Korean victims, acknowledged a Japanese official role in the coercion of women to provide sexual services to the Japanese Imperial Army. Even more important, the 1995 statement on the 50th anniversary of the war, issued by Socialist Prime Minister Murayama, ruling in coalition with the LDP, offered explicit contrition for Japanese 'aggression and colonial rule.'

In Korea, the end of military rule in 1987 and the democratization of the political system had an enormous impact on the handling of wartime history issues. It unleashed previously suppressed forces that raised previously taboo issues such as Korean collaboration with the Japanese colonial regime and the failure of Park Chung-hee's government to press Japan for reparations for wartime crimes. Later in 1998 and again in 2003, it brought to power progressive governments, led respectively by Kim Dae Jung and Roo Moo-hyun. They were supported by most civil society activists on history issues and were better positioned to find avenues for reconciliation. Kim did so at the time of his 1998 visit to Japan, accepting Japanese apologies for the war and forming a joint commission of historians to examine the past. The two governments also made a stab at resolving the "comfort women" issue in the mid-1990s with the formation of the Asian Women's Fund but it failed due to the opposition of Korean civil society.

The progress stalled, however, and was even rolled back, during the next decade. The return of conservative rule in Japan brought into power governments that sought to effectively overturn the Kono statement and revise the Murayama apology. Meanwhile, Korean governments found it hard to resist the temptation to play the card of anti-Japanese nationalism, particular when their popularity waned in the last years of a presidential administration.

The American role and the path forward

U.S policy during this period was largely shaped by the primacy of security concerns, most of all the continuing threat from North Korea, compounded from the late

1980s by its pursuit of nuclear weapons. In this context, the U.S. sought to bring Japan and Korea together in a structure of defacto trilateral security cooperation. In 1999, in response to burgeoning North Korean missile and nuclear challenges, the United States set up the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG) with Japan and the ROK to offer a united policy response. Such cooperation extended to the establishment of the Six Party talks on the North Korean nuclear program that began in 2003.

The U.S. has worked to forge working level cooperation among defense and military officials, including quiet discussion of joint logistical operations in the event of conflict. With the encouragement of the U.S. military, Korean and Japanese defense and military officials have held consultations on mutual security issues, albeit under the radar. When a bilateral agreement on intelligence sharing between the two defense establishments foundered recently, the U.S. helped to transcend the differences by forging a trilateral agreement that was more politically palatable.

American policy makers tended to see wartime history problems as an irritant, to be put aside in the expectation that they would diminish over time. They resisted calls for American involvement, fearing that the U.S. would only end up being blamed by both sides for not supporting either. That said, American officials did understand that history issues could not be completely ignored.

The joint announcement of the Japanese and South Korean foreign ministers of a breakthrough agreement on the comfort women issue, issued on December 28th, was the product of a delicate compromise forged by the two leaders, South Korean President Park Geun-hye and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo.

While giving due credit to the political leadership, this agreement could not have been reached without the persistent pressure of the Obama administration.⁹ President Obama delivered some of that personally in public statements. But much of the work was done out of sight, where American officials were engaged down to a very detailed level of the disputes over specific language in the agreement, careful not to intervene too much but also clearly communicating to both sides the American insistence that a breakthrough was possible with compromise.

The U.S. role flowed from the perception, deepened in the last few years, that the dysfunctional relationship between South Korea and Japan threatened to undermine American strategic interests. Korean and Japanese leaders had been unable to meet in a bilateral summit for more than three years. The frozen ties at the highest level between the two principal American allies in Northeast Asia weakened the defense

⁹ The discussion that follows in the U.S. role in these negotiations is taken from the author's article in the Japanese publication *Toyo Keizai*. See "Behind the Comfort Women Agreement," *Tokyo Business Today*, January 10, 2016. <http://toyokeizai.net/articles/-/99891>

of the Korean peninsula against an unstable North Korean regime and aided China's bid for regional dominance.

The origins of this agreement actually go back to the previous government of the Democratic Party of Japan, which came into office seeking to improve relations with its Asian neighbors and ready to recognize Japan's responsibility for wartime historical crimes. Then Prime Minister Kan Naoto took a significant step in 2010, marking the 100th anniversary of the Japanese annexation of Korea by issuing an apology for colonial rule. "I would like to have courage to squarely confront the facts of history and humility to accept them, as well as to be honest to reflect upon the errors of our own," Kan said in his statement.¹⁰

South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, a former businessman, was eager to move ahead to improve ties with Japan. On August 30, 2011, however, the Constitutional Court of Korea ruled that the government's failure to find a solution with Japan to compensate the surviving "comfort women" was a violation of the Constitution. Following that, officials from the two foreign ministries began discussions to find a formula that would go beyond the Asian Women's Fund formed in the 1990s, which was rejected by many of the victims and by Korean civil society activists because Japan did not take responsibility for its historical act and compensation payments were made from private contributions rather than official funds. The officials discussed a new agreement that included a letter of apology from the Japanese Prime Minister to the victims and humanitarian payments out of the official budget, though not as formal reparations (the Japanese insisted, and continue to do so, that they had settled all such claims with the San Francisco peace treaty and the 1965 treaty to normalize relations with Korea).

In the meantime, however, the Japanese premiership changed hands in September, with the more conservative minded Noda Yoshihiko taking over. Noda was the son of an army paratrooper who personally shared the historical revisionism of many Japanese rightwing conservatives such as Abe, including supporting visits to Yasukuni shrine and opposing the Kono statement acknowledging the Imperial Army's official role in coercing women to provide sexual services.

Noda and Lee met at a summit meeting in Kyoto on December 18, 2011. One week earlier Korean activists had erected a controversial statue memorializing the comfort women across the street from the Japanese Embassy in Seoul.

There are two differing accounts of what happened. In the Japanese account, faithfully put out through the media, Noda was prepared to discuss economic and security issues but was surprised when Lee insisted on dealing with the comfort women issue. According to a senior Korean official, and partially confirmed by

¹⁰ Statement by Prime Minister Naoto Kan, 10 August, 2010, http://japan.kantei.go.jp/kan/statement/201008/10danwa_e.html

knowledgeable Japanese sources, Lee went into the meeting understanding that officials had reached a basic agreement. He was surprised when Noda, personally enraged, spent the opening dinner demanding that the statue be removed and stating there was no need for a new apology. That battle continued into the next day of talks.

Both sides made a stab at reviving the negotiation the following spring. Under the direction of then Vice Foreign Minister Sasae Kenichiro, the Japanese offered a package of a letter from the prime minister, a face-to-face apology by the Japanese ambassador to Korea and humanitarian aid, but without accepting official responsibility. By then, however, the breakdown in trust was too much to overcome. It would be almost four years until the leaders of South Korea and Japan would meet again in a bilateral summit.

Park and Abe both came into office deeply wary of each other. Park felt deeply about the comfort women issue and was determined to settle it, arguing it should be done before the remaining women, then numbering only in the 50s, passed away. As a member of the National Assembly, Park had personally attended the U.S. Congressional hearings on the 2007 resolution on this issue. Relations deteriorated rapidly however after Abe signaled his intention to reverse the official Japanese government stance on the war, not least to deny any official role in the coercion of the women.

American officials began to become increasingly concerned by the rupture in relations between Japan and South Korea, particularly in light of China's growing military assertiveness. In November 2013 the Chinese alarmed Washington by declaring the establishment of an air defense zone in the East China Sea that overlapped both Japanese and Korean territory. Vice President Joe Biden made a swing in December through Tokyo, Beijing and Seoul, dominated by this issue. Thinking he had secured a promise from Abe not to take provocative steps on history issues, Biden pressed Park to agree to a summit with Abe. Shortly after Biden's visit, I met with Park as part of Stanford group and we found her clearly unhappy with the American pressure, expressing concern that Abe could not be trusted. Her resistance was vindicated only days later when Abe shocked Biden by visiting Yasukuni shrine, prompting an unusual public slap on the wrist issued by the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo.

This triggered some serious debate within the U.S. government about the efficacy of getting involved in the disputes on history between Korea and Japan. While explicitly rejecting a mediating role, American pressure on both Tokyo and Seoul became more visible, led by the President. In March 2014 Obama brought the two into a trilateral meeting on the sidelines of the nuclear security summit in the Hague. At that meeting, the U.S. tried to overcome differences by focusing on shared security threats, namely those from North Korea. But that approach apparently failed.

Obama tackled the history issues more directly during a trip the next month to both capitals. He was careful in Japan to avoid pressing Abe in public though he may have been more direct in private. In Seoul, however, Obama went beyond Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's use of term "sexual slavery" to directly address the issue of Japanese responsibility for war crimes. At a joint press conference with Park, the President said regarding comfort women:

"With respect to the historical tensions between South Korea and Japan, I think that any of us who look back on the history of what happened to the comfort women here in South Korea, for example, have to recognize that this was a terrible, egregious violation of human rights. Those women were violated in ways that, even in the midst of war, was shocking. And they deserve to be heard; they deserve to be respected; and there should be an accurate and clear account of what happened."¹¹

This message, however, was very carefully paired with both a warning to Prime Minister Abe to move forward and an admonition to both leaders not to allow history issues to block progress on other fronts, from security cooperation to other arenas of international relations. Obama went on to say:

"I think Prime Minister Abe recognizes, and certainly the Japanese people recognize, that the past is something that has to be recognized honestly and fairly. But I also think that it is in the interest of both Japan and the Korean people to look forward as well as backwards and to find ways in which the heartache and the pain of the past can be resolved, because, as has been said before, the interests today of the Korean and Japanese people so clearly converge. They're both democracies. You both have thriving free markets. Both are cornerstones of a booming economic region. Both are strong allies and friends of the United States. And so when you think about the young people of the Republic of Korea and Japan, my hope would be that we can honestly resolve some of these past tensions, but also keep our eye on the future and the possibilities of peace and prosperity for all people."

Alongside the public statements, messages were being delivered quietly and privately, according to senior U.S. officials. "The US State Department as well as White House played a pivotal role to move PM Abe this time," a senior Korean source involved in managing relations with Japan told me. "And the U.S. side made it

¹¹ Press Conference with President Obama and President Park of the ROK, Blue House, Seoul, April 25, 2014, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/04/25/press-conference-president-obama-and-president-park-republic-korea>

no secret to the Korean side whenever high-ranking officials from Seoul visited Washington.”

Prime Minister Abe certainly heard the American message, as evidenced by his decision during his 2015 visit to Washington to clearly state his commitment not to reverse the Kono statement, and by his decision to avoid provocation in the wording of the August statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of the war.

Park visited Washington in mid-October and found American policy makers echoing Japanese accusations that South Korea was leaning toward Beijing. Within Korean government and policy making circles there were calls for the President to abandon her insistence on a comfort women deal as a precondition for a summit and to adopt a “two track” approach to relations with Japan, separating history issues from security issues. She shifted her stance and met with Abe in early November, on the sidelines of the trilateral summit with the Chinese.

In the year and half that has followed, the Korean and Japanese foreign ministries met as many as 12 times at a Director General level in formal negotiations on the comfort women issue. American officials were closely following those talks and quietly encouraging both sides to compromise, according to a senior U.S. official. But those talks did not get serious until after the bilateral summit in Seoul when both leaders made a commitment to try to conclude an agreement by the end of the year, which would mark the end of the anniversary of the normalization of relations.

The December 2015 deal went beyond the framework first discussed four years ago. On the key issue of Japan taking responsibility and acknowledging the official role in the brothel system, the Koreans backed off from insisting on “legal responsibility” but won an important battle to include that word ‘responsibility’ and Japan admitted “an involvement of the Japanese military authorities.” Combined with the agreement not to try to reverse the original Kono statement, that marked a huge shift for Abe.

The negotiations also came up with a formula to create a foundation to which the Japanese government would contribute official funds. As the senior Korean involved in the talks told me: “It was a new invention and I think it was a very good idea to avoid a definition of the money (compensation, atonement, or something else) that Japan is going to pay as part of the deal. Also it is noteworthy that PM Abe personally apologized since he has been denying the comfort women issue from the beginning of his political life.”

The Japanese, for their part, insisted on the assurance that this was the final and irreversible resolution of this issue. Koreans were opposed to this wording but Abe, according to the Korean source, insisted and the Koreans accepted it finally. The Koreans also agreed to try to relocate the statue, a Japanese demand that has been consistent going back to Noda and the beginning of this long negotiation.

The American response was not surprisingly highly supportive and American officials tried to avoid any claim to have facilitated the agreement. In a background briefing, a “senior official,” understood to be Assistant Secretary of State Daniel Russel, went out of his way to give credit to the two governments and their leaders. But he could not resist a clear hint at a more active U.S. role:

“The U.S. has played an appropriate and constructive role. The Obama Administration strongly supported all gestures of reconciliation. We have shared our best advice; we’ve underscored the benefits to us and to everybody in reaching an agreement; and we’ve worked quietly to, where possible, prevent or to resolve misunderstandings between the two.”¹²

Looking ahead

The danger of the agreement falling apart is very much on the minds of officials in both Washington and Seoul, and hopefully Tokyo. The two leaders are now heavily invested in this succeeding, despite the political backlash in both countries. Abe and Park will both be in Washington in April for another nuclear security summit and a trilateral meeting may be on the agenda. Abe is eager to demonstrate his claim to leadership in Northeast Asia, and Park is facing tremendous challenges at home and from North Korea.

The steps toward cooperation would seem to indicate that Korea and Japan have moved closer toward a shared strategic perception, in line with that of their American ally, and that there is some commitment to put history issues on a parallel track that will not undermine cooperation. But it would be premature to conclude that history issues have been put to rest.

Koreans fear that the Abe administration has merely put its obsession with reversing the postwar judgment on Japan temporarily to the side, mostly to please the Americans. The recent efforts of the Japanese foreign ministry to oppose any discussion of “comfort women” at the United Nations Human Rights Commission are seen as evidence of the lurking compulsion to suppress these wartime issues. The December agreement has not been implemented, particularly the formation of a fund for compensation, and it is not yet clear if Tokyo will insist on the removal of a statue erected to commemorate the women across the street from its Embassy in Seoul. Japanese similarly mistrust the Koreans and lobby in Washington to put the responsibility for failure on them. Both sides watch to see if the U.S. is still committed to pressing forward on these wartime issues.

¹² Background briefing – Developments on the Relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea, State Department, December 28, 2015, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2015/12/250881.htm>

There also remains a serious divergence between Korean and Japanese strategic policy and threat perceptions. The two are bound by their alliance partnership with the United States but their preoccupations are distinct. There is a widespread feeling among Koreans that their country is caught between their largest trading partner, China, and their American ally. Some talk about Korea acting as a 'bridge' between the two great powers.

The central issue for ROK security policy continues to be the division of the Korean peninsula, the ongoing threat of war on the peninsula arising out of North Korean miscalculation and undiminished desire to reunify Korea under its command. One element of the ROK response to the North Korean threat is their obvious effort to drive a wedge between Pyongyang and its Chinese patrons (just as the North seeks to do the same between Seoul and Washington). All of these combine to make the ROK reluctant to be drawn into an overt balancing strategy against the PRC. Both progressive and conservative leaders in Korea share this view.

For their part, conservative Japanese leaders and policy makers tend to view Korea as a secondary concern. The North Korean missile test over Japanese territory in 1998 alarmed Japanese and the issue of Japanese abducted by the North Koreans has been a prominent cause among conservatives. But there is little discussion of the importance of Korea to the defense and security of Japan, except to try to justify the recent revision of the interpretation of the constitutional restrictions on collective self-defense. Rather, Japanese are focused almost entirely on the impact of China's economic and military power on Japan's future.

These gaps in strategic perception have been kept largely under the surface, including by American defense and security planners who emphasize the shared interests and wish to avoid disrupting the tentative steps toward trilateral cooperation. They remain wary of being drawn into choosing sides between their two allies.

While the United States needs to continue to steer its allies toward a shared understanding of the security imperatives that would underpin trilateral cooperation, American officials are well aware of the danger of backsliding on the "comfort women" agreement. The history issue may resurface at the time of the upcoming G-7 Summit in Japan, particularly if President Obama or Secretary of State John Kerry decide to visit Hiroshima, which would mark the first such visit by a senior U.S. official to the site of the atomic bombing.

The reality of American engagement with wartime history issues, the acknowledgement of the impossibility of avoiding such issues in the conduct of American foreign policy in Northeast Asia, should now be evident. But the political will, on the part of the United States and its two allies in the region, to continue to seek ways to foster reconciliation, is still in doubt. The lesson of recent years, however, is that trilateral cooperation rests in part on confronting the unresolved legacy of the wartime past.

END

**PRINCIPLED VICTIMIZATION:
Nationalism in Chinese Domestic Politics**

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Channel surfing in China would make viewers believe that World War II in Asia has never ended. On Chinese television there is a relentless barrage of anti-Japanese programming: dramas, documentaries, lectures and talk shows all endlessly castigate Japanese perfidy and unwillingness to face up to history. The Japanese are portrayed as cartoonish one-dimensional embodiments of evil while the Chinese are either courageous upstanding self-sacrificing peasants or traitorous Kuomintang puppets.¹ While Japan's crimes in China are undeniable, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s inability to face up to its own history honestly and its insistent presentation of China as a victim in order to distract the domestic audience from inquiring too deeply into the regime's many shortcomings, may be losing its effectiveness. This paper will examine elements of the CCP's use of history to bolster support among the Chinese citizenry at a time when the regime appears to be confronting a crisis of legitimacy at home and pushback abroad.

Since its founding in 1921, the CCP has always had a love-hate relationship with the country's history. The party was born in the midst of the May 4th Movement of the late nineteen-teens and early 1920s. This era generated profound reflections on China's fall from its position as the world's leading civilization to its then status as "the sick man of Asia." Much of the blame was placed on the nation's culture, dominated by Confucianism and its emphasis on harmony, seeking a middle path, and deference to authority. One of the most famous writers of the era, Lu Xun, in his short story, "A Madman's Diary" summed up the essence of Confucianism as "eat people," in other words, self-destructive cannibalism.

¹ A trip to a bookstore or magazine kiosk similarly draws attention to the prominence of anti-Japanese publications and video games.

While the Japanese had successfully strengthened themselves in the face of Western imperialism, the Chinese had not. The Treaty of Nanjing of 1842 ended the First Opium War (1839-1842) and opened the door to a series of Unequal Treaties and extraterritoriality under which foreigners in China were not subject to Chinese laws or authority. China's mid-century Self-Strengthening Movement had limited success and in any event was superseded by the massively destructive Taiping Rebellion that had to be put down with the aid of foreign forces and commanders.

To add to the humiliation, the self-strengthened Japanese imperial army defeated the Qing dynasty in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 resulting in the Japanese taking Taiwan and other Chinese territories as colonies. The Japan had historically served as China's younger brother, learning the essential elements of civilization (*hanzi (kanji)*), literature, philosophy (Confucianism), religion (Buddhism), science and technology and so on. In the hierarchical Confucian world view, the fact that the younger brother had literally slapped around his older sibling was another unbearable humiliation. World War II, which began in Asia much earlier than in Europe, witnessed even more evidence of the weakness of Chinese civilization and state power, with the very existence of the nation at risk through the first half of the twentieth century.

In some of Lu Xun's other works he continued to castigate his countrymen as prisoners asleep in a cage unaware of their condition. Should he awaken them? As a former doctor, he wrestled with the dilemma of whether he should apply medication or let them suffocate in ignorance. In his classic satire, "The True Story of Ah Q" Lu Xun presents an indelible portrait of a Chinese Everyman who is

humiliated at every turn by people above and below him, but is always able to rationalize the insults away by claiming moral superiority: people who beat him up show their own moral turpitude and lack of civility.

When the CCP established the People's Republic of China on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong declared that "the Chinese people have stood up!" That is to say, the literal century of humiliation was over and a new page was going to be written with the CCP-led revival of China. But this was not to be a revival of once-glorious but now faded traditional Chinese civilization. Rather, inspired by the universal truths of scientific Marxism-Leninism, China would now go in a totally different direction, striding victoriously along the path toward socialism and then communism.

One central problem for this mission was that Chinese history did not accord with the path laid out by Marx for Europe with feudalism then capitalism, followed by socialism and, eventually, communism. If anything, China had been a prime example of what Marx disparagingly referred to as "the Asiatic Mode of Production" which ended in something of a dead end. The CCP had achieved victory in the name of building socialism, so how could it accept any suggestion that China was not following the universal path of historical development laid out carefully by Marx?

So CCP historians reinterpreted Chinese history to accord with the stages of Europe, even though traditional Chinese social and political structure bore little or no resemblance to "feudalism" (although Japan actually did). They labeled dynastic China as "feudal" with landlords standing in for landed nobility and peasants for serfs, even though these were not fixed categories and Chinese society was noted for

the opportunities for upward mobility primarily through education that, in theory, was available to all regardless of social status.

The CCP claimed to have liberated China from “three great mountains” of feudalism, imperialism, and bureaucrat-capitalism. This final mountain requires a bit of elaboration. Foreign companies, a few local big capitalists, and the KMT state enterprises dominated the “modern” economy. So if China had anything resembling “capitalism” this was it and it was small and concentrated in Treaty Ports (ports opened through the Unequal Treaty System where foreigners enjoyed extraterritoriality), particularly Shanghai and its environs. So the CCP faced the challenge of building socialism without ever having capitalism as predicted by Marx. In other words, from the beginning it was setting out on a unique historical trajectory, even when compared to its new “Big Brother,” the Soviet Union.

The CCP also determined to erase not only the image of “the sick man of Asia” but also to reclaim territories that had been wrenched from it during the century of humiliation. Most prominently that meant Hong Kong from the British, Macao from the Portuguese, and Taiwan from the American-backed KMT which retreated there and established its rump Republic of China government after losing the civil war.

The famous Chinese historical novel, *Romance of the Three Kingdoms*, opens with the oft-quoted line: 话说天下大势 分久必合 合久必分 – “it is said the great trend under heaven is that those which have long been separated must unite, those which have long been united must separate.” This truism, which all Chinese know from childhood has been a guiding principle of the CCP. In its view, because of imperialism, China has not been unified, so part of its historical mission, separate

from the Marxist dictum of building socialism, is to reunite the parts of China which are still separate, at this time only Taiwan, and also to prevent the PRC, that, according to the 1982 state constitution, "is a unitary multinational state built up jointly by the people of all its nationalities," from once more falling into the warlordism of the 1920s which drastically weakened the new Republic of China established in 1912, or the separation of regions nominally autonomous because of their history as far-flung areas not always part of "China." This of course includes Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia (Neimeng). Officially, these are autonomous regions subject to the rule of Beijing. China is definitely not a *federal* system; all power resides in and is distributed by the center. The localities do not have the right to secede or to assert themselves against the center.

Since the 1990s, a number of foreign scholars have questioned the means by which the Manchus' Qing dynasty brought "minority" regions under Beijing's control and the nature of relations between center and periphery. The CCP's historians have attacked this "New Qing History" as another example of foreign support for "splittism" and "separatism," as it argues that the Qing did not try to "Sinicize" these non-Han people, but rather accepted a multiracial empire, much of it created through conquest and not what we would now call "soft power." In other words, Qing China, that without question was a victim of Western and Japanese imperialism, was also imperialistic itself, conquering neighboring territories and incorporating them into the dynasty. Giving any credence or legitimacy to this view of history is tantamount to questioning the CCP's claims about what territories have "always" been part of China.

When it comes to this issue, the CCP has staked so much of its legitimacy on its success at unifying China (almost), driving out imperialists and establishing effective material claims to other territories it asserts have historically been part of China but that the state hadn't bothered to push until recently, that should it show signs of weakness in the face of foreign challenges, it risks opening a Pandora's box of claims of people all over China to genuine autonomy and possibly even independence.

This is crucial to understanding what might strike some observers as China's unnecessary assertion of claims to islands in the East China Sea also claimed by Japan, and islands in the South China Sea claimed by Vietnam, the Philippines and Taiwan, as well as pushing into sea lanes it has earlier acknowledged belong to Indonesia. While some outside observers label Chinese actions as "provocative," Beijing responds by claiming to be the victim of anti-China sentiments stirred up by troublemakers in these other countries (or, in the case of Taiwan, territories), backed up by the United States.

In April 2011, the remodeled National Museum in Beijing opened an exhibit called "The Road to Rejuvenation" (复兴之路). Newly ascended CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping toured it with the new Politburo Standing Committee in November 2012 and used this visit to announce his vision of "The China Dream." This has two parts: one is that every Chinese citizen can realize his or her dream of a comfortable (小康) standard of living, and that China itself can achieve a position of global respect, or, as the 19th century slogan also adopted by Japan and Korea has it,

“wealth and power” (富国强兵). Xi thereby linked together the renewed greatness of China with the enrichment and fulfillment of its people.

The exhibition manages to elide the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, party-led debacles for which it has not apologized.

In the last year the Chinese have begun to formulate details of the “One Belt One Road” program which is designed to link coastal China with Europe through Central Asia. In other words, this is a modernization and institutionalization of the old Silk Road. This quite clearly involves China’s assertion of financial, technical and political power over this vast and largely unstable region. This is partially to shore up support for its tough policy on the large Muslim minority in China’s central Asian region, getting buy-in from the authoritarian leaders of the neighboring countries involved to clamp down on their own restive people and ensure that they don’t link up with their fellow ethnics in China and cause unrest.

While pressing historical territorial claims externally and internally, and pledging an improved standard of living to its people and rejuvenated top tier status on the global stage, Xi Jinping has acknowledged quite publicly that there is a great deal of discontent and frustration within the citizenry directed at the Party itself. This is focused primarily around corruption at all levels of the regime. He has tasked his comrade Wang Qishan with the heavy responsibility of cleaning up corruption and shoring up legitimacy.

At the same time, Xi is tightly cracking down on freedom of expression and dissent, narrowing and ideologizing the education field, tightening controls over all forms of media, including the internet, imprisoning lawyers, and circumscribing the

space for civil society, especially foreign non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which he sees as having ulterior motives of subverting the Party's legitimacy. Domestic challengers are labeled "splittists," "separatists," and even "terrorists," many of them allegedly (and not necessarily unlikely) in league with foreign forces.

On the economic front, 2015 saw a major slowdown in growth, and that is continuing into 2016. gyrations in the stock market, capital outflows, currency fluctuations, unemployment and ongoing concerns over pollution all also raise questions among the populace as to the legitimacy and competence of the party and its system.

Returning to Marx, since Deng Xiaoping, the CCP has drastically downplayed Marxist ideology. It has done this mostly by promoting the contentless slogan, "Build Socialism With Chinese Characteristics." Where many people point out that China has now become, with CCP backing and profiting, a marketized, privatized and globalized economy, the official line is that this may look like capitalism but in reality is "the primary stage of socialism." In other words, the post-1949 leadership mistakenly tried to build socialism prematurely, as China had never had the capitalist economy that would provide the material foundation for a proletarian-led socialist revolution. Therefore it has to back up and create this foundation. It utilizes capitalist tools and well as international capital to do this, but because the ultimate goal remains achieving socialism and then communism, it is mistaken to argue that the second "C" in CCP in actuality stands for "Capitalism." Anyone who dares to do so has the ulterior motive of challenging the Party's legitimacy as well as vision.

Because of the bankruptcy and illogicality of communist ideology, the party has clearly turned to nationalism as the foundation of its claims to legitimacy and monopoly of power. It asserts that because the CCP unified China and led it to its current global prominence, it therefore is beyond challenge and only has the best interest of the people in mind. It hopes to mobilize youth around the idea of the rejuvenation of national and civilizational greatness, recognizing, at least implicitly, that China's globalized, internet-savvy and consumption-obsessed youth are not easily swayed by the dictums of Marx, whoever reinterprets him for the 21st century.

For much of the past decade, as the economy boomed, the CCP could lay valid claim to contributing to the revival of great power status, not just regionally but also globally. However, as the economy has softened, so has pushback. The South China Sea is one region where countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines in particular have become especially assertive. The Philippines has filed suit under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea challenging China's claims to certain islands and reefs. The Chinese are undertaking massive land reclamation and defense construction (and environmental devastation) throughout the region, all the time claiming that this is purely defensive in nature, or to promote tourism.

Meanwhile, the US navy has been patrolling the seas in the name of Freedom of Navigation. The US argues that it has no territorial claims but just wants to ensure that it and all other nations have the freedom to send their ships through there without interference. The Chinese meet regularly with the ASEAN leaders and, again, deny that they are asserting claims over any other nations' territory. The argument is that it is and always has been Chinese, so no other nations have a legitimate claim

over it. Beijing prefers to throw its weight around and “negotiate” with the much smaller ASEAN countries bilaterally, but increasingly they are working in tandem to halt Chinese advances.

Beijing is also facing other challenges in its periphery. It had more or less seen Myanmar as a pseudo-colony which it was developing for natural resources and access to the ocean to face India, much as it has done in Pakistan. But the sudden democratization of Myanmar and cancellation of several projects caught Beijing off-guard. It is trying to recalibrate its relations with the country and its new leadership.

The ongoing protests and demonstrations in Hong Kong, only likely to get more contentious as next year’s elections roll around have also caught Beijing unprepared and devoid of constructive policies. The election of Tsai Ying-wen in Taiwan in January also throws a spanner in the works, and Beijing is taking a hard line towards her as her inauguration date draws near.

When confronted by this external pushback and domestic discontent, Beijing falls back on history. It once more raises the issue of the century of humiliation and unwillingness of imperialists and revanchists in Japan and the United States to acknowledge China’s rejuvenation and accept it as a true partner. They say that the U.S. is responsible for reviving the “Cold War.” They repeatedly claim to be operating a principled foreign policy based on the sacred nature of sovereignty, putting forth often dubious historical claims to territories which other countries claim as well. It denies them the right to assert their “principles” which might differ.

Traditionally in China, the victorious dynasty wrote the history of the previous dynasties as a cautionary tale, pointing out where they went wrong and how the glorious new dynasty would not make mistakes and would last forever. Very much in this tradition, the CCP uses and interprets history to assert its claims against domestic and foreign doubters and challengers. But it looks as if more and more people are not buying it.

History and Politics in China:

Zhonghua nationalism and its Domestic Political Implications

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Introduction

There are some examples that are hard to be explained by conventional theories of International Relations. China is not an exception to this trend, if one has observed Sino-US relationship since 1949, when the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) was established by the Communist Party of China (CPC). For example, even though there was a huge gap of military capabilities between the United States and China, Beijing determined to prepare for an extreme confrontation with Washington when the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-96 occurred. In the 1980s, when the issues of the Japanese history textbooks and the *Yasukuni* Shrine took placed, the Chinese government could remain calm and managed its people's anti-Japanese sentiment and demonstrations. However, the Chinese government in 2016 seems to very difficult to make any strategic concession on the various bargaining tables with the United States, Japan, and ASEAN countries because of Chinese people's nationalistic and political demand that continuously asks and urges the Chinese leaders to show strengthened China's power and influence in the international community.

Why the Chinese nationalism has strongly impacted on its domestic and foreign policies? Many argue that the leaders of CPC have politically utilized *Zhonghua* nationalism since the end of the Cold War era in order to replace the roles of Communist ideology. However, at the same time, the nationalism with the Chinese people's memories of modern history has brought about a significant political backlash. For further understanding of Chinese *Zhonghua* nationalism and its implication on the Chinese domestic politics, this research will attempt to theoretically approach the nature and emergence of the Chinese *Zhonghua* nationalism. One may say that it is not a proper way to understand Chinese *Zhonghua* nationalism through conventional nationalism theories that are rooted from Western philosophies. However, this research will not use the theories to understand the nature of *Zhonghua* nationalism but try to explain the Chinese political dilemmas caused by *Zhonghua* nationalism through the conventional nationalism theories. I will also argue why and how the Chinese leaders of CPC have utilized *Zhonghua* nationalism in domestic politics since the end of the Cold War period. Finally, this research will analyze the inherent

controversies of *Zhonghua* nationalism due to the complicated relationship between *Han* people and other ethnic minority groups in China's modern history..

Theoretical Background

Generally Speaking, the theories of nationalism can be classified into several schools of thought. For example, Anthony D. Smith suggests five schools of thought: primordialism, perennialism, modernism, ethno-symbolism, and postmodernism,¹ while Sheila L. Croucher categorizes the theories into three groups: primordialism, instrumentalism, and constructivism.² On the other hand, Louis L. Snyder divides and explains them along with regional trends: European fissiparous nationalism, African black nationalism, Asian anti-colonial nationalism, Middle East politico-religious nationalism, Latin populist nationalism, the U.S. melting-pot nationalism, and the Soviet messianic nationalism.³ Although scholars of nationalism classify those theories somewhat differently, they generally agree with views that primordialist and modernist theories are the two pillars of theories of nationalism and that ethno-symbolism emerged as alternative theories besides the two pillars. Therefore, I will mainly use the three categories to classify theories of nationalism in order to analyze the nature and characteristics of Chinese *Zhonghua* nationalism in this research: 1) primordialism, 2) modernism, and 3) ethno-symbolism

Generally speaking, the early studies of nationalism were led by historians from the 1920s, such as Carlton Hayes, Hans Kohn, and E. H. Carr.⁴ For instance, Kohn distinguished the origins and nation building processes of 'Western' and 'Eastern' nationalism in Europe in his book *The Idea of Nationalism* (1944). He argues and characterizes that the nationalism on the West side of the Rhine, such as England, France, America, is rational and voluntaristic, while the nationalism on the East side, such as Germany, Italy, Eastern European countries, and Asian countries, is organic and determinist. The Kohn's typology later directly and deeply influenced the studies of civic and ethnic nationalism. In *Nationalism and After* (1945), E. H. Carr also showed how sociological factors affected the development of European nationalism. He argues that in the first stage, European nationalism was influenced by

¹ Anthony D. Smith. *Nationalism and Modernism* (London and New York: Routledge. 1998); Anthony D. Smith "Theories of Nationalism: alternative models of nation formation" in Michael Leifer. Ed. *Asian Nationalism*. (London and New York: Routledge. 2000).

² Croucher, Sheila L. *Globalization and Belonging: The Politics of Identity in a Changing World*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc. 2004, pp. 122-134.

³ See Snyder, Louis L. *The New Nationalism*. New Brunswick, NJ and London. Transaction Publishers. 2003.

⁴ Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism and Modernism: A critical Survey of Recent theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London and New York: Routledge. 1998. p. 16.

monarchical, dynastic, and mercantilist ideas. Then from the late eighteenth century, it characterized popular, democratic, and free trading. From the 1890s to the 1940s, Carr views that the economic nationalism based on the fully socialized mass nations proliferated across Europe and eventually brought about the continental wars.

In the 1950s, with the process of decolonization and the rise of new states in Africa and Asia, the historian-centered studies of nationalism began to be supplemented and, to some extent, overtaken by the political and sociological analyses of the Third World anti-colonial nationalism.⁵ With the new academic trend in the studies of nationalism, many theorists of nationalism have argued on the nature of nationalism, especially what factors caused the emergence of nationalism and the nature of its rise.

First, the primordialist perspective draws mainly from the works of sociologists and anthropologists in the 1950s and 1960s. Primordialists, such as Edward Shils, Pierre Van Den Berghe, and Clifford Geertz, hold that nationalism is a primordial category or a primordial attachment. They also regard the cultures of kinship, language, religion, race, and territory as the decisive elements that decide a person's nationalist identification.

A group of scholars from the primordialist theorists began to argue somewhat different views of the emergence and continuity of nationalism since the end of the 1970s. Perennialism, which, of course, seems to have a similar view to primordialism, holds that nations have existed continuously and/or recurrently from the immemorial time,⁶ and nationalism is simply the ideology and political movement for an already existing nation. Among many perennialists, Joshua Fishman (1980) and Hugh Seton-Watson (1977) regard ethnicity as the major root,⁷ whereas Walker Connor (1978 and 1994) and Donald Horowitz (1985 and 1991) consider languages and ethnic ties based on kinships and myths as the most critical factors.⁸

⁵ Ibid. pp. 8-24.

⁶ There are two groups of perennialists. The first group regards particular nations as continuous and immemorial, whereas the second group regards nations as recurrent. Anthony Smith remarks that it is up to how one perceives the view that pre-modern ethnic groups are equivalent to modern nations. (Smith, Anthony D. "Theories of nationalism: alternative models of nation formation" in Michael Leifer. Ed. *Asian Nationalism*. London and New York: Routledge. 2002. p. 3)

⁷ Fishman, Joshua. "Social theory and ethnography: neglected perspectives on language and ethnicity in Eastern Europe" in Peter Sugar. Ed. *Ethnic Diversity and Conflict in Eastern Europe*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio. 1980. pp. 69-99; Seton-Watson, Hugh. *Nations and States: An Enquiry into the Origins of Nations and Politics of Nationalism*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 1977.

⁸ Connor, Walker. "A Nation Is a Nation, Is a State, Is an Ethnic Group, Is a ..." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1, no. 4. 1978. pp. 378-400; Connor, Walker. *Ethno-Nationalism: The Quest for Understanding*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1994; Horowitz, Donald. *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press. 1985; Horowitz, Donald. *A Democratic South Africa: Constitutional Engineering*

Second, since the 1960s, modernist theorists have argued and approached the nature of nationalism different from the primordialist perspectives. Modernists, such as Ernest Gellner, Eric Hobsbawm, Benedict Anderson, have held that nations and nationalism are the product and aspects of modernity, which refers to the modernization process, such as industrialization, urbanization, increased literacy, and social mobility.⁹ Indeed, the debates between primordialists and modernists from the 1960s are the important turning point in the history of the development of nationalism theories.

Prior to the 1960s, most scholars who studied nationalism considered nations as organic entities, existing from the immemorial time. However, by the 1960s, modernists have argued and directly challenged the primordialist and perennialist perspectives. The modernists hold that nations and nationalism are the products of the modern phenomena. In other words, the context and conditions of modernity demanded and facilitated the advent of nations and nationalism. As a result, although there was a series of critiques on the modernist theories in the 1970s and 1980s, modernism and its nation-building model became 'the current orthodoxy' in the field of nationalism studies.¹⁰

Third, in the late 1980s and 1990s, along with many historical incidents of ethnic conflicts and secessions in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, ethno-symbolism emerged as an alternative paradigm of nationalism.¹¹ Ethno-symbolists, Anthony D. Smith and his followers, emphasize the importance of historical heritages, myths, memories, values and symbols for cultural community formation. They argue that there is a vital role for ethnic ties and ethnic communities in order to provide a basis for the emergence and persistence of nation and nationalism. Ethno-symbolists recognize that although a nation is organic and rooted in history and territory, most nations are created and engineered by nationalist elites in the modern period as modernists have pointed out.¹²

in a Divided Society. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1991.

⁹ Gellner, Ernest. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 1983; Hobsbawm, Eric and Terence Ranger. Eds. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983; Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 1990; Hobsbawm, Eric J. *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. 2nd Ed. Cambridge, New York, and Melbourne: Cambridge University Press. 1992; Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso. 1983.

¹⁰ Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism and Modernism: A critical Survey of Recent theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London and New York: Routledge. 1998. pp. 18-24 and p. 145; Smith, Anthony D. "Theories of nationalism: alternative models of nation formation" in Michael Leifer. Ed. *Asian Nationalism*. London and New York: Routledge. 2002. p. 3.

¹¹ Smith, Anthony D. *Nationalism and Modernism: A critical Survey of Recent theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London and New York: Routledge. 1998. pp. 2-7.

¹² *Ibid.* pp. 196-198.

However, ethno-symbolists emphasize that the newly selected, created, and ‘invented’ traditions are strictly limited by the culture and ethnic ties. They also hold that, unlike modernists, the presence of the relatively strong ethnic and cultural ties is more important than social conditions and discontents for nationalism to emerge. In other words, without a shared culture and an ethnic community, socioeconomic modernization and social discontent cannot produce a nationalist movement which could bring about a nation-building process.

The Origins of Chinese *Zhonghua* Nationalism

The Chinese pre-modern nationalism can be labeled as *Han* people’s nationalism in a way. The national identities of China and Northern peoples were clear separated in the ancient Chinese history. However, the separation of ethnic identity began to blur along with the rise of the early *Zhonghua* nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. During the early period of the Chinese Revolution (*Xinhai* Revolution), *Zhonghua* people meant *Han* ethnic people that discerned them and Manchurian people who rule Qing Dynasty. At the same time, the meaning of *Zhonghua* people also used to resist against imperialism of Western powers and to awaken *Han* people’s national pride and identity in the modern time.

However, the meaning of *Zhonghua* people started to extend to Chinese ethnic minority groups in the early 1900s. For example, Liang Qichao, a Chinese reformist, argued in 1903 that the *Zhonghua* nationalism was a big people (*daminzu*) that included not only *Han* people but also every ethnic minority group in China. Sun Yat-sen also advocated the *Zhonghua* nation contains *Han* and other five ethnic minority peoples. In 1912, he advocated a republic of five peoples (*wuzugonghe*) when he inaugurated of provisional President the Republic of China. Sun said that *Han, Man, Meng, Hui, Zhang* peoples should combine to establish *Zhonghua* nationalism and nation.

Currently, the Constitution of the PRC defines China as “a ‘multi-national state’ with 56 nationalities.” The Chinese government has endeavored to solve ‘nationality problems’ by *Zhonghua* nationalism, especially after the riots in Lhasa in 2008 and in Urumqi in 2009. However, the ethnic tensions and riots are still considered as one of the major social and political problems in China.¹³

Why the CPC leadership emphasizes *Zhonghua* Nationalism?

¹³ Rong Ma “Reflections on the debate on China’s ethnic policy: my reform proposal and their critics” *Asian Ethnicity* Vol. 15, No. 2, P. 237.

At the end of the 1980s, the leaders of the CPC witnessed the collapse of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European Communist countries. The historical period of ideologies was about to end with the victory of democratic and free-market system. Chinese leaders confronted internally with the Tiananmen Square Incident in June of 1989, and externally with the economic sanctions led by the United States and other Western countries caused by the Chinese government's harsh oppression against the demonstrators at the Tiananmen Square. The leadership of CPC needed a new political tool that may replace the roles of communist ideology. During the Cold War era, more precisely after the Deng Xiaoping's reform and open-up policy from 1978, economic development and communist ideology have been the two pillars that firmly prop up the leadership of CPC.

After the Cold War period, the Chinese leaders began to emphasize *Zhonghua* nationalism in order to maintain the legitimacy of CPC and gathering *Han* ethnic people and other fifty five ethnic minorities under the leadership of CPC. The Chinese government also attempted to combine *Zhonghua* nationalism with patriotism and has made huge efforts to lead the patriotic nationalism to replace the political roles of communist ideology. Although the Chinese leaders well understand the double-edged effect of nationalism, the post-Cold War phenomena of international community and a series of demonstration, burning oneself to deaths, and terrorism by ethnic minorities, especially Tibet and Uighur peoples, urged to them to politically utilize *Zhonghua* nationalism.

Theoretical Analyses of *Zhonghua* Nationalism's Dilemma

Among the major nationalism theories, the emergence of *Zhonghua* nationalism can be mainly explained by modernist theories, while the national identities of ethnic minority groups in China should be explained by primordialist theories. As the two schools of thought have debated on the emergence and nature of nationalism, the relationship between the national identities of *Zhonghua* nationalism and of ethnic minority groups in China have been a controversial and important socio-political issue after the Cold War era ended. The post-Cold war Chinese leaders need to emphasize *Zhonghua* nationalism for social and political integration among *Han* and other minority peoples. However, while the leaders have imposed *Zhonghua* nationalism on the ethnic minority peoples, some of these peoples, at least some of Tibet and Uighur peoples, have directly and indirectly expressed resistant reactions, including terrorism, riots, demonstrations, and burning him/herself to deaths.

It is true that those resistances might be explained by economic and cultural factors,

but they should be analyzed by the nationalistic factors, especially *Zhonghua* ethnic identity debates that existed in China's modern nation-building process. First, the national-building process of modern *Zhonghua* nationalism has evolved and developed through the resistances against imperialism and colonialism. When the Chinese government promulgated the origins and emergence of *Zhonghua* nationalism to its people through the mass education system and various campaigns, Chinese ethnic minority peoples often applied the resistant elements of *Zhonghua* nationalism for defining their own minority ethnic identities against *Han* chauvinism. Benedict Anderson well explained this phenomenon by a historical example of Dutch colonialism on Vietnam and the rise of Vietnamese modern nationalism.¹⁴

Second, the relationship between *Han* people and other ethnic minority groups continuously changed along with definitions of *Zhonghua* people in the early twentieth century. For example, Sun Yat-sen originally defined *Zhonghua* people was identical to *Han* people, and he said *Zhonghua* people should expel Manchurian Qing Dynasty from the territory of China. However, Sun and his revolutionary group revised the definition of *Zhonghua* people as the combined people of *Han, Man, Meng, Hui, Zhang* peoples when they advocated a republic of five peoples. Sun and Yuan Shikai stated that the five peoples had equal status within the republic of five peoples. However they did it for preventing the ethnic minority groups from claiming independence from Qing Dynasty. For the ethnic minority groups, *Zhonghua* nationalism could be interpreted as *Han* chauvinism at that time.

Conclusion

Chinese *Zhonghua* nationalism inherently contains theoretically controversial elements. As ethno-symbolists have argued, to solve China's ethnic tensions mainly depends on how ethnic minority groups accept *Zhonghua* nationalism. The leaders of CPC are well aware of the nature of double-edged *Zhonghua* nationalism, but they has to continuously develop the meanings of the nationalism in order to maintain the leadership and legitimacy of CPC as well as to solve, or at least to ameliorate, the problems of ethnic minorities in China. The Chinese leaders well understand the increasing Chinese people's domestic political demand. However, they will has to politically utilize the Chinese *Zhonghua* nationalism unless they find another eligible political tool to replace the nationalism. Or even further usage of *Zhonghua* nationalism would be expected, if the Chinese leaders will have to confront with a

¹⁴ Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. London and New York: Verso. 1983. P. 153.

hard landing for their economy.

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The Role of Past History to the Japan-ROK Relations and Its Implication for Northeast Asia

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INTRODUCTION

At long last, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye shook hands and smiled. The two leaders held their first official summit meeting since each took office (Abe in December 2012 and Park in February 2013) on November 2, 2015 in Seoul. U.S. attention was focused on this meeting although the main event of that week was the trilateral summit among the People’s Republic of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK hereafter), a process that had resumed (with difficulty) after a three-year break. Since 1990, the leaders of Japan and the ROK held summits at least once a year, but that practice has been suspended for three and a half years as the deterioration of the bilateral relationship became uncontrollable.

On December 28, 2015, less than two months after the Japan-ROK November summit, another breakthrough occurred, one that barely seemed possible a few months before. Seoul and Tokyo agreed to resolve the issue of South Korean “comfort women” forced to serve as sex slaves by the Japanese military during World War II. With “most sincere apologies” the Japanese government agreed to provide reparations of one billion yen (about \$8.3 million) to the 46 former comfort women still alive, and the ROK government valued the Japanese government’s efforts, acknowledging that the issue has been resolved “finally and irreversibly” with this announcement.¹

The Obama administration has continuously urged, directly and indirectly, both governments to reconcile with each other.² U.S. Ambassador to Seoul Mark Lippert played

¹ See Announcement by Foreign Ministers of Japan and the Republic of Korea at the Joint Press Occasion on December 28, 2015, Mofat.go.jp, <http://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/na/kr/page4e_000364.html>, accessed January 5, 2016. It was immediately followed by the U.S. government’s welcoming press statement. State.gov, <<http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2015/12/250874.htm>>, accessed January 18, 2016.)

² For example, Antony J. Blinken’s first travel overseas as U.S. Deputy Secretary of State was to Northeast Asia in February 2015 and he visited Japan and Korea twice during the next 11 months. In 2015, U.S. Secretary of State John F. Kerry and Assistant Secretary of State Daniel R. Russel also traveled to Northeast Asia (March and May, respectively) and one of the most important missions of these trips was to urge a breakthrough in the chilled relations between Tokyo and Seoul. “We continue to emphasize the importance of approaching historical

the most critical messenger role in coordinating the summit agenda between Japan and South Korea.³ Policymakers in Washington believed that momentum for Japan-South Korean reconciliation should be created before the 50th anniversary of the two countries' diplomatic normalization—the year 2015— passes. Discord between Japan and South Korea, two vital U.S. allies in East Asia, is detrimental to America's strategic interests.⁴ The two sets of bilateral alliances should be merged in terms of both institutional mechanisms and practice to facilitate trilateral security cooperation to help the U.S. better manage risks concerning China and North Korea.

It is widely believed that Japan-South Korea relations have hit bottom and begun to rebound and how soon and how much they will recover depends on Japanese and South Koreans themselves. Can the mutual animosity over history be cured? If it cannot be completely settled, to what extent can the people of Japan and Korea escape the fetters of the past? Regardless of this problem, can the two countries cooperate on security matters as much as the U.S. desires?

This paper argues that the recent development in Japan-ROK relations provides little hope that the two countries will be freed from their historical yoke as the two governments wished; sincere reconciliation over history between Japan and Korea will be impossible for several decades at least. The history disputes can be partially soothed, but fundamental mutual distrust will continue. This is because domestic politics in both countries reward nationalistic approaches to Japan-South Korea relations. But it is not only history problems between Tokyo and Seoul that limit Japan-South Korea and U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation; differences in U.S., Japanese, and ROK strategic priorities in their policies toward China and North Korea also pose powerful obstacles. Japan's threat perception is focused on China while South Korea is more concerned about the North Korean threat, and the U.S. regards both as equally important. U.S. policy toward East Asia will continue to be undermined as long as Japan-South Korea relations are determined by domestic politics, an influence that will widen their mismatched policy priorities. Critically, this drift is beyond U.S. control.

Cooperation for Convenience Given Structural Incentives Reluctant Reconciliation

legacy issues in a manner that can promote healing and reconciliation," Kerry said in a joint news conference in Seoul with his ROK counterpart Byung-se Yun on May 18, 2015. See Asahi.com, <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201505190073>, accessed December 15, 2015.

³ As he mentioned to the press, Ambassador Lippert "has been quietly urging the two countries to cooperate" and said the Japan-Korea summit was "a crucial step for the improvement of the bilateral relations." See Yonhapnews.co.kr, <<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/dev/9601000000.html>>, accessed October 31, 2014; and Anews.com, <http://www.anews.com/print_paper.php?number=913523&news_article>, accessed January 25, 2016.

⁴ Victor D. Cha, *Alignment Despite Antagonism: The United States-Korea-Japan Security Triangle* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1999).

Japan-South Korea relations recall the myth of Sisyphus: both countries are condemned to roll a rock to the top of a mountain (reconciliation on one historical issue), only to have the rock roll back to the bottom (improvement proves fruitless due to another history debate). While there are structural incentives to work together, Japan-South Korea cooperation has been fragile and subject to frequent challenges.

We need to look at the last seventy years of Japan-Korea relations to better understand why sincere reconciliation is hard to achieve. Japan-South Korea diplomatic ties were reestablished in 1965, twenty years after Korea was liberated from Japanese colonial rule, but it was a normalization bridged by short-term interests, not by a genuine understanding. The Park Chung-hee regime (1963-1979) in South Korea was less anti-Japanese than the previous Rhee Syngman regime, and Korea needed Japan's financial and technical support for the economic miracle on the Han River. Japan and Korea also shared security threats—the Soviet Union broadly and the more immediate threat of North Korea.

Critical to the emergence of Japan-Korea security ties was the active and initiating role played by the United States. John M. Allison, assistant secretary of state for Far Eastern affairs between 1951 and 1953 and ambassador to Tokyo between 1953 and 1957, recommended to the State Department that “we must face up to the fact that Korea is a small nation surrounded by three powerful neighbors, only one of which, Japan, is friendly to the free world, and it is therefore essential that Korea realize that its safety and future progress, as well as that of the West, depends upon the renewal of friendly relations with Japan, and this can only come about through compromise and cooperation on both sides.”⁵ The imminent threats from the Communist bloc and the urgent need to rely on the U.S.-led alliance network temporarily overcame potential conflicts between the two countries.

Once the Cold War order was dismantled, both Japanese and Koreans questioned whether the U.S. security umbrella was still essential. The elimination of the Soviet Union as a military threat to Japan and South Korea meant that they no longer so desperately needed the protection of a U.S. security umbrella. Under the U.S.-led unipolar dynamics of the early 1990s, China was just one of many potential great powers and North Korea's economy had been devastated by recurrent droughts and floods which seemed to portend the regime's demise. Japan and Korea were immersed in debates about how much their relationship with the U.S. had been unequal, instead of inquiring about new roles their alliances with the U.S. should undertake in a changing global and regional environment.

Japanese leaders started to raise doubts as to why Japanese taxpayers should pay so much money for the presence of 47,000 troops in Japan⁶ while Washington policymakers pressed

⁵ John M. Allison, *Ambassador from the Prairie: Or, Allison Wonderland* (Boston, Massachusetts: Houghton Mifflin, 1973), p. 259.

⁶ In mid-1990s Japan was paying more than \$6 billion per year toward costs associated with U.S. bases in Japan; this amount is equivalent to about 74% of the total, after excluding salaries to U.S. soldiers. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, “DoD Release Report to Congress on U.S.-Japan Security Relationship,” March 2, 1995, p. 10

Japan to produce security contributions commensurate with its economic ability. Trade conflict was also aggravated when the U.S. accused Japan of not redressing its \$60 billion trade surplus with the United States by opening domestic markets.⁷ U.S.-ROK friction also emerged in the security spheres in the early 1990s over such issues as transfer of the peacetime operational control of Korea's armed forces, relocation of the U.S. military complex at Yongsan, adjustment of cost-sharing for the U.S. military presence, and amendment of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). Popularization of the anti-American movement in South Korea was also driven by Washington's pressure on Korea to open its markets under the cloak of the Uruguay Round (UR) trade negotiations.⁸

Confusion and transition in the U.S. alliances with Japan and Korea led to more doubts about the rationale for Japan-South Korea security cooperation. History-based problems emerged from hibernation. Despite an earlier statement by then chief Cabinet secretary Kiichi Miyazawa in 1982, which promised additional notes regarding descriptions in history textbooks, South Korea continuously charged that Japanese middle and high school students were taught an abbreviated and watered-down modern history of Korea. In the eyes of most Koreans (and Chinese too), Japanese history textbooks still barely touches upon the mistreatment of its neighbors, and such issues as the forced annexation of the Korean Peninsula (1910) and the Nanjing Massacre (1937). The story of the Pacific War and the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is more focused on victim consciousness (*higaisha ishiki*) than on assailant consciousness (*kagaisha ishiki*).⁹

⁷ For detailed discussions on the U.S.-Japan friction on the issues of burden-sharing and trade in early 1990s, see Ishihara Shintaro; Watanabe Shoichi; Ogawa Kazuhisa, *Soredemo "No" to Ieru Nihon* [Still, The Japan That Can Say No] (Tokyo: Kobunsha, 1990); Gerald L. Curtis, ed., *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change* (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Harrison M. Holland, *Japan Challenges America: Managing an Alliance in Crisis* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1992); George Friedman and Meredith Lebard, *The Coming War with Japan* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991); David D. Hale, "Is It a Yen or a Dollar Crisis in the Currency Market?" *The Washington Quarterly* 18:4 (Autumn 1995), pp. 145-171; Shafiqul Islam, "Foreign Aid and Burdensharing: Is Japan Free Riding to a Coprosperity Sphere in Pacific Asia?" in Jeffrey A. Frankel and Miles Kahler, eds., *Regionalism and Rivalry: Japan and the United States in Pacific Asia* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), pp. 321-389; Mike M. Mochizuki, "Japanese Strategies in a New World," in Aspen Strategy Group, ed., *Harness the Rising Sun: An American Strategy for Managing Japan's Rise as a Global Power* (Lan ham, Maryland: The Aspen Institute, 1993), pp. 195-229.

⁸ For discussions on the causes of U.S.-ROK conflict in post-Cold War period, see Chang-geuk Moon, *Hanmi Galdeung ui Haebu* [Anatomy of the Korea-U.S. Conflicts] (Seoul, Korea: Nanam, 1994); Kang-ro Lee, "Critical Analysis of Anti-Americanism in Korea," *Korea Focus* 13:2 (March-April 2005), pp. 74-98; Seung-hwan Kim, "Anti-Americanism in Korea," *The Washington Quarterly* 26:1 (2002-2003), pp. 109-122; Don Oberdorfer and Robert Carlin, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*, 3rd edition (New York: Basic Books, 2014), pp. 381-418.

⁹ In 1990, the Japan Ministry of Education denied permission for middle and high school textbooks to include references to the death toll in Asian countries during World War II. *Mainichi Shimbun*, July 4, 1990. For extensive discussion of textbook incidents, see Harrison M. Holland, *Japan Challenges America: Managing an Alliance in Crisis*, op. cit., pp. 153, 157-158; Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," *International Security* 18:3 (1993/1994), pp. 113-133; Haruo Shimada, "How is Japan Changing?: Economics, Society, and Politics in the 1990s," in Aspen Strategy Group, ed., op. cit., p. 63; David E. Sanger, "Skulls Found: Japan Doesn't Want to Know Whose," *The New York Times*, August 13, 1990, pp. A1, A5.

At the same time, however, Japan acknowledged that it did not make an official apology on past aggression when it normalized diplomatic relations with China (in 1972) and South Korea (in 1965). The statement by then Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama in 1995 was the first official apology from Japan on what it did to its neighbors during the early part of the 20th century. The issue of ‘comfort women’ was not covered by the Treaty on Basic Relations and accompanying agreements in 1965, however, and became more generally discussed after 1991 and again locked Japan-South Korea relations in a history dispute.¹⁰ The issue was driven by emotion and acquired great force given the violation of women’s human rights. In the statement by then chief Cabinet secretary Yohei Kono in 1993, the Japanese government acknowledged responsibility for the conscription of comfort women. Following up on the statement, the privately financed ‘Asia Women’s Fund’ was set up but South Korea rejected it, saying that the subject of an apology and compensation should be solely the Japanese government.

Two Separate Alliances

The U.S. was relatively indifferent to Japan-South Korea relations during the early post-Cold War period. Total U.S. debt reached 64% of GDP in the early 1990s, the highest level since mid-1950s¹¹. Chronic debt focused attention on U.S. forces abroad, and some argued that this presence had been overstretched during the fight against the former Soviet Union.¹² The 1990 East Asia Strategy Initiative, drawn up according to the Nunn-Warner amendment, announced a ten-year, three-stage reduction of U.S. forces in Japan and Korea.¹³ It was a revival of the Nixon Doctrine (1969) that allies should pay a more “equitable” share of the costs of maintaining U.S. forces on their soil and they should take a leading role in defending their own countries.¹⁴ As a first step, more than 10% of U.S. forces in the region (8,000 personnel from Japan and 7,000 personnel from South Korea) were withdrawn by 1992.

¹⁰ Some Japanese scholars and journalists, like Tagako Sen of the Yomiuri Shimbun and Chuo University professor Yoshiaki Yoshimi, were ahead from 1980s in pursuing truth about the imperial army’s operation of brothels mainly with foreign women. After the late Kim Hak-sun spoke publicly about her suffering during World War II on August 14, 1991, comfort women became a worldwide issue. Out of 238 who have gave their names to the authorities, 46 were alive at the time of official resolution of the issue (December 28, 2015) between the governments of the ROK and Japan. The estimated number of women forced into prostitution varies widely, from 100,000 to as high as 200,000.

¹¹ Economic Research at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, <<http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GFDEGDQ188S>>, accessed January 29, 2016.

¹² Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 17, 156, 187; Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000* (New York: Random House, 1987), pp. 438-535; Takashi Inoguchi, “Beikoku: Ajiansenryaku Minaoshi Hitsuyoni,” [The United States: Asian Strategy Review Has Become Necessary] *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*, March 18, 1989, p. 21.

¹³ U.S. Department of Defense, “A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century,” April 1990, pp. 18-19.

¹⁴ U.S. Department of State, “The Message the President Carried to the Nations of Asia,” *Department of State Bulletin*, Vol. LXI, No. 1578 (September 22, 1969), p. 258.

The remaining withdrawal plan was canceled as the 1995 East Asia Strategy Report (the Nye Initiative)¹⁵ concluded that the U.S. should maintain a level of 100,000 U.S. forces in the Asia-Pacific region. The decision was influenced by new factors producing regional instability in the post-Soviet threat era: the North Korean nuclear crisis and the rise of China. Since the North Korean nuclear program was discovered in 1992, the Pyongyang regime has never stopped developing nuclear weapons, stalling for time, applying brinkmanship tactics, taking economic aid from the six-party talk member countries, and canceling international agreements¹⁶ on denuclearization. China's economic reform started to pay off and its trade began to surge in the 21st century. China surpassed Japan in 2010 to become the world's second largest economy¹⁷ and its behavior in the East and South China Seas in recent years, including unilaterally announcing China's Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in 2013 and constructing an artificial island in disputed areas from 2014, has triggered attention and caution around the world.

In accordance with this changing security environment, adjustments were made to America's alliances with Japan and the Republic of Korea. The 1978 Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation¹⁸ were updated in 1997 in ways that expanded geographical coverage of joint military action from the Japanese archipelago to the entire Asia Pacific region.¹⁹ Japan's role during contingencies was enlarged from rear-area support for U.S. combatant operations to collective self-defense in the 2015 Guidelines²⁰ announced at the U.S.-Japan summit in April and endorsed by the Japanese National Diet's "Peace and Security Preservation Legislation" in September. It was not until 2008 that the U.S.-ROK alliance was upgraded beyond the Korean peninsula to become a global strategic alliance covering issues in Afghanistan, Iran, Libya, the global economic crisis, and others.²¹ U.S.-

¹⁵ Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs), *The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 1995).

¹⁶ Agreed Framework with the U.S. (October 21, 1994); Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks (September 19, 2005); Agreement on Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (February 13, 2007); Agreement on Second-Phase Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement (October 3, 2007); and the Leap Day Agreement with the U.S. (February 29, 2012).

¹⁷ GDP (Gross Domestic Product) of China, Japan, and the U.S. in 2010 (in current U.S. dollars) were \$6.04 trillion, \$5.50 trillion, and \$14.96 trillion, respectively. Worldbank.org, <<http://date.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD>>, accessed January 31, 2016.

¹⁸ The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (November 27, 1978), Mod.go.jp, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/19781127.html>, accessed January 31, 2016.

¹⁹ The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (September 23, 1997), Mod.go.jp, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/19970923.html>, accessed January 31, 2016.

²⁰ The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation (April 27, 2015), Mod.go.jp, <http://www.mod.go.jp/e/d_act/anpo/shishin_20150427e.html>, accessed January 31, 2016.

²¹ See Joint Vision for the Alliance of the United States of America and the Republic of Korea (June 16, 2009), Whitehouse.gov, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/joint-vision-alliance-united-states-america-and-republic-korea>>, accessed January 31, 2016. When President Lee Myung-bak took office in February 2008, strained U.S.-ROK relations of the previous ten years, mainly caused by South Korea's Sunshine Policy toward

ROK relations from the early 1990s to 2007 were strained as a result of divergences in North Korea policy, a result of mismatched leadership in the two governments. The Kim Young-sam government opposed the Clinton administration's plan for a surgical strike on North Korea's nuclear facility in Yongbyon, which would have forced then North Korean leader Kim Il-sung to give up his nuclear ambitions. Later, Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Rho Moo-hyun both tried to persuade President George W. Bush that Kim Jong-il's distrust of the U.S. and his desire for nuclear weapons made sense.

The U.S. alliances with Japan and the ROK have evolved on their own as if the two were not related to each other. With the former focusing more on the China threat and the latter focusing more on the North Korean threat, discussion on how the two alliances should coordinate in the region has been relatively muted. The earliest, ongoing joint study of U.S.-Japan-ROK trilateral security cooperation for North Korean contingencies and post-Korean unification era began in 1997 and included the Pacific Forum CSIS, the Okazaki Institute, and the New Asia Research Institute,²² but it has been difficult for the Japanese and South Korean governments to grasp and practice these think tanks' suggestions. A critical chance arrived in the summer of 2012 to take a first step to institutionalize Japan-South Korea security collaboration.

Hostility Reproduced by Domestic Politics

GSOMIA Crisis

By the early half of his last year in office, South Korea's Lee Myung-bak administration had been building the best ever relations with Japan. Cooperation on North Korean nuclear and human rights issues had recovered. The Democratic Party of Japan, which ended the so-called '1955 system' of Liberal Democratic Party rule by winning the August 2009 general election, took much more forward-looking stances on history issues. The Statement by Prime Minister Naoto Kan in 2010, the 100th anniversary of Japan's annexation of the Korean peninsula, conveyed an apology for the colonial period directly to the Korean people and announced his intention to return the royal protocols of the Chosun Dynasty (*Uigwe*) that Japan plundered in 1920. In response, the ROK government moved quickly to advance security ties with Japan, and after two years of preparation, a draft for the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) between Japan and the ROK was finalized. Conclusion of GSOMIA would allow the U.S. to work more effectively with its two allies, as it would no longer have to withhold from one country intelligence that it received from the other. However, the signing scheduled for June 29, 2012 was canceled only a half hour before the event upon a request from the ROK government.

North Korea and its nationalistic approach to U.S.-ROK relations, began to quickly recover.

²² For major topics and discussions exchanged among the three institutions, see Ralph A. Cossa, ed., *U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations* (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 1999); Sang-woo Rhee and Tae-hyo Kim, eds., *Korea-Japan Security Relations: Prescriptive Studies* (Seoul, Korea: New Asia Research Institute, 2000); Tae-hyo Kim and Brad Glosserman, eds., *The Future of U.S.-Korea-Japan Relations: Balancing Values and Interests* (Washington, D.C.: The CSIS Press, 2005).

Seoul has similar agreements with 24 other countries but the South Korean government could not withstand the exceptional public furor against the pact with Japan during fractious election-year politics. Domestic confusion continued to grow even after the GSOMIA was put on hold as opposition parties accused the government of being “pro-Japanese,” a far more politically damaging charge in South Korea than being “pro-North Korean.” The New Frontier Party and the conservative press, once supportive of the pact, quickly distanced themselves from it.²³ The crisis began to settle down only after I resigned as senior presidential secretary for national strategy on July 5. Few people knew that the Tokyo-Seoul channel, which sought to reach an agreement resolving the comfort women issue immediately upon conclusion of the GSOMIA, suddenly lost its momentum. Also, few people anticipated that Japan-South Korea relations would so quickly fall into their worst state ever. It had been conventional wisdom that relations between the two civil societies were deepening despite ups and downs in bilateral relations at the governmental level. The current situation is serious because mutual trust among the general public and intellectuals is being destroyed.²⁴

What would have happened to Japan-Korea relations if the Lee government overcame that domestic pressure and GSOMIA had been signed? A presidential speech on the 67th Independence Day (August 15, 2012) probably would have recognized Japan’s sincere efforts in celebrating the resolution of the comfort women issue. There would have been little incentive for President Lee to visit Dokdo/Takeshima five days before the speech. Moreover, the GSOMIA would have been followed by a Japan-ROK Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA), as the U.S. hoped, which would allow for logistical cooperation when both countries are engaged in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and peacekeeping operations. President Barak Obama would not have needed to push the leaders of Japan and South Korea to reluctantly sit beside him on the sidelines of The Hague Nuclear Security Summit in March 2014, and they would have endorsed a memorandum of understanding on sharing military intelligence among the three countries.²⁵ If we exercise our imagination further, Japan’s 96th prime minister might have been other than Abe. Up to just two weeks prior to the Liberal Democratic Party’s presidential election on September 26, 2012, Abe’s approval rate trailed those of his political rivals Shigeru Ishiba and Nobuteru Ishihara.²⁶ Abe’s popularity began to surge after he openly criticized the ROK government after the President Lee’s visit to Dokdo/Dakeshima on August 11, 2012. The Noda Cabinet’s decision on September 10 to nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands followed, which led to

²³ For description of political atmosphere in Seoul during the GSOMIA crisis in early July, 2012, see Polinews.co.kr, <<http://www.polinews.co.kr/news/article.html?no=151801>>, accessed January 31, 2016.

²⁴ In particular, a number of Korea hands in Japan, who had been considered pro-Korean by Korean intellectuals due to their sympathy with the emotions of South Korean people, suddenly began to turn their backs from the later part of 2012. The annual Korea-Japan Forum, the most influential communication channel between opinion leaders of the two countries, was put on hold in the summer of 2012 for the first time since its establishment in 1993.

²⁵ The GOMIA between Japan and the ROK, more binding and formal agreement on intelligence sharing, has not been signed yet between the two governments as of 2016.

²⁶ Asahi.com, September 10, 2012, <<http://www.ashi.com/special/08003/TKY201209090295.html>>, accessed February 1, 2016.

deteriorating relations with China. Abe's hardline stance on China and nationalistic resort to the party members at that time also contributed to his winning the election.²⁷

Lingering Disputes

If we could reset the clock to before June 29, 2012, the erosion of Japan-Korea relations during the last four years might not have occurred, but this would not have led to a sincere and fundamental reconciliation between the two countries. Reaction in South Korea and Japan since the December 28, 2015 accord on the resolution of the comfort women issue shows that reconciliation driven by convenience that sets aside accumulated mutual distrust will remain tentative and short-lived. A majority of South Korean people regret the agreement²⁸ mainly for two reasons: apology was not delivered through the mouth of Prime Minister Abe but was read by his proxy, Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida; and the Abe Cabinet maintains that the Imperial government was not involved with the conscription of "comfort women" during the Pacific War, which contradicts the recent Japan-Korea agreement itself as well as the message of the 1993 Kono Statement.²⁹ When it became known that the Japanese government submitted a report to the United Nations office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) right after December 28, 2015 positing that "forceful taking away of comfort women by the military and government authorities could not be confirmed in any of the document,"³⁰ and after Prime Abe reconfirmed this view to the Japanese Diet on January 18, 2016,³¹ South Koreans' feeling that Japan never made a sincere apology was strengthened. While a majority (65%) of them values the comfort women agreement by the two governments, seven out of ten Japanese are also skeptical about the

²⁷ During the three months (August to October 2012) of growing tension with South Korea and China over territorial issues, then number one opposition party LDP's popularity against the ruling Democratic of Party of Japan widened from 4 to 13%. Tv-asahi.co.jp, <<http://www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/201207/index.html>>; <<http://www.tv-asahi.co.jp/hst/poll/201210/index.html>>, accessed February 2, 2016. Japan's foreign relations, particularly the territorial disputes with China and Korea, suddenly became one of the biggest issues before the LDP's presidential election on top of the candidates' views on the country's economic policy and the level of consumption tax. It worked to the advantage of conservative candidates (Ishiba and Abe) and Abe came from behind in the 2nd round of voting for the party president on September 26, 2012. Nikkei.com, September 19, 2012, <http://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFK1803_Y2A910C1000000?df=2>, accessed February 2, 2016; Jp.wsj.com, September 26, 2012, <http://jp.wsj.com/public/page/0_0_WJPP_7000-518851.html>, accessed February 1, 2016.

²⁸ In a nationwide public opinion survey conducted by Joongang Ilbo during two days after the comfort women accord, 54% respondents said they were not satisfied with the agreement while only 35% said they were. *Joongang Ilbo*, January 5, 2016, pp. 1, 3, 4.

²⁹ If the "comfort women" issue was instead resolved in the summer of 2012 by then President Lee and Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, it might have been more favorably received by the public of South Korea and Japan, because the Noda cabinet was open to a direct apology by the Prime Minister and acknowledgement of governmental responsibility on the mobilization of comfort women during closed negotiations with the ROK government in June of 2012. See author's interview with *Asahi Shimbun*, February 22, 2013, p. 19.

³⁰ Yonhapnews.co.kr, <<http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/bulletin/2016/01/30/0200000000AKR20160130032500073.html?from=search>>, accessed February 2, 2016.

³¹ Koreatimes.co.kr, <http://koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nations/2016/01/120_195814.html>, accessed February 1, 2016

resolution of the issues, believing that South Koreans are not interested in genuinely solving the dispute.³²

Until reaching the agreement, the governments of both Japan and ROK have felt a great deal of psychological pressure in regard to the blame that could be targeted against them if the disputes on comfort women were not settled soon. As the resolution 121 of the U.S. House of Representatives (July 30, 2007) reads,³³ the U.S. has continuously urged Japan to “formally acknowledge, apologize, and accept historical responsibility in a clear and unequivocal manner for its Imperial Armed Forces’ coercion of young women into sexual slavery.” While defining the issue in terms of infringements of women’s rights, Washington also signaled that the Park Geun-hye Administration should not merely sit on its hands watching popular nationalistic sentiments and separate security issues from history.³⁴

Under the circumstances, Seoul and Tokyo made a political decision to officially put an end to the 25-year disputes over the comfort women issues. However, the agreement between the two governments so far has failed to end the acrimony in civil society and has unintentionally resulted in even more setbacks in Japan-South Korean relations. Having agreed not to raise the issue anymore to the international community, the ROK government will have a difficult job winning support for the agreement from the opposition parties and the public as well as the comfort women. At the same time, any effort in Japan to reverse the message implied in the agreement would only aggravate South Korean public opinion that is against the idea of removing the ‘comfort women’ bronze statue in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul.³⁵

Even if the comfort women issues can be set aside, three other structural and difficult disputes will persist unless a revolutionary conceptual change takes place in the politics of Japan and South Korea. First, the presence of fourteen A-class wartime criminals at the Yasukuni Shrine means that Japan’s relations with Korea (and China) will be affected every time Japanese politicians pay their respects at the shrine. Second, whether it is logically compelling or not, Japan’s claim to the Dokdo/Takeshima Islands will reinforce the Korean people’s perception that Japan does not approach history in a sincere manner. And third, a

³² Mainichi.jp, <<http://mainichi.jp/articles/20160201/ddm/001/010/104000c>>, accessed February 2, 2016.

³³ Govtrack.us, <<https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hres121/text>>, accessed February 1, 2016.

³⁴ Remarks by Wendy R. Sherman, then under Secretary of State Department for Political Affairs, on February 27, 2015, at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, were the most straightforward reflection of America’s Korea fatigue and the belief that Seoul’s obsession with history was seen as blocking cooperation with Tokyo. She said, “Of course, nationalist feelings can still be exploited, and it’s not hard for a political leader anywhere to earn cheap applause by vilifying a former enemy. But such provocations produce paralysis, not progress. To move ahead, we have to see beyond what was to envision what might be.” State.gov, <<http://www.sate.gov/p/us/rm/2015/238035.htm>>, accessed February 1, 2016.

³⁵ The following studies also point out the importance of political leadership and statesmanship in dealing with the aftermath in South Korea and Japan after the agreement on December 28, 2015. Brad Glosserman and Scott Snyder, “The Japan-South Korea Comfort Women Deal: Can It Last?” *The Diplomat* (February 1, 2016); J. Berkshire Miller, “No Grand Bargain: Japan and South Korea After the ‘Comfort Women’ Deal,” *Foreign Affairs* (January 12, 2016), <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/northeast-asia/2016-01-12/no-grand-bargain>>, accessed February 2, 2016.

significant gap in future generations' understanding of the history between the two countries will limit future-oriented Japan-Korea relations. Eighty-five percent of Japanese and South Korean citizens did not experience the Second World War. They are free from direct pain of the past but their conflicting narratives acquired by different textbooks, museums, monuments, holidays, and political rhetoric, if coupled with nationalistic sentiments, may collide and lead to even more serious damage to bilateral relations.

Domestic Politics

Although democracy in South Korea has rapidly advanced since a direct presidential election system was adopted in 1987, social conflicts and political divides have deepened as diverse demands from different social groups, suppressed for a long time, erupted. Using this trend, Pyongyang has attempted to penetrate South Korean politics, aiding and aligning with powers who argue that all political opinions should be respected in the name of democracy. That leftist force intended to transform the South Korean people's national pride that resulted from the country's remarkable development into a pro-North Korean, anti-American, and anti-Japanese ideology.³⁶ What has been most neglected and remains unhealed is anti-Japanese sentiment. It is too risky to defend Japan's position that all claims for restitution and contrition had been settled by the 1965 treaty and international law should take precedence over domestic laws. Whether one is an artist, business professional, or politician, being branded as pro-Japanese in South Korean society is an intellectual death sentence.

Asked in a survey conducted by the Japan Press Research Institute in March 2015 who they recall first among Japanese,³⁷ the most well-known figure was either the late Emperor Hirohito (among Westerners) or Prime Minister Abe (among East Asians). The runner-up depended on the country: Americans identified major league baseball player Ichiro Suzuki, the British pointed to singer John Lennon's wife and multimedia artist Yoko Ono, singer and actress Momoe Yamaguchi was the Chinese choice, and adult video idol Sora Ioi was the Thai selection. Only Koreans picked another politician—Hirobumi Ito, who forced the signing of the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1905 (Eul Sa Neuk Yak). The Korean people's assessment of Japan seems to be held captive by history, and the non-political sides of Japan are neglected.

Abe's emergence was simply a sign of the Japanese desire for a new strong leadership that will revive Japan's global economic and political status. If not Abe, it could have been someone else with similar values. After all, the Liberal Democratic Party's basic stance has been that national security would be protected only if the alliance with the U.S. stays solid.

³⁶ For most in-depth analysis on the leftists in South Korea and their strategies, see Gap-je Cho, *Jongbuk Baekwasajeon* [An Encyclopedia of Pro-North Korea] (Seoul, Korea: Chogapje.com, 2012). The most powerful source of cleavage in South Korean society is believed to be ideology (61%) by far ahead of other issues such as social status (14%), generation (12%), region of origin (7%), and labor (4%). Korea Research, *Bundan 70 Nyeon ui Wonin gwa Geukbok e Daehan Gukminshik Josa* [Survey of Public Opinion on the Causes and Solutions of 70 Year Long Division] (Seoul, Korea: Korea Research, June 2015), pp. 1-25.

³⁷ Shimbuntsushinchosakai [Japan Press Research Institute], *Shogaikokuni Okeru Taninichi Media Yoronchosa* [Public Opinion Survey on the Image of Japan by Foreign Countries] (Tokyo, Japan: Japan Press Research Institute, 2015), pp. 1-16.

Re-elected as party leader in September 2015, Prime Minister Abe will keep his post at least until 2018. There is slim chance of a change in governing party in Japan considering that the ruling party's approval rate (31%) is 10% larger than total aggregated approval rate for the five major opposition parties, according to an Asahi Shimbun public opinion poll in July 2015.³⁸

An August 2015 Yomiuri Shimbun poll reports that 63% of Japanese think their government has done enough to atone for its wartime past.³⁹ In Japan, there exists a broad sense of frustration that South Korean demands over history-based issues are inconsistent. There is concern that resolution on one issue might be nullified by another history dispute, resulting in a vicious cycle that will make history an endless dispute with Korea. This belief is abetted by a widely spread public sense of 'anti-militarism' in Japan⁴⁰ that stems from its self-image as a victim in the Second World War. Dominating the discourse is the belief that only the militarists are responsible for Japan's expansionism during the early 20th century and the rest of the Japanese were sacrificed by the atomic bombings and defeat in the Pacific War. The image of Japan as a perpetrator that caused enormous sufferings to tens of millions of Asian neighbors has often been overshadowed.

Given the prevailing culture of mutual recrimination, the logic of Democratic Peace Theory⁴¹ seems irrelevant to Japan-ROK relations. According to a Joint Survey conducted by Japan's Genron NPO and South Korea's East Asia Institute in May 2015,⁴² only 14% of South Koreans and 20% of Japanese see their neighbors as "democratic." The phrase "the ROK shares fundamental values with Japan such as freedom, democracy and a market economy" disappeared from the official website of the Japan Foreign Ministry in March 2015. Moreover, 56% of the Japanese public consider current South Korean society to be "nationalist" while 57% of the South Korean public consider Japan to be "militarist."⁴³

³⁸ Mansfieldfdn.org, <<http://mansfieldfdn.org/program/research-education-and-communication/asian-opinion-poll-database/>>, accessed November 6, 2015.

³⁹ Japantimes.co.jp, <www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/20/national/history/yomiuri-poll-finds-voters-feel-japan-apologized-enough/>, accessed November 6, 2015.

⁴⁰ John W. Dower, *Ways of Forgetting, Ways of Remembering: Japan in the Modern World* (New York: The New Press, 2012); Thomas U. Berger, *Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan* (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1996).

⁴¹ Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80:4 (1986), pp. 1151-1169.

⁴² The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, *3rd Report of Korea-Japan Comparative Analysis on Mutual Perceptions* (May 2015), pp. 9-10.

⁴³ Ibid. The indictment on a Japanese journalist in Seoul (October 2014) over an article "defaming the South Korean president" led the Japanese government to call it politically motivated and to believe that freedom of expression was threatened in South Korea. Martin Fackler, "Japan Protests Indictment of Journalist by South Korea," October 9, 2014, *Nytimes.com*, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/10/world/asia/japan-protests-an-indictment-of-a-journalist.html>>, accessed February 5, 2016. Until the Seoul Central District Court found him innocent on December 17, 2015, the issue was a major spat that divided the two countries.

Instrumentalist accounts hold that those in power manipulate the collective memory of their society to serve their concrete material interests.⁴⁴ If the leaders of both countries are not actively manipulating public opinion, at least they have been rewriting the popular perception of history for their personal interests, not their countries' national interests. As will be laid out below, it makes sense strategically for both countries to pursue reconciliation and security ties with each other, but it will be impossible or too costly to do so if elite groups are obsessed with gaining and retaining political office.

Balance Sheets for Trilateral Cooperation: the US, Japan, and the ROK

On China

Japan and the ROK can and will pursue more cooperation across hard and soft security issues, but bilateral ties regarding China and North Korea will remain a challenge. Setbacks will result not only from history disputes and public sentiments but also from differences in foreign policy priorities between Japan and South Korea.

Richard N. Haass, president of the Council for Foreign Relations, notes that we need to watch which of the two faces of China⁴⁵ will prevail; will the country's struggle with an aging population, environmental degradation, and corruption get deeper or will it enjoy a "new normal"⁴⁶—slow and quality growth after two decades of high-speed growth? Either way, the reality in Asia is that China's large stature has a significant influence on neighboring countries' security and economy and that China's foreign policy behavior is becoming more offensive⁴⁷ regardless of its actual power. Yet when assessing China, Japanese and Korean views are complete opposites. A joint survey by the Yomiuri Shimbun and Hankook Ilbo in June 2015 shows that an absolute majority of Japanese people (84%) rank China as the largest threat while 6 of 10 South Koreans identify "Japan" as their main threat, second only to North Korea (78%). Among South Koreans, China's favorability has been increasing, passing 50% in 2014 (following the rise to power of Presidents Park and Xi Jinping, both of whom took office in 2013).⁴⁸

For the past several years, Chinese officials have waged a global effort to criticize Japan for

⁴⁴ Thomas U. Berger, *War, Guilt, and World Politics after World War II* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

⁴⁵ Richard N. Haass, "The New "Two Chinas" Question," *Project Syndicate* (August 21, 2015), <<http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/two-chinas-economic-slowdown-by-richard-n--haass-2015-08>>, accessed September 14, 2015.

⁴⁶ "Spotlight: China's Five-Year Plan Offers Model of Sustainable, Balanced Development," Xinhuanet.com, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-11/09/c_134797917.htm>, accessed February 3, 2016; "Xi's "New Normal" Theory," Qiushi (Organ of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China), <http://english.qstheory.cn/2014-11/13/c_1113224518.htm>, accessed February 3, 2016.

⁴⁷ South and East China Sea areas particularly have been the case for the recent years.

⁴⁸ *Hankook Ilbo*, June 9, 2015, pp. 18-19.

its expanding security role and to get the ROK to condemn Japanese wartime behavior.⁴⁹ The Chinese mass media's coverage on sparks between Japan and South Korea has been as concrete and dramatic as those of the two parties directly involved.⁵⁰ China signed a free trade agreement with the ROK in June 2015, four years after the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, but Beijing succeeded in getting the ROK to join the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in 2012 and Seoul has not yet joined the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The PRC also is testing the solidarity of the U.S.-ROK alliance, opposing America's deployment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile system on South Korean soil.⁵¹

Balance of power theory⁵² suggests Korea will be an inside balancer, hedging against its three bigger neighbors (China, Russia, and Japan), and Korea's alliance with the United States will be critical, enabling Korea to create bargaining leverage. The United States and Japan, which see China more as a competitor than South Korea does, seek to consolidate trilateral security ties among the United States, Japan, and Korea. In the same reasoning but from the opposite standpoint, China's strategy would be to enlarge its scope of influence in East Asia by attempting to weaken Japanese and South Korean ties with the United States. As long as the Republic of Korea finds it sandwiched between the U.S. and the PRC⁵³ and wants to maintain amicable relations with both great powers, its zeal for trilateral ties will likely be weaker than that of the U.S. or Japan. Still, trilateral security ties among the U.S., Japan, and the ROK will increase the three countries' leverage alike in engaging the PRC. In the case of South Korea, however, the consistency of its China policy may be affected by the tension between national strategy and the people's cultural affinity toward China

On North Korea

Less than half of Japanese citizens support Japan's right to collective self-defense,⁵⁴ but there

⁴⁹ "China and South Korea Warn Japan to Hold Fast to Pacifist Principles," *Asahi Shimbun*, September 19, 2015, <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/behind_news/politics/AJ201509190049>, accessed January 31, 2016; Philip J. Cunningham, "CCTV News Covers the "Japan Threat"," *Pacific Wave*, August 7, 2014.

⁵⁰ For a glimpse of the intensity and frequency of Chinese mass media's coverage of Japan-ROK disputes, see Chinadaily.com, <<http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/Japan-ROK-disputes.html>>, accessed February 3, 2016; "South Korea Rejects Japan's Proposal on Island Disputes," *CCTV*, August 30, 2012, <<http://english.cntv.cn/program/asiatoday/20120830/107565.shtml>>, accessed February 3, 2016.

⁵¹ "China Presses South Korea Over THAAD," January 29, 2016, *Koreatimesus.com*, <<http://www.koreatimesus.com/china-presses-s-korea-over-thaad/>>, accessed February 3, 2016.

⁵² Hans J. Morgenthau and Kenneth W. Thompson, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (6th ed.) (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1985); Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979); Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1987).

⁵³ David C. Kang, "Between Balancing and Bandwagoning: South Korea's Response to China," *Journal of East Asian Studies* 9 (2009), pp. 1-28; Jae Ho Chung, *Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

⁵⁴ Mansfieldfdn.org, op. cit.

is little doubt in Japan that, if Japan should ever exercise military power, it would be directed against China or North Korea. In South Korea, however, an absolute majority regards Japan's ability to exercise the right of collective self-defense as a threat,⁵⁵ which produces enormous pressure and a dilemma for politicians and policymakers when choosing foreign policy options toward Japan.

As was shown by the two countries' close coordination in response to Pyongyang's 4th nuclear test (January 6, 2016) and 6th long-range ballistic missile test (February 7, 2016), it is obvious to strategists in Tokyo and Seoul that close security ties on North Korean issues will serve the interests of both countries. However, there is a need to handle the public perceptions of Korea and Japan that deviate from this logical conclusion. While Japanese and American people rank China as the largest source of conflict in Asia, more than half of South Koreans view "Japan" as a worry, second only to North Korea.⁵⁶ The divided public opinion among the four countries on the issues of East Asian security leads to the following notions: Japan's role is not regarded as critical by many South Koreans for deterring the North Korean threat and achieving reunification; and many Japanese seem to worry that if the two Koreas are unified, a unified Korea may lean more toward China.

The collapse of the North Korean regime is only a matter of time. Pyongyang has survived 22 years of economic sanctions by the United Nations Security Council but a true crisis will arise inside the regime. Kim Jong-un has executed more than 130 high-ranking members, including his uncle Jang Sung-taek, since he came to power in early 2012.⁵⁷ The quick and unpredictable pace of purges (compared to that of his father and grandfather) suggests that his power base is vulnerable. When no one is sure of their fate, the logrolling cartel among top elite groups can break down quickly. Even China, which believes that its political gains from a divided Korean peninsula are bigger than the economic gains from a unified Korea, has begun to cautiously discuss North Korean contingencies with South Korean counterparts.⁵⁸

Just as firm U.S. support was critical in preempting the Soviet Union's ability to block German unification, the ROK will also need a solid alliance with the U.S. to check possible attempts at obstruction by China and to unify a democratic Korea. "The day after" in North Korea is important to the U.S. too and Washington should keep U.S. forces in Korea at a certain level to serve as an invaluable hedge against Chinese adventurism in and around the Korean peninsula. Transition to unification may not be clean or peaceful. Not many people

⁵⁵ The Genron NPO and East Asia Institute, *3rd Report of Korea-Japan Comparative Analysis on Mutual Perceptions*, op.cit., pp. 25-27.

⁵⁶ *Hankook Ilbo*, op.cit., pp. 18-19; Karl Friedhoff and Dina Smeltz, *Strong Alliances, Divided Publics: Public Opinion in the United States, Japan, South Korea, and China* (Chicago, Illinois: The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, October 2015), pp. 1-17.

⁵⁷ [Weekly.chosun.com](http://weekly.chosun.com), February 1, 2016, <<http://weekly.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?nNewsNumb=002393100003&ctcd=C03>>, accessed February 3, 2016.

⁵⁸ E.g., the track 1.5 annual strategic dialogue since 2009 between the New Asia Research Institute and the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party's Central Committee.

remember that the Japanese navy sent 53 warships and helped the U.S. in conducting mine-sweeping operation during the Korean War.⁵⁹ Whether the issue is accidental military collision, massive outflow of North Korean refugees, or handling of weapons of mass destruction in North Korea, inclusion of Japan in Korean unification plans⁶⁰ will serve all three countries well.

Ironically, it may be that the U.S. security umbrella has been so robust as to allow Japan and South Korea to lapse into the history debate. Or Japanese and Koreans may believe that each's bilateral alliance with the U.S. will suffice in defending critical security interests. Nevertheless, the U.S. faces difficult dual tasks; preventing the allies' breakaway through a formidable security assurance while inducing Japan and the ROK to band together with the U.S. to rebalance and reorganize the Asia-Pacific order. Japan's larger role should be encouraged for Korean peninsula issues, as should a more responsible ROK role in the East and South China seas. And trilateral ties should eventually grow to extend beyond Asia, to include cooperating on global agenda items such as terrorism, climate change, and energy security.

Conclusion

The post-war global liberal order designed by U.S. leadership played an essential role in allowing Japan and South Korea to achieve their miraculous economic development. However, the U.S. rushed to put these two countries in the democratic camp at the early stage of Cold War with the Soviet Union, and unsettled history between the two allies now plagues America's East Asia policy. No matter what institutional mechanism is established for security cooperation among the U.S., Japan, and the ROK, it will not function properly if Koreans and Japanese do not perceive it to be important and legitimate. As the gap in national power between Japan and the ROK narrows, their mutual identity clash is likely to be aggravated.

To be better prepared for reunification and to create more Chinese understanding on this matter, the ROK must obtain Japan's active cooperation in addition to its alliance with the U.S. As long as Japan's leadership considers minimization of history issues a virtue, it will harm Japan's international reputation and national interests. Most policymakers and politicians in Japan and South Korea may find this strategic alignment plausible, but it is very unlikely that there will be any brave move to improve bilateral relations given public opinion. Until a regional crisis alerts those publics to the utility of U.S.-Japan-South Korea security ties, the best possible option for the U.S. seems to be playing the role of smart coordinator, while urging Japan and the ROK to join in on specific issues as developments create opportunities for cooperation.

⁵⁹ Yoichi Hironaka, "Japan's Value in the Korean War: Issues Surrounding the Dispatch of Minesweepers," December 1, 1997, Paper presented to the 3rd Korea-Japan Security Shuttle between the New Asia Research Institute and the Okazaki Institute, pp. 1-7.

⁶⁰ Bruce Klingner, "Allies Should Include Japan in Korean Unification Plans," *Backgrounder* (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, September 2015), pp. 1-8.

Master or Servant? Public Opinion, Polling, and Democratic Responsiveness in Korea

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Abstract

James Bryce famously declared that in the United States, "public opinion stands out ... as the great source of power, the master of servants who tremble before it." To Bryce's point, polling the public is commonly assumed to be a democratic practice—a scientifically-based proxy for instantaneous elections to enhance the marketplace of ideas and inform elite political actors. We interrogate this presumed role by examining political polling in the context of democratization. What does the practice of polling look like in the transition from authoritarianism to democracy? Do polls serve or subvert the aims of free and competitive elections? Drawing on 23 in-depth elite interviews of pollsters, journalists, campaign experts, and academics in Korea, we find a decidedly mixed account of high reliance on polling, endemic challenges to the quality of poll data, and generally poor understanding of the vulnerability of polling technology to error and manipulation. This is a critical and cautionary tale, with implications for the extant literatures on political responsiveness and democratic consolidation.

I) Opening vignettes

- A) In the 2012 Korean presidential election, Park Geun-Hye emerged as the clear choice to be the Saenuri (ruling party) candidate. But there was a great deal of uncertainty and contestation about who would run as the opposition candidate between the left-leaning Democratic Unified Party's, Moon Jae-In and physician and tech entrepreneur Ahn Cheol-Soo. As election day drew near, both Moon and Ahn's campaigns settled on a process for deciding: there would be a debate followed by an opinion poll. That negotiated compromise ultimately failed because each campaign tried to engineer the survey context to their candidate's favor.
- B) 2012 reprised the 2002 Korean presidential election. Something similar occurred in Lee Hoi Chang's second bid for the presidency under the Grand National Party. Lee, former Prime Minister and Chief Justice, faced two formidable possible opponents from the left and center: Roh Moo Hyun, the Millenium Democratic Party candidate and former human rights lawyer and Chung Mong Joon, Hyundai founder Chung Ju-Yung's billionaire scion and independent candidate. Roh and Chung held a televised debate on November 16th, followed by a poll, and when he failed to prevail, Chung bowed out as a presidential candidate.

II) Research question

- A) What role does polling play in the electoral politics of Korea?
- B) The more general form of this question is, what role does polling play in democratizing societies? This general question puts two literatures that are not usually in contact with one another: political responsiveness and democratization.

III) Political responsiveness

- A) Students of political responsiveness ask and aim to answer the question, does public opinion *cause* politicians to do something they might otherwise not? This formulation, of doing something they might otherwise not, is designed to capture Dahls' first face of power. The electorate here has power over politicians just in case their responsiveness is meaningful. In this sense, political responsiveness is a defining feature of democracy and democratic politics.
- B) In the responsiveness literature, public opinion and the technology of polling that is designed to reflect it are typically assumed, without critical inquiry, to reflect democratic practice. As a democratic practice, polling is viewed by many as the means to achieve democracy. Thus Sidney Verba writes: "democracy implies responsiveness by governing elites to the needs and preferences of the citizenry. More than that, it implies equal citizenry."
- C) Much changes, however, in the translation from concept to operationalization in the study of democratic responsiveness. Specifically, most studies of democratic responsiveness are quantitative and survey based, where researchers see a change in public opinion at time t and look for a corresponding change in legislative policy activity at time $t+1$.

- D) Important to our project, the use of polling is a foundation for studies of political responsiveness. To the extent that surveys achieve representativeness through random selection, they provide an unbiased view into what citizens want. More to the point, they proxy for citizens would want under conditions that parallel, in important respects, elections—survey respondents express their views anonymously, all respondents are counted equally, and particular (dispositive) force is imbued to the opinion of the majority.
- E) But, there are two important limitations to the study of political responsiveness that we note and then pick up on later in this paper:
- i) To the extent that there is sampling error or measurement error in the measure of public opinion, the use of surveys fails as an appropriate gauge of responsiveness. Consider, as a parallel to polls, the questions that might be raised about the legitimacy of an election if it were known that specific segments of the electorate were ruled ineligible to vote (the equivalent to sampling error due to coverage issues) or if ballots failed to be printed accurately or in the multiple languages that reflect a plural polity (the equivalent to measurement error due to “context effects” or language-of-interview effects).
 - ii) Most extant studies of responsiveness have studied the relationship between polling and politics in the United States, with a budding literature on this relationship in Western Europe. Yet, from the standpoint of our more rigorous definition of responsiveness, it is rather less interesting to examine whether large scale shifts in the political beliefs of mass publics correspond to shifts in legislative coalitions or policy regimes in advanced, mature democracies. In contexts like the U.S. and E.U. member states, both the institutions of political accountability and the electorates habits of popular sovereignty are inscribed into the nation’s political DNA.
- F) These are conditions, in short, where one is especially likely to be able to presume that polling is a democratic practice, that polling data are correspondingly high in quality, that changes in public opinion measured through those poll will be noticed by politicians, and that politicians might act to address those changes in public opinion. In less advanced, less mature democracies, these presumptions are fraught, if not flaunted. That makes the study of responsiveness in such less consolidated democracies more interesting and potentially fruitful.

IV) Democratization

- A) According to Samuel Huntington, a budding democracy is well on its way to consolidation when it passes the “two turnover test” where a democracy “may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes power in the initial election at the time of the transition loses a subsequent election and turns power over to those election winners, and if those election winners then peacefully turn over power to winners of a later election.”
- B) The focus here on the arrival of a democratic state out of what was once an authoritarian state is, firstly measured in terms of observables in the conduct of elections – whether

there is competition between parties and their candidates, whether there is freedom of speech and assembly in the expression and exchange of political views, whether the press is free to report on the election, and whether there is no taint of corruption or intimidation.

- C) This formal, codified definition of democratic consolidation has been subject to scrutiny. Among other limitations, it is merely the visible manifestation – in electoral "won" and "lost" columns – of a more pivotal transition to democratic legitimacy, namely, the adoption of institutions and ideas that enable free and open competition over ideas, candidates, and parties. As Adam Przeworski describes this deeper foundation, the process of democratization is consolidated when democracy is “the only game in town, when no one can imagine acting outside of the democratic institutions, when all the losers want to do is to try again within the same institutions under which they have just lost.”
- D) The shortcomings in this formal, criterial conception of democratization is that it is reducible, in most versions, to a Schumpeterian minimalist conception, to the exclusion of more plural conceptions like deliberative democracy, participatory democracy, and radical democracy. Put otherwise, the standard in assessing a transition out of authoritarianism as democratic is to look to power in its first dimension, the winning and losing of elections, agnostic to whether that first dimension might have been differently decided with more robust habits of participation and deliberation, or a more radical understanding of the entrenchment of power elites in the aggregation of votes and the domestication of mass preferences.
- V) Framework for our analysis: To answer the question, “is polling a democratic practice?” we need to start with some premises, which bear further elaboration.
 - A) First, we see the question of whether polling is unproblematic and valid as a measure of the underlying concept of public opinion (the “public opinion qua polling” view) as endogenous to the process of political responsiveness. That is, whether the “will of the people” can be fully and precisely gauged by fielding a poll and interpreting its results is, in a deep sense, intertwined with a particular nation’s history of *being* politically responsive. In societies like the United States that have been conditioned to habits of democratic participation over centuries (and have institutions corresponding to those habits) the public opinion *qua* polling view is perhaps a reasonable starting point for inquiry. In societies like Korea (the ostensible area focus of this study), that relation itself warrants inquiry and interpretation.
 - i) In this sense, it is more reasonable, we submit, to theorize public opinion as antecedent, during, and after observable indicators like elections and polls.
 - B) Second, and consistent with the above view on public opinion, we see “democratization” more than just elections – whether in Huntington’s two-turnover test or Przeworski’s sense of readying to try again after losing. Rather, missing from these formal conceptions is Robert Dahl’s articulation that “... the consolidation of democracy requires a strong democratic political culture that provides adequate emotional and cognitive support for adhering to democratic procedures (1997, p. 34).” Achieving this requires both political institutions that enable competitive elections and plural inputs to governance and

collective decision-making, and importantly a sense of freedom from fear of arbitrary or abuses exercise of powers that obtain from those institutions and their processes.

- i) In this sense, the question of how societies that are undergoing a process of transition – from authoritarian rule to something more democratic – use polling becomes itself a window into the question of whether and how democratization itself is taking place. That is, polling is both a way to measure democratization and polling as a measure of democratization itself.
- C) Note here that the extant literature examines the outputs of polls that ask about the public's views of democratic institutions and measure respondents' habits of democratic participation and deliberation as measures of democratization. What we propose is to surveil the field of polling itself to ask whether and how democratic a society appears. In this sense, polling is conceptualized in this study as a "soft" institution of democratization.

VI) Empirical hypotheses

- A) The null hypothesis is the public opinion qua polls view, where polling is a democratic practice and public opinion holds regnant power over politicians and the shape of governance. The key components of this null are well illustrated by two quotes:
- i) From James Bryce, British jurist, politician, former Ambassador to the United States, and author of the celebrated late 19th Century analysis of U.S. politics, *The American Commonwealth* (1888): "Towering over Presidents and State governors, over Congress and State legislatures, over conventions and vast machinery of party, public opinion stands out, in the United States, as the great source of power, the master of servants who tremble before it."
 - ii) From Archibald Crossley, a founding father (along with his contemporaries George Gallup, Elmo Roper) of modern public opinion polling: "Scientific polling makes it possible within two or three days at moderate expense for the entire nation to work hand in hand with its legislative representatives, on laws which affect our daily lives. Here is the long-sought key to 'Government by the people'."
- B) If this null, the overriding presumption in the political responsiveness literature, were true, we should expect the following empirical findings about how polls are used in democratizing societies:
- i) Public trust and literacy on polls should be high. The average citizen should see polls as a politically legitimate and scientifically valid means of gauging a polity's political views. Moreover, that average citizen should have a basic understanding of how polling works and what its results convey (and what they do not convey) in the context of an election or a policy debate.
 - ii) Politicians attentiveness to polls and their literacy on polls should also be high. Politicians too should see polls as a political legitimate and scientifically valid means of gauging what is on the minds of their constituents in the interregnums between elections or in the prelude to an election. Similarly, we should expect that politicians

understand what the results of a poll convey and how to judge polls that are high in quality from those that are shoddy.

- iii) Corresponding to this view of polling's legitimacy in the eyes of both the public and politicians is the expectation that polls are not used to subvert the democratic process. That is, if polls are a democratic practice, politicians will not seek to exploit polling as a technology that can be used to manufacture a sense of public consent and consensus –for a candidate or a policy objective, for instance – that does not exist prior to the use of polling.
 - iv) Also corresponding to these key elements is the further expectation that the keystone institutions of democratic politics – a free mass media and competitive political parties – should be responsible in their production of polls and their publicity around polling. For instance, we should not expect polls to be used to highlight social divisions or unfounded anxieties that may be latent or even non-existent prior to the polling.
 - v) Finally, we should expect, if polls were a democratic practice, that data quality from those polls that are recognized as legitimate, should be high and that key democratic stakeholders (pollsters, parties, politicians, the mass media, and the voting public) should care that the data quality is high.
- C) This specification of what the null hypothesis of public opinion qua polls requires is admittedly a very high bar. N.B.: even advanced democracies like the United States, where we previously noted that a presumption of this null might be reasonable, falters at historical moments in relation to these expectations. At the top of our minds, for instance, is the current 2016 presidential election cycle, which has been oversaturated with media coverage of polling and with at least one party frontrunner who has at times been preoccupied by what the latest polls say about his candidacy (and those of his opponents) and who has been all too willing to shape and re-shape these poll results to construct a semblance of momentum and inevitability.

VII) Case selection: Korea

- A) Korea is heralded as a success case in the “Third Wave” of democratization. Context here: debates over whether political development is a necessary (and maybe even sufficient) conditions for economic development, or whether it might actually impede the latter (Huntington).
 - i) Diamond and Kim (2000) and Diamond and Shin (2000): Korea as a robust instance of democratization and an analytically interesting variety of it. [MORE]
- B) What does the evidence of democratization look like?
 - i) Korea clearly passed the “first turnover” test, with the successful election of opposition party candidate Kim Dae Jung in the 15th presidential election in 1997. Moreover, strictly speaking, it also passed the “second turnover” test the ascent of Lee Myung Bak of the conservative Grand National Party in 2007 after a decade of progressive rule under the New National Party / Millenium Democratic Party.

- ii) Korea also fares generally well by various cross-national indicia of democratization. For instance, the CIA *World Factbook* identifies Korea as “a fully functioning modern democracy.” The Electoral Integrity Project rated Korea as “high” on a scale from “very low” to “very high.” And by Freedom House ratings, Korea appears reasonably democratic on political rights and civil liberties, and less so on political corruption (#43 out of 180 nations by Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Scale).
 - iii) Yet even on these measures, there is evidence of government efforts to intimidate the rights of labor to organize, persistent evidence of gender and ethnic discrimination, and most recently, suggestions of the ruling Saenuri party’s intimidation of political opponents (esp. in retaliation to their criticism for the administration’s handling of the Sewol ferry incident).
 - iv) Especially notable here are the charges of 2012 election tampering by the Korean National Intelligence Service of social media feeds. [MORE: notable as a instance of an attempt to manufacture a sense of public opinion through the use of technologies that purport to merely reflect that opinion, unfiltered.]
 - v) More generally, the jury remains out on how far down the road to democratic consolidation Korea has come. For instance, Larry Diamond and Byung-Kook Kim’s influential (if perhaps now dated) analysis concludes, “political institutions remain shallow and immature, unable to structure a meaningful choice of policy courses and to provide the responsiveness, accountability, and transparency expected by the South Korean public (2000, p. 2).”
- C) Examples of extant studies of democratization and political responsiveness. The aims of such studies are reflected in Larry Diamond’s claim that “democratic consolidation is most evident and secure when support for democracy is not only unconditional but also widely shared by all major political groups and tendencies (1999, p. 175).”
- i) Shin, Park, Hwang, Lee, and Jang (2003): results from the 2002 Asian Values and Democratization Survey. In response to the question, “What does democracy mean to you?” (with up to three mentions), there were many respondents who mentioned “freedom in general” (36%), equality before the law (27%), and freedom of expression and the press (22%). Notably, however, popular sovereignty (“power of the people”) was mentioned by only 7 percent and a number of respondents mentioned definitions that are unrelated to commonly held definitions of democracy (“no anarchy or disorder”; wealth; private property; absence of corruption) and fully 34% mention some definition that is too rare to code and collect.

VIII) Research design and methodology

- A) Details described in the methodological appendix below.
- B) Case selection of Korea already discussed above. For the present study, the focus is on Korea, but

- C) Sample selection: elite interviews of the field of those conducting polling and consuming the outputs of that polling. Specifically polling around elections.
- D) Sampling design: elites were selected based on their reputation in the field and, subsequently through snowball sampling.
- E) Study mode: was in-depth semi-structured interviews.
- F) Sample characteristics: five persons from polling firms that work on political campaigns and that survey political opinions; 2 persons from think tanks that produce political surveys; three journalists from media sources that produce and cover political surveys; ten academics who produce, use, and comment on the use of surveys and political polls; three members of the Korean National Election Commission.

IX) Interview protocol

- A) In outline form, the general script for our interviews cover the following topics. In specific instances, where the interview subject had particular expertise or expansive views on a topic (or, conversely, where s/he had little to say on a topic), we modified the protocol accordingly.
- B) Historical context of survey research in Korea, including the rise of political polling as an industry.
- C) Views of the Korean public's perceptions of polling.
- D) Views of Korean politicians' use of and perception of polling.
- E) Views of mass media's coverage of and production of polling.
- F) Whether polls have come to proxy for politics (e.g., as in the motivating vignettes, whether the results of polls substitute for candidate and party competition; whether polls represent democratic participation; and the like).
- G) Views on the quality of survey data in Korea; whether it has improved or worsened over time; whether the quality of polling on politics and elections is appropriate to its influence on democratic competition; how political polls compare to academic polls; how polling in Korea compares to other democracies; what the most prominent challenges to better quality polling are; and so on.

X) Historical context

- A) Coverage of political polling in Korea: from 1959 to the present.
- B) 1959: first media survey from Hankuk Ilbo. Conducted by scholars of public administration and public policy. Notable founding figure here is Lee Myung Ha.
- C) 1970s: in the Park Chung Hee administration, the use of polling by the National Assembly, by the Office of Statistics, and project sponsored by the U.S. Population Council. These are surveys that monitor and surveil what is happening in Korean society,

arguably in the interests of social control as well as to the ends of economic development. Importantly, *not* polling that arises from a democratic impulse.

- D) 1987: the first direct elections, and with it, the rise of political polling.
- E) 1997: National Assembly elections that saw a shift in the institutionalization of political polling as a regularized practice in Korean elections.
- F) 2002: The aforementioned use of polling to adjudicate between the potential oppositional candidacies of Roh Moo Hyun and Chung Mong Joon.
- G) 2012: In the most recent elections, the vignette of polling proposed to adjudicate between Ahn Chul Soo and Moon Jae In, and reports of more than 3,000 political polls.
- H) Seok Hyunho (KOSSDA): “A lot of these early surveys were village surveys of the Korean rural population. We could not survey on sensitive topics like poverty. No official procedure, but local police would follow and monitor when surveys were conducted.”
- I) Hanwool Jung (EAI): “In the ‘80s and ‘90s, it was mostly focusing on volatility and neutrality and how the information regarding opinion polls is being disseminated. However in the 2000s, it’s more about the methodology and selection process. So I argue that ... it moved debate to the methodology.”

XI) The Korean public

- A) Reasonably high degree of trust in polls seen in polls on polls:
 - i) Korea Gallup: levels of trust in polls exceeds levels of trust in government statistics generally, from 1989 to 2000. Most recent data are from 2000, where nearly 60% reported trust in polling, compared to just 40% who reported trust in government statistics.
 - ii) KBS / Media Research: in more recent data [YEAR?]
 - (a) A majority of Koreans still reported trusting media poll coverage “very much” or “generally,” and only a little over 10 percent reporting “none at all” or “not much” trust.
 - (b) A solid majority also reported being “very” or “generally” interested in media poll coverage.
 - (c) Less than a majority reported relying on media poll coverage in elections “a lot” or “somewhat”; more than a third reported “zero” or “not much” reliance on media poll coverage.
- B) Some elites were optimistic about the capabilities of the Korean mass public. Kyusup Hahn (SNU): “Korean voters in general, I don’t know if I should say this, are more intelligent than American voters overall. Because the education level here is extremely high. When it comes to understanding the methodological aspects of polling, Koreans are much better I think than their American counterparts. So after a while I think Koreans

now understand looking at social media doesn't give you a very active look at what public opinion is."

C) Others saw public understanding as situational and episodic, and mired in a poor grasp of how public opinion works.

i) From Jiyeon Kim (Korea Research): "As far as general voters, I think there is a unique tendency in Korea where everyone becomes experts on the issue on hand. When the scandal of Dr. Hwang came out, everyone became DNA experts. When the Cheonan sinking occurred, everyone became security experts. When it comes to public opinion, everyone becomes an expert. Even when I talk to my friends who don't have professional knowledge about polling, I am amazed at how much they know about the current issues. However, when you actually talk to them, you would realize that what they know or what they think they know is misunderstanding or they just simply don't have clear knowledge in the matter of public opinion."

ii) Younglim Hong, *ChosunIlbo*: "I see that the average voters are definitely not aware of technical understanding in surveys. In case of politicians, I would say that a half of them do not understand sophisticated [concepts] such as response rates. I don't really expect to know if voters would know such thing."

D) Also, adding constraints and limiting the capabilities of the Korean mass public are the anchoring and sorting effects of ideological polarization and the saturation of polling in electoral information streams.

i) Kyusup Hahn (SNU): "The disadvantage of Korean [politics] is that it is extremely polarized. So ... for example there is always information that could be supportive of any view. Because it is so polarized, everyone is looking for sources that confirm their prior views compared to Americans."

ii) Hanwool Jeong (EAI): "Now I am worried about the influence of too much polling in Korea. For example, we have primary elections and in some districts the polling data is critical to choosing the candidate. I don't think that's a good idea. When you carefully review the questions [in these polls], some questions are not appropriate for respondents, such as "what do you think about the budget size of Korea?" Who knows the size of the budget in Korea? Nobody knows. Because too many surveys are being conducted, non-experts are writing these questionnaires, producing "non-attitudes," but media takes the result as valid because it sounds interesting."

XII) Korean political elites

A) On the question of whether Korean politicians see themselves as more like trustees of the public (who either discount polls or use media and polling to shape public opinion) or dutiful delegates to the public's wishes (who are responsive to polling), a common response is to reject the dichotomy and highlight the electoral salience of polling.

i) Jiyeon Kim, Asan: "Well legislators, I don't think they are really interested in polls except if it is about their own approval ratings... and during the election time. ... The Blue House conducts their own surveys probably almost every week. But I haven't really seen any particular efforts to manipulate the public opinion. Not because they

are good people ... So it is a kind of in-between they are not as bad as manipulative but not as good or as responsive as to the public opinion.”

B) Our experts held a generally dim view of the sophistication and literacy of politicians regarding polling and its scientific basis.

i) Dukjin Chang, SNU/ISDPR: “Politicians are always aware of polling results ... But these results are quite systematically different in a way that is very predictable. So although [politicians] are aware of polling results, do they really have a scientific or academic understanding of what it means? If you ask *that* question, I don’t really think so. They are interested in polling results because it has some implications for their short term political interests.”

ii) Jiyeon Kim, Korea Research/Millward Brown: “I think there is a lot of deviation in terms of understanding on the details of polling. Even people who look like they should know may turn out to have very low levels of understanding of survey methodology. For example, they might have heard about RDD surveys and how they are conducted. However, they misunderstand and sometimes just have no knowledge of the technique. Even some professors in academia have very little of sophistication about polling. There have been personally very surprising cases of politicians or even professors who mistook the numerator and denominator in calculating response rates. So I would say that in general they are uninformed.”

C) And at least some interviewees see attempts to use polls to engineer a sense of public opinion:

i) Sung Han Young, *Hankyoreh*: “When the parties conduct their own surveys—they can do it because they have enough money from the governmental funding and party membership fees—they design the questionnaires intentionally advantageous for them.”

XIII) Mass Media

A) On whether mass media see a responsibility to educate the public about polling and survey methodology, interviewees pointed to both that responsibility and constraints on that responsibility.

B) Changwoon Shin, *Joongang Ilbo*: “The readership is not just general voters but also politicians as well as journalists. I am not sure if they pretend that they don’t understand the detailed knowledge of survey or they truly really don’t know. Regardless they seem to lack any kind of sensibility about the technical features of polling. We try to educate them through discussion groups, presentations and guidelines whenever we get to have a chance. However, they still lack an understanding ... One of the reasons why we have a hard time educating readers is that are space limits in newspapers and time limits in broadcasting ... We once used up an entire page of a newspaper to post our survey questionnaires. But this kind of thing is not possible anymore. On top of that, we recently just reduced the size of papers so the pressure is even more ... Even political journalists do not understand the methodological specifics, so they just write what they see. For instance, if the survey result shows 40 to 38, they just write an article as though one

candidate is leading 2% over the other. And then politicians, who read such articles claim, "Oh, according to *Joongang Ilbo* research, I am ahead by 2%."

XIV) Polls as electoral proxies

- A) Interviewees were nearly uniform in their view that polls should not be used as a substitute for the regular process of choosing candidates in an election.
- B) In particular, pollsters were very mindful that the results of polling are especially fraught when support for two candidates is very close and within the typical survey's margin of error. Park Moo-ik, *Gallup Korea*: "Using polls to decide between the candidates is just nonsense and is the thing that only Koreans do - people don't do this in any other country in the world. What if there is a 25% response rate? We cannot make sense of what the results mean. It is like throwing dice in the air to decide. Even though Gallup has a good record in predicting the election outcomes ... it does not make any sense to me ... It does not make sense because anyone who wins a poll by even 0.1% can be chosen a presidential candidate. It is just absurd. As you know polls have standard errors, but they just ignore it. Gallup was asked to conduct the poll, but declined and publicly denounced the idea several times. Without taking into consideration of standard error and non-response, they just add up to 100% to come up with a result."
- C) In addition to concerns about margins of error, pollsters were concerned about the proxy use of polling due to the risk of strategic responses to surveys, or what one interviewee called "reverse selection."
- i) Jiyeon Kim (Millward Brown): Have you heard about the term "reverse selection" in the case like the election between 이회창 and 정몽준 and 노무현? 이회창 supporters actually answered that they support 정몽준 because 노무현 was very compelling candidate. This is another case that shows people take taking survey as an act of political participation. I think it's a problem that was actually driven by the media and the politicians. I have been strongly telling them it's wrong to use opinion polling to decide the candidate. When they are trying to use the public opinion survey to decide the candidate who should run for, regardless of marginal error they would still select one who receives even 0.1% higher than the other. This shows the transition from science to rock scissor paper. This is also happening in the local election in this year too. I think it's becoming a huge problem."
- ii) Kim Jiyeon, Asan: "I wouldn't do it. . I would avoid any chance or cost. That's actually what most big companies do. In 2002, with Chung and Roh, the big polling firm ... they try not to take it, because it's so politically irresponsible. If [Chung and Roh] are neck and neck, the poll result could be easily be within the error margin. And there is no way of telling if a Lee Hoe-Chang supporter might pretend to support [Chung or Roh] in order to get the less competitive candidate in the real election. I hear that is a really big issue.
- D) One justification for this proxy use of polls is when the regular process is at an impasse. *Anon*, major party pollster and strategist: "In [2002], between Roh and Chung, the only way to build a coalition was to base it on polling. There were no other means ... polling

was the only alternative. So the debate, similar to the case of 2012, became about [question] wording. Roh wanted to ask which candidate would be more competitive, while Chung wanted to ask who the respondents supported for president. The same thing happened in 2012. It was a huge deal because, practically, the polls would decide the next president. In a way, just a thousand people made the decision ... Ahn's camp did not have any other ideas than polling. This is because they did not really think about unifying the presidential candidates. Their strategy was ... to achieve the dominant position in competitiveness between Ahn and Park. We were trying to force Moon to withdraw. So, simply there was no negotiation. Polls were showing that Moon was behind.

- E) In this context, at least one interviewee acknowledged a willingness to use polling. Anon, pollster: "If the parties can't decide candidates, then we should step in. I know that using polls to decide candidates is far from democratically ideal, but this is the only thing we've got. Then I think we should make the best use of it. I happen to be the person who is willing to do what's necessary, when everyone else is avoiding it."

XV) Data quality

- A) One source of worry about data quality in election polls in Korea is of "house effects," or the tendency of certain firms to produce results that favor one party's candidates over the other party's candidates.
- i) Hahn Kyusup, SNU: "I think there is certainly big variance in terms of quality across polling firms. So we actually did an analysis based on about 250 polls that were conducted during the last presidential election, and there's obviously a fairly big variance in terms of their results. For example, for some of the polling firms they are consistently showing that Moon was winning or ahead, or overestimated his vote share. And other polling firms consistently overestimated Park's vote share. Some of them I think is intentional and some of them is not necessarily intentional but because of the methodology that they are using."
- B) Another worry is the wide range of practices regarding sample design, interviewing modes and other technical approaches to polling. A specific worry is the use of ARS (automated recording systems) in surveying opinion.
- i) Jeong Hanwool, EAI: "There are all kinds of issues with sampling. But one of the things that I would like to point out is that when they mix the cell phone in the sample, they do it without any kind of formal criteria. Some firms would have 100% of cell phone samples while the other would have only 50%. There is just no basis for that. If you think about the fact that some people will own both landline and cell phone, that would just distort the probability of getting selected in the sample. I guess the profit motif of the private polling firm is problematic. I have seen in the website of some private polling firm that advertise ARS as a viable means to conduct a public opinion polling. This is a problematic aspect of profit-driven private polling firms."
- ii) Jiyeon Kim (Millward Brown): "One of the issues in Korea is the ARS survey. It has been called 'telephone pollution,' because it's just about calling everyone over and over. Even though we conduct a standard survey, from the respondent's

perspective, it's just another call to answer some questions. So the response rate is decreasing over the time for that reason. And there is no way to regulate it."

- C) The worry about strategic responses to surveys bleeds into the discussion on data quality as well. Jiyeon Kim (Millward Brown): "In the primary election, they conduct the survey to decide the candidate then some supporters say things like they should stay at home rather than going to the work so that they can answer the phone call to make their response count for supporting the candidate. These cases show that people take taking survey as a political action. I think it's a huge problem."
- D) Finally, one interviewee proposed a revealed preferences gauge on data quality. Dukjin Chang (SNU, ISDPR): "Polling is a powerful tool. Often times, even if you have problems with the quality of the data, you can still come up with quite accurate prediction especially in averaging [across polls] ... in that sense, they are doing pretty well. But in terms of the quality of data, there are a lot of problems of course ... One simple way to compare it is cost. ... They do not spend the money they have to spend. That shows the quality of the data."

XVI) Polling and democracy

- A) On the overarching assessment of whether polling is a friend or foe to democratization, the views of our respondents were mixed, but hopeful.
- B) One vantage on this question is through the arc of history, where the use of polls today is a clear improvement over Korea a half century ago. Lee Namyoung, Sejong University: "In the 1960s and 70s there were no academic surveys, mainly because government was afraid to hear public opinion. They thought that if public opinion did not approve of the government, that's not going to be advantageous for them. So they suppressed attempts to poll opinions and prevented publicizing poll results. I think the threshold moment came in the 1980s, after President Park was assassinated in 1979. The next president Chun Doo Hwan freed people to study abroad for education. One by one, the country started to open up to international community. I think the 1988 Olympics were when South Korea finally reached a level of moderate openness. That was the time when polling and popularization of polling results began. There was a sense that public opinion is actually conveyed to the government ... After the 1990s, democratization accelerates the process. Through Kim Young Sam, Kim Dae Jung and Roh Moo-hyun, we became more like a Western country, and people were not afraid to express their opinions anymore. In the past, they did not even like to talk about their political opinion or even just refuse to answer any kind of polling. Now they directly address the governmental issues and other matters."
- C) Another perspective is that the normalization of polling and the inclusion of polling metrics like presidential approval ratings has a salutary effect on Korea's democratization. Park Won-Ho, SNU: "If you think about it, polls are used in contexts you and I never thought of before [laughs]. For example, they have even used it for in the party nomination process [where] there was actually an allegation of fraud. What they tried to do was ... for example, if you are in the 50s, that's the demographic group that you can fill up the quota easily. So the interviewer will tell you to answer that you are in your 20s, something like that. In general, however, I think the usage of polling in

elections has contributed a lot. For example, Koreans never heard about presidential approval ratings 10 or 15 years ago. Now you see, almost every week, the approval rate of Park Geunhye. ... Does this empower voters? I think, yes. The downside is that there is now so much polling that polls are losing credibility both among politicians and the public. For example, if you watch the news from JTBC, they conduct a poll while the news is on-air ... and they give results at the end of the news show ... If we have too many surveys, I think we have less credibility.”

- D) Another important perspective is that polls, properly used, can serve as a gauge on the health of democratic politics. Park Mooik, Gallup: “Well, sometimes the poll is too much used... I don’t think there is any better way to measure the public opinion, except polling. ... But think about the growth of democracy. In theory, it says that the people have power to govern. Because many times we are disappointed at [the results of] public opinion in polls. That means people lack the information they need, there is no guarantee for people to choose the right answers. We need to take into account of public opinion, but sometimes, we need to be more sophisticated and informed about people’s advice. That is my position.”
- E) At the same time, there are cautionary notes about the use of polling to engineer a sense of what public opinion is. Anon, major party pollster and strategist: “It’s clearly against the law but there is a trick: you go into a small county ... and repeat ARS surveys over and over. After you get 30% support, you know all the numbers for those supporters, and you use those numbers in your campaign ... Another trick is used by small-scale polling firms. They include the respondents who support your candidate into the raw sample. If you fill 30% of your sample with the respondents on your side, you get an artificial 30% increase instantly. Yes, it is clearly manipulating sampling procedure ... So this is how you manufacture public opinion. If you are campaigning for 3 months, a challenger will score 5% in the beginning; two weeks later, 10%; and then another two weeks, you get 20%, 30%. Then the media will pick up the trend, and describe the surge of numbers. Then you see your candidate actually becoming a real phenomenon.”

XVII) Regulating polling

- A) A final aspect of polling as a democratic practice that we inquired with our interviewees is the role of regulation, either from government or from within the industry. Here it is noteworthy that Korea has recently passed legislation to create a “Fair Election Survey Deliberation Commission.”
 - i) According to interviewees, the context for the creation of this regulatory arm is to ensure greater transparency over the field of political polling.
 - (a) In part, due to the sheer number of polls conducted today in Korea in any given electoral cycle. The numbers alone create an environment where there is unlikely to be serious accountability for poor data quality or unethical polling practices.
 - (b) Another consideration is the alarmingly large number of firms conducting political polling. By one source, roughly 300 “firms” registered with the election commission in 2012, a number that is so high that many of these registered firms

are either fly-by-night operations that function in a similar fashion to C4 political action committees in the United States or firms that are so unrecognizably small that there is no guarantee of whether polls are actually being conducted and what their quality of survey practices looks like.

- ii) Shin Changwoon, *Joongangilbo*: “The consensus is that in order to solve problems, for example, the level of trust in the press surveys, or fairness, or other matters that people are not aware of, all survey data will have to be public ... Therefore, probably starting later this month, [pollsters] will have to report their results to the commission website ... or else they will have to pay a fine. This way ... anyone who is interested in learning more about sampling error or response rates ... can check online.”
- B) Yet there is also skepticism about whether federal oversight is sufficient. Kim Jiyeon, Korea Research: “I think it’s almost impossible to do this through the regulation from outside because regulation being forced by National Election Commission provides the minimum. So just because a survey passed the regulation does not guarantee its quality because most of surveys can actually so easily pass the regulation ... Ultimately, self-regulation should work the best but it is also hard to achieve. Not everyone feels like I do. Every company regardless of their commitment or size all have an equal vote in the [polling] association. However, each company faces different business challenges ... Small firms simply cannot meet the standards proposed by the big firms.”
- i) This inherent differentiation of resources and business environments makes self-regulation difficult, but there is an effort to do just that, spearheaded by the larger firms. Again from Korea Research’s Kim Jiyeon: “So what we are planning to do is to open up the all kinds of information related to the polls that we conduct. Some polling firms that are willing to participate are working to open access to the data and upload even the raw data, including questionnaires. So anyone can check the reliability and validity of our data in analysis. Not too many polling firms are on board yet but we are planning to open up a website, focusing on major polling firms. ... My hope is that this kind of practice will distinguish between the good polls and bad polls, resulting in informing the audience to pay more attention to the data with good quality.”

XVIII) Summary and next steps

- A) While many observers of democratization in Korea have been quick and enthusiastic to celebrate the nation’s passage through the “two turnover” rubicon to democratic consolidation, the state of polling as a democratic practice remains more fragile.
 - i) There are challenges in the public’s understanding of what differentiates good from bad polls, or ideologically biased from more scientifically unbiased surveys, and so on. But levels of public trust in polling is reasonably high.
 - ii) From the standpoint of elites, there is some willingness to use polls for political gain, but on the whole there is a reliance on polls as a barometer of one’s likely electoral prospects.

- iii) On the whole, the occasional practice of using polls as a proxy for the political party's role in selecting candidates is frowned upon by pollsters themselves, but this does not mean the practice will not continue.
 - iv) There are also potentially troubling issues with data quality in Korea, such as the over-reliance on quota sampling (rather than probability sampling), the rise of automated surveys, low response rates, and efforts to engineer particular results on where the Korean public stands.
 - v) One promising sign is in efforts, both internally (among scholars and practitioners of polls) and externally (from the federal government) to establish better standards for high quality polling, strong norms of transparency, and regulations that could enable greater accountability for poor or manipulative polling practices.
- B) An important next step is to examine how Korea differs in this mixed account of promise and perils from other democratic and democratizing societies. Specifically, there are good justificatory grounds for a comparison of Korea to Taiwan and perhaps Japan in their use of polling in the electoral arena. It is to this comparison that we turn as a next step in this project.

Methodological Appendix

Working Schedule

We conducted two series of interviews for this project during the spring of 2014. In the first week, we conducted 10 interviews; after having a hiatus of two weeks away from the field, we returned to conduct additional 11 interviews. Because we were travelling internationally for our interviews, the two series of interviews were conducted in the span of four days each. Approximately we conducted three interviews per working day, typically one in the morning and two more in the afternoon.

Sampling and Recruitment of Interviewees

Our primary aim in conducting these interviews was to understand the field of public opinion polling in Korea. Rather than trying to build a representative sample of the entire set of actors – not only pollsters, but academics, journalists, and political consultants who work with poll data – in the field, we chose to identify the key actors who were located in the strategic positions to understand the general state of the craft in Korea.

There are two reasons for taking this approach. First, the field of polling in Korea is very much a volatile one, with many actors (especially pollsters) moving in and out of the business in rapid pace. Specifying the boundary of the population from which to draw a sample was practically impossible. Second, although the boundary of the field was fuzzy and volatile, the core group of actors had maintained a relatively stable membership with strong networks among them. We chose to focus on this core group and relied much on their insights — presumably originating from their experiences of being at the center of the field for a considerable period of time — in understanding the polling in Korea.

In actual recruitment of interviewees, we essentially took a snowball approach. Both of the authors have considerable experiences of working in the field of public opinion polling, both in the U.S. and Korea. Using our pre-existing personal networks, we contacted prominent pollsters and academics first, and asked them to name the important actors in the field. In the end of every interview, we asked our interviewees to recommend whom they perceive as major actors in the field of polling in Korea. We followed up on the recommendations in our second trip, interviewing people who were recommended in our previous interviews. By end of the second trip, we reached the point where we interviewed almost all of the major figures in the field of polling in Korea, and none of the names suggested by our interviewees were new to us.

In the end, we covered the major polling firms (“big 4,” according to our interviewees); the most experienced journalists in major news outlets; academics who work with polls, including those who oversaw the foundation of the field as well as the new generation who just began their work; regulators of the Central Election Commission, which oversees the regulations regarding polling in elections; and a political consultant who worked for a major political party. One caveat is that we were only able to interview one political consultant who worked with one major party, and we did not spoke those who worked for other parties. While this may pose a problem of

ideological bias, some of the pollsters we interviewed did work with almost all major parties, so we are confident that our argument is not affected much by the omission.

Interviews

We conducted semi-structured interviews that typically ranged from an hour to two. Our interviewees chose the language of the interview: usually the academics chose to be interviewed in English, and other professionals opted for Korean. In conducting interviews in Korean, one of the co-authors served as an interpreter, while the other co-author asked questions in English. Upon request, we provided our questions in advance to our interviewees. The actual interviews largely followed the script, but sometimes we delved into other topics to probe further, especially when the interviewee discussed information that were not mentioned in other interviews. Interviews were often conducted in the offices of our interviewees, while some interviewees met us in public places such as cafes and restaurants. We provided a small gift (souvenir pens) as an expression of gratitude to our interviewees after interviews were completed.

Analysis

All of our interviews were recorded and transcribed, both in Korean and English, by a bilingual research assistant. Both of the co-authors went through the transcripts multiple times, attempting to develop coding schemes for the entire set of the interviews. After we agreed on the common set of codes, one of us coded all the interviews according to the scheme, while the other person checked afterwards to see the result made sense. Through this process we reached agreement on how the interviews were coded, and the results provided the baseline for the analysis presented in the paper.

Hunger Fighters: The Origins of International Development in Republican China, 1920-1949

“Money and food are eaten and gone, and if there is not sun and rain in proportion, there is again hunger.” - Pearl Buck, in *The Good Earth*

Histories of US relations with China and East Asia typically center on state-to-state relations, and especially with the beginnings of American open door policies to open trade and ensure oceanic commerce with its Pacific neighbors. This paper begins with a slightly different bent, examining instead non-state actors driven by religious and social missions for saving people throughout the world as they engaged in a different project of famine relief and prevention. I frame these efforts as the precursor to a crucial project of US involvement in East Asia in the modern era, the practice of international development that has shaped the decolonization, nation-building, and modernization projects of 20th-century Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. This specific narrative begins with US philanthropists, missionaries, and scientists who began working in China in the early 20th century. In tracing the intellectual debates engendered by these actors and their attempts to disseminate what they perceived as modern methods of famine prevention, I argue that their involvement fostered the emergence of multiple schools of agricultural and rural development centered on different scientific and social visions of modernity, and that these schools would eventually be co-opted by the state and coalesce into a model that was later portrayed as the “East Asian miracle.”

Among the dozens of missionary and philanthropical groups working in Republican China (1911-1949), this paper focuses on a few select development practitioners, both Chinese and American, and their associated institutions. The development experts who began their careers in China were largely natural scientists, social scientists, and engineers, both Chinese trained in pioneering centers of agricultural and social sciences in the United States and Americans who went abroad for the first time. These figures, including Americans John Earl Baker, John Reisner, and Raymond Moyer, and Chinese Yan Yangchu, Shen Zonghan, and Jiang

Menglin, would become key figures in the histories of international development and in Asian agricultural miracles of the 1950s and 1960s. Their shared experiences, beginning with the formative years of intellectual searching at American research universities such as Cornell and Columbia, through Chinese institutions such as Yenching University (*yanjing daxue* 燕京大學), Nanking University (*jinling daxue* 金陵大學), and social and rural reform movements such as the Mass Education Movement and the North China Council for Rural Reconstruction, demonstrated remarkable exchange and debate over how to fight famine and improve rural livelihood.

From these debates emerged two predominant discourses of development. The first was socially grounded, originating from missionary activities and Chinese intellectuals and reformists who focused on rural China and believed in dissemination of knowledge for the good of the average village and villager. Out of these beliefs came an emphasis on public health, mass literacy, and most importantly, agricultural extension (the dissemination, through demonstrations in farms and villages, of agricultural technology and applied science, ranging from selected seeds, newly designed agricultural implements, to pesticide application practices). The second was “high modernist,” to borrow James Scott’s term.¹ These intellectuals were largely trained as scientists, ranging from plant breeders to entomologists and soil experts. Though many of these individuals believed also in the value of social practices like agricultural extension, they differed from social reformers in their belief in the power of technology and science to transform society. Though the language of the “modern” was not in vogue in this period, they encapsulated a vision of modernity through their goals and practices.

¹ Scott, 1999

By the 1920s, well established Protestant missionary groups around the world had already begun discussing the benefits of agricultural development for those they were hoping to convert. Galangue Station in Angola, which was almost entirely manned by African Americans who had volunteered to return to Africa, was one such example. Run by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions (ABCFM), it was featured in the 1928 issue of alumni magazine *The Talladegan*. ABCFM missionary Reverend Samuel B. Coles wrote in the *Talladegan* article titled “The History and Future Development of Galangue Station” of its efforts at improving basic agriculture, including establishing blacksmithing to forge improved axes and hoes and introducing Galangue’s first plow. Coles expressed his desire for agriculture to free Galangue from the contributions of church members back in the United States. In addition to listing the number of acres tilled and planted with wheat and percentage of village deployed in agricultural enterprise, he hoped that eventually “better methods of farming will better the entire economic condition of the people and will make an independent self supporting native church.”²

In China, Korea, and Japan, a similar phenomenon was unfolding. Over a dozen Western missionary groups had been operating in China by the Republican period, both in the port treaties of China’s eastern coast as well as inland provinces like Shaanxi and Sichuan. Though most missionaries in China had moved there in order to teach and convert the Chinese to Christianity, a number were also involved in famine relief, another means by which souls could be saved. By 1921, according to a report by the United International Famine Relief Committee (*guoji tongyi jiuzai zonghui* 國際統一救災總會), the number of foreign workers engaging in famine relief numbered at 385, with missionaries from Presbyterian, Anglican, Roman Catholic, Methodist,

² Samuel B. Coles, Excerpt of “History and Future Development of Galangue Station” from the *Talladegan*, November 1928, Folder 2, Box 1, Harry Love Papers, Cornell Rare and Manuscripts Library (hereafter CRML).

Lutheran, and Baptist denominations representing the United States, Canada, Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden, and Norway.³

As Christian missions sought to help peoples in mission lands, philanthropic organizations in the United States also began to look outward. The Rockefeller Foundation (RF), run by Rockefeller family scion John D. Rockefeller Jr. and endowed with Rockefeller family funding, began to fund projects abroad, usually involving American expertise. The earliest Rockefeller efforts in China began with medicine. The famous Peking Union Medical College (PUMC) was a Rockefeller Foundation funded medical college that sought to improve public health in China by training Chinese doctors under the supervision of American faculty. Along with nearly a dozen medical colleges, mostly associated with the missionary universities such as St. John's, Nanking, Lingnan, etc., these cooperative training projects in medicine sought to bring Western medical practices to China.

By 1920, the Rockefeller Foundation began to look beyond PUMC, which by then had become a fairly successful organization at demonstrating tangible results through the number of Chinese doctors trained and graduated from PUMC. Part of the RF's modus operandi included working with and funding new and existing committees, like the China Medical Board, that would fundraise from specific donors interested in specific causes, such as medical relief in China, and appoint capable experts to carry out those missions. 1920 provided a new window of opportunity for the RF to expand in China, albeit in response to a national tragedy.

In 1920, a severe drought in north China led to a subsequent famine that received considerable attention in the United States. Historian Lillian Li estimated 30.3 million affected by the drought across five provinces, with around 500,000 dead as a result of the subsequent

³ Letter from Houghton to Embree, May 19, 1921, Folder 1040, Box 45, Series 1.2, RG 4 China Medical Board, Rockefeller Foundation, Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC).

famine.⁴ Newspapers in the United States covered the consequences of the famine with headlines such as “Starving Children Eat Baked Weeds,” placing the death count at thousands a day and relaying a figure of \$100,000,000 needed for relief efforts.⁵ Reports appeared so dire that American Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Warren Harding appointed an American Advisory Committee for Famine Relief (AACFR), headed by prominent Americans in an effort to organize relief in north China.

AACFR, with a goal of raising \$5 million in gold, effectively organized both religious and non-religious fundraising pathways, and by 1922, considered its efforts a success. Starting in 1921, as rainfall began to increase, conditions in north China improved and no longer necessitated the continuation of food and relief distribution. But with significant capital still left over after relief efforts, the AACFR came to a crossroads. A memorandum, drafted by a specially convened subcommittee of the AACFR, was circulated by AACFR to the counterpart board in China, the American Advisory Committee in Beijing (AACB), and the major donors, including John Rockefeller Jr. and leading officials within the Rockefeller Foundation. The contents of the memo outlined an emerging debate over the future of humanitarian aid.

The obvious option that presented itself would have been a continuation of the AACFR mission. 1921 had seen flooding along the banks of the Yellow River, and leftover funds could easily have been applied to help mitigate that natural disaster. However, a rising opinion was expressed against such a course of action. Instead, the memo pointed to the existence of discouraging factors: 1) the AACFR believed the Chinese government possessed the funds and capability to attend to the affected flooded population, but chose to reserve that funding for “other uses” knowing foreign aid would flow in 2) continual foreign aid could potentially

⁴ Li, 2007

⁵ Starving Chinese Eat Baked Weeds: Thousands of Refugees, Migrating Afoot, Subsist on Cakes Resembling Clay, 1920

“pauperize” the Chinese by making them dependent upon foreign aid for future relief (as historian Pierre Fuller argues, an argument with little basis in reality) and 3) natural disasters occurred with such certainty that continual fundraising of American sources would see no end and funds should be spent immediately in order to ask for less in the future⁶. In concluding the memo, the AACFR suggested three possible courses of action: 1) continue business as usual, 2) as a middle course, use the experience of the 1920 drought relief efforts as a lesson for future events by continually keeping track of crop conditions so that surplus reallocation could be done in a more timely manner, and at the opposite end, 3) use funds for “specific preventative lines.”⁷

The memo triggered an extended and lengthy debate among the policymakers within the Rockefeller and the humanitarian aid community regarding would “preventative lines” could entail. George Vincent, a doctor serving on the China Medical Board and adviser to the Rockefeller Foundation, remarked that the AACFR should follow the precedents set by missionary organizations and the Rockefeller and establish an “American Anti-Famine Foundation.” Missionary organizations did not attempt to “make a large number of converts,” it argued, but rather “to train its converts to the task of spreading the gospel to the masses of their countrymen.” Likewise the Rockefeller accomplished the same in setting “standards of medical education so that hundreds and eventually thousands of Chinese physicians shall heal millions of sick.” Thus, “no better purpose could be served” than to “put these famine funds to the education of the Chinese people in the prevention of future famine.” Vincent’s letter closed with a prediction that “there will come a time when the friendship of the common people of China

⁶ Memorandum, American Advisory Committee for Famine Relief, September 17, 1921, Folder 1040, Box 45, Series 1.2, RG 4 China Medical Board, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

⁷ Ibid.

will be worth more to America than the favor of the Mandarins,” a prediction that was eerily ominous of events to follow.⁸

The counterpart board in China, the American Advisory Committee in Beijing (AACB) likewise weighed in with their thoughts. Consisting largely of missionaries in Beijing, the AACB leaned heavily toward the latter options. In fact, the AACB recommended that no funds be allocated toward the alleviation of the 1921 Yellow River floods, firmly believing that local “Chinese officials were in possession of necessary funds, derived from special super⁹-taxes, ample to accomplish the necessary relief” but were withholding the funds “for other purposes and [to] seek American relief.” Like Vincent, it believed the most important goal would be to “prevent future famine” (emphasis original). In historical perspective, the AACB and American missionaries often mistook the actions of the Chinese state as well as ignored local Chinese attempts to relieve famine, but the discourse engendered by these letters nonetheless was quite real and proved influential for donors such as the Rockefeller outside of China. In the full six page letter, it laid out a plan of action. First, the AACFR should endow the remaining funds such that the interest from the principal could be administered by a new organization dedicated to finding worthy causes of investment. Next, ventures in two areas should be funded: reforestation and agricultural education. In the former, the AACB specifically mentioned the University of Nanking, “an institution of fine character,” notable because it was “largely conducted by Americans,” and Peking University (Yenching University) in the latter, also notable for the presence of Americans and its already extant extension system on 200 acres in north China. Most importantly, however, was that Nanking University had the only established and dedicated College of Agriculture and Forestry among universities surveyed, coincidentally at the time also

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Pierre Fuller discusses this in detail in his dissertation. Fuller, 2012

being temporarily administered by agricultural economist, Cornell graduate, and then husband of Pearl Buck, John Lossing Buck. The AACB saw value in reforestation and agricultural education, and in explaining the latter specifically referenced American agricultural experiences: “In America the vast improvements in agriculture in recent years have come as a result of careful experimentation and demonstration and that such work, though not expensive, would constitute a most suitable and certain of famine prevention and that it could easily be made to affect a large part of China’s population.”¹⁰ The authors saw parallels between American success in agricultural education and its potentially applicability to this new shift in discourse from relief to prevention. For a foreign aid situation, where resources were limited, population scaled nearly infinitely, and success was rarely guaranteed, agricultural education appeared to be the best investment.

The AACB’s recommendation was not without its critics, however. Roger S. Greene, director of the China Medical Board and member of the AACB, elaborated his own experience in dealing with other missionary groups. He noted that various missions have been communicating a serious need for relief funds, including from Arthur Brown of the Presbyterian Board of Foreign Missions, and that diverting surplus from “actual relief” could be “rather embarrassing” given the public facing nature of mission work. Nonetheless he believed the plan of the AACB was still the right path in terms of a long term resolution. In his additional comments, he also suggested that one or two Chinese individuals “of high standing” be asked to join in creating an organization in charge of the surplus endowment, in order to give the organization some legitimacy with the Chinese without necessarily displacing the role of the Chinese government.¹¹

¹⁰ Letter to American Advisory Committee for Famine Relief in New York, October 1921, Folder 1040, Box 45, Series 1.2, RG 4 China Medical Board, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

¹¹ Roger S. Greene to Vernon Munroe, January 25, 1922, Folder 1041, Box 45, Series 1.2, RG 4 China Medical Board, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

The greatest concern came not from those who believed that famine relief should remain dedicated to relief, but rather from those who thought that prevention was a problem that required alternate approaches — namely, infrastructure development instead of agricultural science or forestry. John K. Davis, the American Consul in Nanjing in 1922, sent a letter to Roger Greene, throwing his support behind a plan drafted by American Society of Civil Engineers President John Freeman to drain the Huai River basin and thus remove a cause of perennial flooding in northern Jiangsu and Anhui provinces. Davis explained his support for the Freeman report from an implementation point of view. Many famine relief efforts, he argued, were “characterized by an abundance of good intention but a paucity of executive ability.”¹² His implication was that he had full faith in the ability of Freeman to carry out his vision of infrastructure development, while he was unsure of the same with regards to rival proposals, including the one for agricultural education and reforestation from AACB. The debate over infrastructure development would recur throughout foreign assistance efforts in China and later in Taiwan, as each technical group, whether soil scientists, entomologists, educators, and civil engineers espoused their own professions as the panacea for the traditional ills of China. In this instance, however, the agricultural missionaries had sufficient support among AACFR and its supporting missionary boards and philanthropic organizations. Civil engineering and infrastructure development were sidelined in favor of reforestation and agricultural education.

By the end of 1922, the debate had been settled and plans were underway. The AACFR, in agreement with the AACB, decided to endow one million US dollars in surplus funding and provide three-quarters of the funds to Nanking University and one-quarter to Peking University. The funds would be managed by the newly formed China International Famine Relief

¹² John K Davis to Greene, April 19, 1922, Folder 1041, Box 45, Series 1.2, RG 4 China Medical Board, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

Commission, consisting of representatives from eight famine relief organizations operating in China at the time.¹³ Significant leeway in the terms of the funding allowed the universities to exercise their best judgement to accomplish the stated goals: “the study and investigation of famine causes, prevention or relief, and as a means thereto for the education of the Chinese in agriculture, forestry, and other such activities as may relate to famine.”¹⁴ John Reisner, a missionary, former Cornell professor of agricultural science, and at the time Dean of the College of Agriculture and Forestry at University of Nanking, drafted a proposal for utilizing the funds in conjunction with Peking University. The resulting proposal laid out two goals: “development of agricultural education by training teachers of improved agriculture for mission middle school and teacher training centers” and “preparation of courses in general agriculture for higher primary schools, and aid in training of teachers to give such courses.”¹⁵ This emphasis on agricultural education, and specifically on training teachers that would be able to teach farmers, would later become crucial in the dissemination of agricultural practice and knowledge that undergirded the Nanking development model.

A mere two years after the agreement by the AACFR to fund the College of Agriculture and Forestry at Nanking, a subsequent plan was underway from familiar names but under a different social impetus. Back in the United States, increased institutional support and discussion of missionary activities prompted new discussions over the best ways for missionaries to accomplish their goal of helping the Chinese populace. The discourse began to shift away from a focus on pure education to the environmental and social conditions — flooding, drought, and poverty — that caused recurring famine in China. The reported success of agricultural

¹³ Nathan, 1965

¹⁴ Munroe to Greene, October 4, 1922, Folder 1041, Box 45, Series 1.2, RG 4 China Medical Board, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

¹⁵ Reisner to Greene, July 14, 1922, Folder 1041, Box 45, Series 1.2, RG 4 China Medical Board, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

education in helping agrarian villages from Christian periodicals and alumni magazines like the aforementioned *Talladegan* began to spur the interest of academically trained scientists. Many of these were also religious and deeply believed in the work of missionaries abroad, and some were even returned agricultural missionaries like John Reisner. Centered at the agricultural knowledge centers of the United States, these scientists believed that the panacea for the social obstacles that missionaries faced could best be addressed through agricultural expertise.

Former colleagues, John Reisner and Cornell Professor of Plant Breeding Harry Love began to discuss their ideas for institutionalizing agricultural knowledge and bringing the benefits of university research to missionaries working abroad. They began with their home institutions and started the Nanking-Cornell Crop Improvement Program, which Love would later claim to be the earliest instance of international technical cooperation between two universities in agricultural development. Supported by the International Education Board, which was also funded by the Rockefeller Foundation, the Cornell-Nanking venture aspired on paper to two goals: 1) to select and breed varieties of staple food crops of the famine-prone areas in China that would produce increased yields, demonstrate higher resistance to disease, and be more easily planted and farmed and 2) to train men in the “principles, methods, application and organization of crop improvement.”¹⁶ The cooperative program sent Cornell faculty to Nanking University over a course of 7 years, with three Cornell professors making trips to China.

From its onset, the Nanking – Cornell program set its sights high. Unlike back in Ithaca, where basic and applied scientific research entailed selecting and breeding crops for the sake of producing the perfect plant, the Nanking – Cornell program explicitly placed a social goal, famine, above their usual plant breeding agenda. In writing to Love requesting Cornell dispatch

¹⁶ Newspaper clipping, “Farm Expert to Aid China in Crop Boost,” January 28, 1931; Agriculture; Box 114; Narrative Reports 1904-1939, China; Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service, RG 166; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereafter NACP).

one of its plant breeding scientists, Reisner was clear in the type of personnel he needed, "a man not only of ability, but of experience and one who is able to see the larger implications."¹⁷ In other words, while technical prowess was unquestionably necessary, Reisner hoped that Cornell would send someone who was not just interested in breeding a better plant, but also helping contribute to a better world.

The Nanking-Cornell program immediately began field tests of popular local crops, wheat, rice, soybean, millet, barley, etc., that formed the staple of Chinese diets. Reisner realized quickly, however, that plant breeding alone did little to ameliorate the social conditions in China. In a letter from Brayton C. Case, an agricultural missionary who had been on mission in Burma but visited Reisner in China, Case wrote of Reisner's observations in 1929 after five years of helping to train and direct the Nanking University plant breeding department. One instance mentioned a village pastor who had come to the College of Agriculture at Nanking University seeking help for his rice growing village that suffered from regular famine. After one of the College of Agriculture instructors examined the pastor's home village, the instructor advised the pastor to switch his village to sericulture production. Though new to sericulture, the villagers, after training at Nanking, were able to properly grow mulberry, rear silkworms, and most impressively, form credit cooperatives to fund their enterprise. Reisner attributed this success to agricultural extension. "In China," Case paraphrases Reisner, "there is great need of further research to gain knowledge for solving her agricultural difficulties, as well as the need of developing extension work to have this knowledge applied by the people to their agricultural practices." Thus the emphasis began on the importance of disseminating findings from experimental breeding work. No amount of the most productive and drought resistance rice

¹⁷ Love and Reisner, "The Cornell-Nanking Story; the First International Technical Cooperation Program in Agriculture by Cornell University." Cornell University Library.

would have helped the villagers of Reisner's anecdote as much as training in basic sericulture. Case further continues to indicate that Reisner contrasted this to Korea and India, where "relatively a much larger amount of work had been done on research than on extension" and as a result he believed that agricultural extension could be "utilized with great benefit" in Korea should their missionary population be leveraged for extension work.¹⁸

After the departure of the last Cornell faculty in 1931 from Nanjing, the crop improvement program continued, with the College of Agriculture and its associated agricultural experimentation stations throughout China operating until 1949, and even afterward in the PRC. The program was deemed a success by the Cornellians in Ithaca. University cooperation projects like Cornell-Nanking were reproduced throughout the post-WWII era by the US with countries like Korea, Japan, the Philippines, etc. Later, agricultural economist and the dean of Cornell's College of Agriculture, William I. Meyers, stated he had been told by a State Department official that President Truman's Point Four Program, the first American international development program, was influenced by the success of the Cornell-Nanking program. True or not, the crop varieties out of the Cornell-Nanking program did not lift China out of famine, as war with Japan and civil war became more pressing concerns for the Chinese populace.

Back in the United States, the Cornell-Nanking program engendered significant changes at Cornell. Seeing the success of the joint venture at increasing international intellectual dialogue and at attracting bright Chinese students and faculty, the faculty of the plant breeding department saw that agricultural science had great potential in the world beyond the United States and began to expand their horizons beyond China. Ralph Felton, another professor of agricultural science at Cornell University, started a foundation dedicated to training missionaries

¹⁸ February 23, 1929, Letter from Case to Reisner. Folder 2, Box 1, Harry Love Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.

going abroad in agricultural methods — the Agriculture Education Foundation. In 1929, after discussion with “agricultural missionaries” with formal training in agricultural sciences and returning from places like Burma, Brazil, and Africa, Felton and a group of likeminded colleagues from well established missionary organizations — the International YMCA and the Stokes Fund — began “a united effort to strengthen the work of Agricultural Missions.” The theory behind the Foundation reflected a belief, expressed by the former Commissioner of Education for Alabama and later Director of the Stokes Fund, that “mission work needed more than anything else an increased emphasis on Agricultural Education.¹⁹” Felton took this belief to heart and recruited fellow colleagues at Cornell, including fellow faculty member and Cornell-Nanking founder, Harry Love.

Love, Felton, and two other colleagues laid down the foundations for the Agriculture Education Foundation. Harry Love was chosen by the group as its president; Felton became its first secretary. They set a goal to endow one million dollars, of which interest would be spent annually to support missionary activities in agricultural teaching. More importantly, the goals of their enterprise had to be specific — the institution had to help the farmer out “in a practical way,” which meant demonstration farming and tailoring the methods in each country upon their specific needs, whether that meant an emphasis on research, resident teaching, or agricultural extension.²⁰ Practically speaking, the organization sought to work within the confines of existing missionary groups. It would seek to extend its help where it was wanted by local agricultural missionaries, cooperate with missions abroad, and rely upon the expertise of Felton’s friend Warren Bristol at the International YMCA to begin fundraising.

¹⁹ Ralph A. Felton, Memorandum, February 17, 1929, Folder 2, Box 1, Harry Love Papers, CRML.

²⁰ Ralph A. Felton, Memorandum, February 17, 1929, Folder 2, Box 1, Harry Love Papers, CRML.

As part of its efforts at practical dissemination, the Foundation, which later became the Agricultural Missions Foundation and Agricultural Missions Incorporated, organized annual workshops for missionaries going abroad. For over two decades until the late 1940s, Cornell became the host to the “Cornell Annual School for Missionaries.” As the introductory paragraph of the brochure for the 12th iteration of the school explained, “Now more than ever before, the problems of missionaries during the next few years are likely to be bound up with the everyday living of the men, women, and children of the communities where they work. Problems of nutrition, food supply and sanitation, and of family life and community-social relationships will be paramount in most parts of the world.²¹” As the paragraph hinted, course curriculum and faculty specialties included a spectrum of academic disciplines that would later inform the various “schools” of development, from the high sciences of Plant Pathology and Soil Conservation, to the more enterprising Poultry Husbandry, and then the sociologically oriented Family Life, Rural Community Organization, and Rural Education that would form the backbone of community development. Among the list of participants included the typical Presbyterian, Congregationalist, Lutheran, Episcopal, and Methodist denominations, and its missions from Tianjin in China to Santiago in Chile and Uttar Pradesh in India.²² As the academic ground for such missionary training, Cornell became an important origin of knowledge dissemination abroad, and the practices carried on by the earliest agricultural missionaries were crucial in creating a model of agricultural development based on education, extension, and research. These models set important precedents, which in the case of China persisted by means of

²¹ Thirteenth Annual Cornell School for Missionaries Brochure, February 14, 1942. Folder 16, Box 4, Harry Love Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.

²² Thirteenth Annual Cornell School for Missionaries Biographical Sketches and Directory, February 14, 1942. Folder 16, Box 4, Harry Love Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.

institutionalization and the seniority of practitioners who later became the technocrats in charge of American and Chinese led efforts.

The Mass Education Movement began under the leadership of Yan Yangchu (晏陽初, James Y.C. Yen), a social reformer who believed that literacy should be the basis for rural development. Yan hailed from rural Sichuan, and as a young man had learned English at a Christian missionary school in Sichuan.²³ He went abroad for his university education, studying history and politics first at Yale and then Princeton. After graduation he served as a volunteer with the YMCA in France, serving the Chinese laborers who were sent to the front to help support the war effort. There, helping the illiterate Chinese laborers pen letters home, Yan became convinced that literacy would lift the rural masses of China out of poverty, and, as the MEM would later adopt as its slogan, “Eliminate illiteracy and make new citizens for China” (除文盲作新民 *chu wenmang zuo xinmin*).²⁴ After WWI, Yan returned to China and started the Mass Education Movement, creating first a “model” village to demonstrate the practices of literacy, public health, and farming education at Ding county (定縣) in north China, and later, after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, in Hunan and Sichuan. MEM included among its board some of the most well known Chinese intellectuals and government officials, including Minister of Education and Peking University President Jiang Menglin (蔣夢麟, Chiang Mon-lin), later crucial in development on Taiwan, as well as the Minister of Labor and Commerce and the Minister of Health, who all three had corresponded with Yan regarding the possible contribution of a MEM model to improving national education, public health, and labor value.

²³ For a biography of Yan, see Charles Wishart Hayford, *To the People: James Yen and Village China* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990).

²⁴ Translation by Yan. Yan to Rockefeller, October 14, 1929, Folder “Report Letters 1929 to 1940,” Box 1, International Institute for Rural Reconstruction Collection, Rare Books & Manuscripts Library, Columbia University.

The MEM model relied upon villages as units of cohesion and instruction. Ding county, the first experimental village of MEM, had around 200 inhabitants in 1930. MEM workers would teach the principles that Yan had prioritized, which in 1930 began with literacy and education, then agriculture and economic reconstruction, and finally village self-government and “citizenship training.”²⁵ In many reports and published materials, these would be boiled down to four principles that were used to sell the idea of the MEM to donors and potential donors: “Cultural Education, Economic Improvement, Public Health and Citizenship Training.”²⁶ In literacy education, Yan relied on what was called the “1000 Character Primer,” a set of four books consisting of one thousand Chinese characters each, starting with the most commonly used. Unlike other literacy textbooks at the time, which were geared towards a classical or literary usage of Chinese, Yan specifically designed his textbooks to provide practical literacy, meaning beginning with vernacular vocabulary that would be common in a rural population.

Yan also believed in the importance of public health, and the MEM had recruited figures like PUMC graduate Chen Zhiqian (陳志潛, C.C. Chen) to help draw up the public health program. As concepts of hygiene and preventative medical practices to halt the spread of sanitation triggered contagions began to circulate among health officials in China, including those trained from PUMC, MEM incorporated these concepts into its village education. In one example of how public health was taught, Yan outlines in a letter to funders that Dingxian seized on “market days” when villagers from ten or twenty *li* away would come to a MEM demonstration village. On market day, MEM organizers would seek help from the local army, students and teachers, the district magistrate, and village elders in order to prepare “the usual

²⁵ Yan to Auchincloss, October 1, 1930, Folder “Report Letters 1929 to 1940,” Box 1, International Institute for Rural Reconstruction Collection, Rare Books & Manuscripts Library, Columbia University.

²⁶ C.C. Chen, Scientific Medicine as Applied to Tingsien, 1933. “Health Program Reports 1933 to 1935”, Box 1, International Institute for Rural Reconstruction Collection, Rare Books & Manuscripts Library, Columbia University.

campaign posters, very pointed illustrations of common sources of infection; there were parades headed by the military band, there were speeches and little dramas, lantern slides, health motion pictures, and even radio!²⁷” In explaining the reason for choosing a community-based path of public health, Chen Zhiqian incorporated a critique of Western methods. In a 1933 report, he quoted a National Health Administration report that outlined the lack of medical professionals outside of large urban centers and the predominance of private or missionary hospitals. Chen lamented the “imposition of the Western practice of private practice” in China, using almost socialist tones to describe the “wasteful line of individual competition” that system had engendered. Instead, Chen pushed for the MEM system as an alternative that still utilized “scientific medicine” but brought it to what he estimated to be 85% of the Chinese population, which were farmers in the rural hinterland.²⁸

MEM joined forces with five local universities in north China to form the North China Council of Rural Reconstruction, which would eventually be renamed the National Council for Rural Reconstruction (NCRR)²⁹. By 1936, the operation at Ding county had attracted the displeasure of local officials who clashed with Yan. Yan departed Ding county to set up in Sichuan and Hunan, but he left some operations to NCRR, which continued to operate in north China even after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War and under occupation by Japanese administration. NCRR operated model villages like Ding county in other areas throughout north China. Eventually the idea of “rural reconstruction” would become commonplace as historian Kate Merkel-Hess has discussed, adopted by nearly every provincial governor (“warlord”)

²⁷ Yan to Auchincloss, April 15, 1930, Folder “Report Letters 1929 to 1940,” Box 1, International Institute for Rural Reconstruction Collection, Rare Books & Manuscripts Library, Columbia University.

²⁸ C.C. Chen, *Scientific Medicine as Applied to Tingsien*, 1933. “Health Program Reports 1933 to 1935”, Box 1, International Institute for Rural Reconstruction Collection, Rare Books & Manuscripts Library, Columbia University.

²⁹ McDonald, 2009

during the Republican era in addition to the Nationalist government. Yan's MEM operations in Sichuan would also grow throughout the 1930s, though after war broke out with Japan, Yan spent most of his time in the United States to lobby the US government. Out of those efforts arose the US-China Aid Act of 1948, to be discussed below.

Though the Cornell-Nanking program was only able to send three Cornell faculty members to Nanking, its impact on development outlasted the tenure of its exchange program, in both intended and unseen ways. As Rockefeller Foundation official George Vincent earlier pointed out with the PUMC model, and as Reisner and Love had hoped to establish a similar institution, the men that emerged from the Cornell-Nanking program would later prove to be crucial to directing development in late Republican China and Taiwan. Chinese students had boarded ships for Europe, Japan, and the United States in search of higher education abroad since the late Qing and earlier, but those students were largely the products of upper class, elite, and literati families who had the financial means to support studies abroad. Many of the students already had spent years in missionary run schools in the United States, giving them an advantage through familiarity with Western languages and cultural exposure through religious study. Contrary to these existing pathways, the Cornell-Nanking program institutionalized a level of exchange that helped attract donor funding for graduate studies in the United States, especially from organizations like the Rockefeller Foundation, and made short-term and longer term studies at Cornell a recurring and even expected pathway for promising Nanking graduate students. Though also often hailing from wealthier families, few Nanking students had the luxury of missionary school training and even fewer had the financial means to study at an institution like Cornell.

One prominent exception to this pathway was nonetheless still a product of the Cornell-Nanking program, and later would become a fervent supporter of this educational pipeline practice. Shen Zonghan (沈宗瀚, Shen Tsung-han or T.H. Shen), a Zhejiang native born in 1895, had, as a fresh college graduate, borrowed money from a friend to pursue graduate studies in agriculture in the US, first at the University of Georgia, and then his PhD at Cornell University. After obtaining his PhD, for which he studied wheat breeding, he decided to return as a faculty member at Nanking University, working with his former teachers in the Cornell-Nanking program. By 1930 Shen had become the head of the Agronomy Department in the College of Agriculture and Forestry at University Nanking.³⁰

In the mid 1930s, many of the faculty members at Nanking, including Shen, continued on to work in the National Agricultural Research Bureau that proved a spiritual successor to the Cornell-Nanking program. The NARB was a central Nationalist government funded bureau founded in 1933 in Nanjing.³¹ By 1938 ten agricultural institutions throughout China had become subsumed under the NARB umbrella, with Nanjing serving as the central office overseeing provincial agricultural institutes and stations.³² Its directors included Xie Jiasheng (謝家聲, K.S. Sie), like Shen a Cornell graduate and a former Nanking faculty member, and eventually Shen himself who would take over for Xie as director in the last years of NARB. Like Nanking University, the NARB included divisions that specialized in field surveys to collect crop species and experiment stations throughout the provinces of China to select and breed crops best suited for local conditions. But while Nanking University placed great

³⁰ T.H. Shen, University of Nanking Report of Department of Agronomy, June 30, 1932. Folder 8, Box 15, Harry Love Papers, Division of Rare and Manuscript Collections, Cornell University Library.

³¹ James B Grant to Selskar M Gunn, October 13, 1936, Folder 88, Box 9, Series 601, RG 1 Projects, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

³² James B Grant to Selskar M Gunn, November 11, 1938, Folder 89, Box 9, Series 601, RG 1 Projects, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

emphasis on training future agricultural scientists and extension workers in addition to its basic and applied research, the NARB focused less on the educational mission and more on basic and applied research, as well as the social mission of a government bureau tasked with agricultural development. For Shen and others who had left Nanking to join the NARB, they felt “a certain responsibility toward the Bureau,” in part because they were involved with its creation and because they believed in the value of science toward helping society improve as a whole.³³

The NARB reflected the societal goals of its roots with Cornell-Nanking through its increased emphasis on extension work. In one proposal seeking funding from the Rockefeller Foundation for insect control work at NARB, basic and applied research was combined with extension in pursuit of the goal of increasing industrial and food crop production in inland provinces.³⁴ The proposal outlined typical basic science goals; item five, for example, was for “continued research on the cottonseed-oil emulsion and the testing of other plant oils for the preparation of emulsions.” But applied research took equal footing: “continued research on the construction of other types of sprayer” used to apply pesticides. This was in conjunction with an increase in the size of the machine shop currently producing two types of sprayers. And at the extension end, it was complemented with control campaigns across five provinces to demonstrate use of sprayers, pesticides, and dusters all under the aegis of insect control methods.³⁵

The pesticide extension system became a point of pride later for the NARB. In a report describing the network of research institutions affiliated with the NARB in 1946, by then NARB

³³ September 26, 1934, Letter from K.S. Sie to Harry Love. Folder 81, Box 1, Harry Love Papers, Cornell Library Rare and Manuscripts Collection, Cornell University.

³⁴ Annual Report of Insect Control Work to the Rockefeller Foundation Conducted by the NARB, June 1939, Folder 92, Box 9, Series 601, RG 1 Projects, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

³⁵ National Agricultural Research Bureau Ministry of Industry to Selskar Gunn, January 23, 1937, Folder 89, Box 9, Series 601, RG 1 Projects, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

Director Shen took special care to highlight the achievements of extension in rural China. The National Pesticides and Experimental Equipment Plant in Sichuan, for example, whose founding Shen attributed to work on pesticide and extension research conducted at NARB as early as 1935, was a crucial cog, Shen explained, at the head of the system for distributing pesticides and sprayers. Below the plant was one major provincial station with substations serving important counties. At the local level, “the rural agencies which are the distributing centers for the pesticides and sprayers are taken over by the farmers themselves, primary school teachers, drug-store keepers, or post office men” paid on a commission basis and under supervision from extension workers, a system Shen pointed out is similar to the “key farmers” (farmers who served as contacts for extension workers) in the US agricultural extension system.³⁶

Equally important to the NARB mission was the legacy of Nanking in applied and basic research. One report from the Rockefeller Shanghai officers called the NARB “without doubt one of the outstanding technical bureaus of the Chinese Government” with “well trained, competent, and industrious” personnel and in addition noted its progress in insect control research over a relatively short period.³⁷ In later years, Shen reminisced upon the ability of the NARB to both innovate new technologies and push those new technologies out. In a 1952 letter to UN Food and Agriculture Organization official H.L. Richardson, four years after his departure from NARB, Shen lamented the lack of “college training and fundamental research” done by NARB successor organization JCRR, which as a result made the JCRR “not so creative” in comparison to the NARB³⁸.

³⁶ “Agricultural Research Organization in China” by T.H. Shen, October 9, 1946; Agriculture 1946; Box 600; Narrative Reports 1946-1949, China; Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service, RG 166; NACP.

³⁷ Grant 36154, April 15, 1936, Folder 88, Box 9, Series 601, RG 1 Projects, Rockefeller Foundation, RAC.

³⁸ Letter from Shen Zonghan to HL Richardson, August 16, 1952. 入藏登錄號 034000000356A, Folder “R,” 沈宗翰文件稿 (4箱), Academia Historica Archives.

Though American missionary and philanthropic organizations were key predecessors for development in China, there even more projects aimed at development initiated and led by Chinese intellectuals and reformers. Chinese groups independent of the state had worked in famine relief during the Qing and earlier.³⁹ Intellectuals at Chinese universities had also written on and worked within the Nationalist government to enact social reform aimed at rural improvement. Two organizations would later prove particularly important in their roles as models and intellectual schools for later development — the Chinese National Association of the Mass Education Movement (*zhonghua pingmin jiaoyu cujinhui* 中華平民教育促進會) (MEM), as well its associated Rural Reconstruction Movement, and the National Agricultural Research Bureau (*zhongyang nongye shiyansuo* 中央農業實驗所) (NARB). Coincidentally both of these institutions arose from efforts detailed earlier, namely the former out of Christian education missions, including the YMCA, and the latter out of the Nanking University College of Agriculture and Forestry and its cooperative program with Cornell.

As World War II reached a high point, both China and the United States began to consider the issue of postwar recovery. By 1943, intellectuals and bureaucrats throughout China had begun to discuss the need to begin tackling postwar issues. The American Embassy in Chongqing followed these discussions, forwarding conversation summaries, editorial translations, and relevant commentary to the State Department. Food and relief was a common subject, though varied in terms of its relative importance depending on the background of the commentator. International relations scholar Zhang Zhongfu (張忠紱, Chang Chung-fu) penned an editorial in the *China Times* in 1943 that was then translated and forwarded to Secretary of State Cordell Hull. The editorial discussed the importance of tackling potential postwar issues

³⁹ Fuller, 2012

through the establishment of the United Nations. While issues such as international economics and territorial adjustments were complicated matters, he argued issues like food and relief could “easily be agreed upon in separate conferences” since they were “simpler.”⁴⁰ Zhang’s envisioning of food and relief was for a short period the prevailing mood among international relations experts, having relegated it first to the short lived United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) and later to the UN Food Agriculture Organization (FAO), which for its first few years of existence largely consisted of the “separate conferences” that Zhang had described. But the lessons of UNRRA would provide an impetus not only for the growth of FAO but more importantly for US planners as they realized the importance of food and relief to international relations.

Of greater relevance were the commentators of China’s economic development. With China being predominantly an agrarian society, food and agriculture could not be ignored. Some academics and technocrats were generally vague. One, Zhang Qiyun (張其昀, Chang G. Yun), the head of the History and Geography department at Zhejiang University, perceived of China as regions, the Northwest, Southwest, Northeast, etc., that would specialize in its relative advantage, whether soybean production in the Northeast or oil drilling in Gansu. Another, Dong Shijin (董時進, Tung Shih-tsin), an agronomist at Peking University, argued for the importance of the agricultural sector for the overall industrialization and welfare of the Chinese economy. In an article published in *Dagong Bao* (大公報), Dong pointed out that if anything, the Sino-Japanese War has shown the importance of having a “modern country.” To shed the label as “a land of famine,” China needed to raise the living standard of all Chinese, meaning providing enough food and clothing, and that necessitated an emphasis in improved agriculture. Despite all

⁴⁰ Solution of Postwar Problems - Editorial Published by Chang Chung-fu, March 31, 1943; Postwar Planning; Box 168; Narrative Reports 1942-1945, China; Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service, RG 166; NACP.

of the discussion among intellectuals for industrialization, Dong reminded readers that in China “industrialization should be built on the foundation of agriculture. It means better industrial development in addition to better agriculture. Industry cannot replace agriculture.” He illustrated his point through the example of cotton, a raw product produced by China’s agriculture that was utilized as an input into China’s industries and complete as a finished product ready for export. As J. Bartlett Richard, the Commercial Attache at the US Embassy translating the article commented, Dong served as “a real reminder that agriculture is and must continue to be the first industry of China.”⁴¹

The head of the National Resources Commission (*guojia ziyuan weiyuanhui* 國家資源委員會) and the Minister of Economic Affairs at the time, Weng Wenhao (翁文灝, Wong Wenhao), had a more concrete plan for agriculture. Weng was concerned from an industrial point of view, and specifically with regards to resource inputs and production outputs. With regards to agriculture, Weng was a pragmatist — he believed that improvements in farm implements were of little value in the Chinese context “not only because of the small size of farms but also because of the conservatism of farmers.”⁴² Weng was correct to an extent. High peasant population density and, in many parts of China, the inelastic supply of arable land meant that economies of scale would not benefit as greatly from the use labor saving technologies as other types of agricultural economies. But his doubts over the willingness of Chinese farmers to adopt new technologies was one of the major driving factors behind the shift to agricultural education and extension among non-state sponsored projects like Cornell-Nanking and others to follow. At

⁴¹ Solution of Postwar Problems - Editorial Published by Chang Chung-fu, March 31, 1943; Postwar Planning; Box 168; Narrative Reports 1942-1945, China; Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service, RG 166; NACP.

⁴² Chang Chung-fu, Editorial on Solution of Postwar Problems, March 31, 1943; Postwar Planning; Box 168; Narrative Reports 1942-1945, China; Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service, RG 166; NACP.

that point, however, the editorials proved to shape the discussions of American postwar reconstruction efforts in China.

Back in the United States, with the end of the war on the horizon, an internationalist consensus began to reemerge among policy planners. Roosevelt and Secretary of State Hull began to envision an international system with the United States taking an active role. As part of this vision, the US would also have to take a key role in helping rebuild the war torn regions of the world.⁴³ This idea eventually manifested in an agency of the newly formed United Nations, the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), to which the United States contributed significant personnel, funding, and administrative direction. In the case of China, the lack of fertilizer production and damaged domestic transportation infrastructure as the result of the Sino-Japanese War preventing imported food from reaching areas of greatest need.⁴⁴ Reflecting the ideas of both Dong and Weng, as well as requests from the Chinese government, which specifically sought American expertise, UNRRA placed a heavy emphasis on agricultural rehabilitation to repair the damage caused by the Sino-Japanese War.⁴⁵ It stepped in by sending personnel to distribute basic agricultural goods, such as flour, as well as fertilizer supplies to farmers in need. In contrast with the religious missions and philanthropic organizations of the past, UNRRA was a direct state-to-state reconstruction project on a national scale. Its ambitions and arguably its downfall lay in the reconstruction approach that called for short-term relief on a national scale performed by a neutral third party that would have little ability to enact genuine structural change.

⁴³ Sayward, c2006. Borgwardt, 2007

⁴⁴ Newspaper clipping, "Farm Expert to Aid China in Crop Boost," January 28, 1931; Agriculture; Box 114; Narrative Reports 1904-1939, China; Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service, RG 166; NACP.

⁴⁵ US Experts Assist China in Reconstruction, September 28, 1943; Postwar Planning; Box 168; Narrative Reports 1942-1945, China; Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service, RG 166; NACP.

As part of its efforts, UNRRA recruited American agricultural scientists who had previously spent their careers in the US. One example was William J Green, representative of the American agricultural scientist of the New Deal era. Green was born and raised in the American Midwest and trained in agronomy and agricultural economics at the rising land grant colleges throughout the Midwest: Oklahoma State University, Texas A&M, and the US Department of Agriculture Graduate School. He began his career in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and Farm Security Administration, working in Washington D.C. and in the farming heartland of America in the Midwest.⁴⁶ With the success of New Deal programs and agricultural advances in the US, the US Department of Agriculture had difficulty justifying the cost of its programs. In other words, American agricultural scientists were victims of their own success. Thus when the UNRRA came calling with an opportunity for agricultural experts to work abroad, scientists like Green jumped at the chance. Green would serve as the Chief of the Agricultural Rehabilitation section in the UNRRA China office, and dictated how UNRRA funding should be spent to help China recover its agricultural regions to prewar levels.

While agricultural advisers like Green came to China full of ideas of the potential of reconstruction for China's future, the reality was that China had problems that ran far deeper than the United States had experienced since the Civil War. China had emerged from one war, lasting over eight years in some regions, and was immediately engaged in a new one as the Nationalist state attempted to eliminate the Communist forces that were spreading from northwest China. With basic agricultural necessities such as fertilizer in short supply and infrastructure over the vast hinterland making distribution difficult even in times of peace, UNRRA struggled to meet even its first stated goal of relief, much less to speak of reconstruction during civil war and

⁴⁶ "Summary of Personal Data." "William John Green Retires." William John Green Papers, Box no. 24, Hoover Institution Archives (hereafter HIA).

revolution. UNRRA's nonpolitical operating mission meant that it was obliged to service both Nationalist controlled and Communist controlled areas equally, distributing aid only in accordance with the need of the populace. In one instance serving on an official UNRRA mission, Green's jeep convoy was mistaken as having been a Nationalist government convoy, surrounded by the Communist Second Army, and taken into custody. When the commanding general was called to camp and realized his fortune upon having captured highly ranked American UNRRA officials, he immediately set them free, sent for Zhou Enlai, and threw an impromptu celebration complete with banners wishing President Truman well, all in the hopes of currying favor among the Americans to provide greater support for Communist controlled areas. Though this case ended in a somewhat jovial situation, it was these nonetheless commonplace events that exacerbated the UNRRA mission.⁴⁷

From the outset, the UNRRA mission appeared destined to be a classic case of development: an idealistic mission that promised miracles through Western manpower, knowhow, and money in order to deliver the masses of famished and fatigued from the weariness of war, yet ultimately ignorant of the specific circumstances under which it would operate and, most critically, unable to address the political realities that underlay the problems it was attempting to "relieve." The Nationalist government, realizing the difficulty that UNRRA would face, established a sister organization, the Chinese National Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (CNRRA), designed to serve as the local agents of development. CNRRA would oversee distribution and report circumstances on the ground. Appointed to the head of CNRRA was Jiang Tingfu (蔣廷黻 Tsiang Ting-fu), a Columbia PhD graduate who had joined the history faculty of Tsinghua University and later was appointed as Chinese ambassador to the United

⁴⁷ William John Green Diary, page 123, 151-152. "China, 1945-1948." William John Green Papers, Box no. 19, Hoover Institution Archives.

Nations. Upon the inauguration of Herbert Lehman as the Director-General of UNRRA in 1943, Jiang included in his remarks a brief but apt prescription for China's woes: "Of the relief and rehabilitation needs in China, transport comes first. Without transportation facilities, whatever supplies and services UNRRA might send to China, they will be piled up at the ports and will be of no use to the Chinese people."⁴⁸ Jiang's words were unsurprisingly prescient.

The failure of UNRRA was not just due to the consequences of civil war and revolution. The Americans who manned UNRRA were often not able to overcome the problem of distributing reconstruction efforts to where they were needed in China in the short window of opportunity they had. In a report from the China UNRRA office headquartered in Shanghai in 1946, it was noted that "Although agricultural rehabilitation had been given No. 1 priority during the spring months, lack of [agricultural rehabilitation] personnel and supplies made it impossible to meet all the requests from regional offices. Very few [agricultural rehabilitation] supplies other than those for the Yellow River project had arrived, and UNRRA was being criticized for not having fertilizer, vegetable seeds and hand tools for distribution."⁴⁹ Unlike Europe where UNRRA was able to follow in the footsteps of the advancing Allied forces and literally reuse the bridges, roads, and railroads rehabilitated for military movement, China was "liberated" entirely at once. As a result, agricultural rehabilitation did not benefit from infrastructure repair, and in fact had to compete with industrial rehabilitation, which the Nationalist government prioritized. At the main port of entry for UNRRA food and fertilizers, Shanghai, shipping traffic was so heavy they would cause delays in just offloading and preparing foods for inland transportation.

⁴⁸ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration First Session of the Council No. 12, November 11, 1943, Reel DG14 Office of the Director General, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Collection, Columbia University Library.

⁴⁹ Summary of China Office Report for March 1946, Shanghai, April 25, 1946, Reel DG15 Office of the Director General, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration Collection, Columbia University Library.

For a country the size of China, basic issues such as distribution were simply too large to overcome with the manpower assigned to UNRRA.

Jiang Tingfu had even harsher words for UNRRA. In 1947 Jiang spoke bitterly of the CNRRA's experiences dealing with UNRRA to Rockefeller Foundation's officer Roger F. Evans, with Evans relaying that "Of 1000 UNRRA technicians and administrators, [Jiang] asserts that 950 Americans were generally far below the standard we could and should have supplied -- romanticists, tourists, puffed-up little pencil pushers, calory-counters [sp], and chart-drawers."⁵⁰ Jiang firmly believed that the Americans did not understand China, and how different of an approach relief and rehabilitation required in China, eventually prompting his resignation in 1947. Having spent less than five years in China, Green was officially recalled when the UNRRA ended its mission in China in 1948 in accordance with UNRRA policy.⁵¹ Though long term projects at rehabilitating agricultural and rural industries and domestic production of fertilizer were handed off to the newly formed UN Food and Agriculture Organization, UNRRA nonetheless failed at its stated goals of relieving the war torn regions of China, setting up the discussion in the United States of "Who Lost China?" Though UNRRA would provide a lesson in the difficulties of the relief-importation-distribution model of development, its agricultural experts would carry these lessons learned to their next destinations. For many of the scientists, Green included, their transnational careers would bring them back to Asia in a number of years, the next time to Taiwan.

Meanwhile, in 1948, the United States passed the China Aid Act. Just three years earlier the Economic Cooperation Act, more popularly known as the Marshall Plan, initiated American

⁵⁰ Roger F. Evans China Diary, May 26, 1947, Folder 430, Box 51, Series 601, RG 1, Rockefeller Foundation, Rockefeller Archive Center (hereafter RAC).

⁵¹ William John Green Diary, page 123, 151-152. "China, 1945-1948." William John Green Papers, Box no. 19, Hoover Institution Archives.

reconstruction aid to Europe and established the Economic Cooperation Administration, the predecessor to the current day US Agency for International Development. The China Aid Act of 1948 was almost a Marshall Plan for China, lobbied heavily by Yan Yangchu who had been living in Washington DC for much of the Chinese Civil War, and it added China as a formal recipient under the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA). The result of the China Aid Act was the first ECA mission to China, the Sino-American Agricultural Mission of 1948, which aimed to establish a long term joint cooperation committee that would provide not just the short term famine relief that UNRRA attempted, but also a long term development project. The Americans and Chinese who advised the Mission, Shen Zonghan, Jiang Menglin, Yan Yangchu, Raymond T. Moyer, an Oberlin and Cornell agronomy graduate and Christian missionary who had spent significant time in Shanxi province, and Owen L. Dawson, the agricultural attaché at the US Embassy in China, chose to follow the Rural Reconstruction movement and adopt the same name to encapsulate its purpose. In late 1948, Sino-American Joint Commission for Rural Reconstruction (*zhongguo lianhe nongcun fuxing weiyuanhui* 中國聯合農村復興委員會) (JCRR) was established. Its mission was to further development in China, focusing on rural development, and it was through this institution that China Aid Act was to disburse its significant funding.

From its onset, the JCRR was the subject of an ideological divide over how “rural reconstruction” could best be accomplished. At the heart of the debate were the goals of development – what were the best means to benefit the rural population? For Yan Yangchu, the founder of the Mass Education Movement in China, the priority should lay in four areas, a familiar four for those familiar with his MEM ideology: “(1) education, (2) livelihood, (3)

health, and (4) self-government.”⁵² The goals he thus outlined for JCRR were the same ones of his Mass Education Movement, which was focused on improving rural life through literacy, social education, hygienic practices, and his notions of participatory citizenship in community governance.

In the middle of the spectrum was Jiang Menglin, a graduate of University of California, Berkeley, in botany and later a PhD graduate in education from Columbia, studying under John Dewey. Jiang began his education in the United States as an agricultural scientist, continuing his studies in primary education in China on botany and zoology, stemming from an interest in “observing nature.” But his switch to pedagogy and education Jiang attributed to a classmate at Berkeley, who remarked that “though agriculture was very important, there were other studies more vital for China...without being able to solve our political and social problems in the light of modern developments in the West we could not very well solve the agricultural ones.”⁵³ Later the realization came as he sought to apply what he had learned in agriculture – “how to raise animals and plants” – to the social world – “how to raise men.”⁵⁴ Studying alongside with Hu Shi at Columbia under John Dewey, Jiang came to internalize a pragmatist view toward education, and that learned experience was crucial and practical goals were to be lauded. Jiang returned to China and became the President of the prominent Peking University, and just before being appointed to JCRR, he served as the Minister of Education for the Nationalist government. Like Yan, Jiang thus believed in the importance of education for the rural population, but Jiang was less interested in literacy as the sole means of its delivery. Jiang placed more trust, as did

⁵² “Editorial Comment on Exchange of Notes Providing for Establishment of Sino-American Commission on Rural Reconstruction in China,” August 6, 1948; Agriculture 1948; Box 600; Narrative Reports 1946-1949, China; Records of the Foreign Agricultural Service, RG 166; NACP.

⁵³ Monlin Chiang, *Tides from the West, a Chinese Autobiography* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1947), 72.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, 73.

some of the other agricultural scientists, in the dissemination of practical knowledge through agricultural extension and farmers' cooperatives.

Finally, at the other end was Shen Zonghan, a believer in agricultural development, meaning improving the lives of the rural population through finding and perfecting crop species and methods via applied agricultural research and disseminating these better practices and crops through extension. As the youngest of the three, Shen was likely the least influential in the initial months of defining the role of JCRR. But of the three, he was also the only one holding a degree in agricultural science, and having served in a formal capacity both as an agricultural researcher and as a bureaucrat in charge of agricultural development. Though his full influence would not be seen until decades after his appointment, his faith in science, and specifically in plant breeding, underlay most of his decision making. In some ways, Shen was the high modernist of the three, the most likely to place his trust in the transformative social power of crop selection to solve the ills of famine.

Other ideas were discussed by prominent agricultural and rural development figures who penned editorials in prominent newspapers or sent letters to the Sino-American Agricultural Mission. Some of these advocated "national self-defense" or "political uplifting," others advocated agricultural development not for the sake of rural livelihood, but rather for national economic growth as agricultural productivity frees up labor for industrial growth. One editorial from the *Shanghai Evening Post & Mercury* urged the government to avoid the glorification of any one man, interpreted by Owen Dawson as an "oblique reference" to the commissioner who was the face of the mass education movement, Yan Yangchu.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ Ibid.

The debates were resolved by the Chinese government through simple appointment. Despite Yan Yangchu's publicly stating his belief that he would be named Director-General of the commission, Jiang Menglin was named the chairman of the five member commission, with Yan Yangchu and Shen Zonghan as the three initial Chinese commissioners, and later, Oberlin in Shaanxi missionary Raymond Moyer and former AACFR member and director of famine relief in China for the Red Cross, John Earl Baker as the two American commissioners.⁵⁶ Yan left the JCRR shortly thereafter for the United States, where he relocated his American-Chinese Committee of the Mass Education Movement and years later founded his International Institute of Rural Reconstruction, based out of New York, and schmoozed with the political elite of the United States. Just a few years later he would implement his first international project of development in the Philippines, organizing community development projects that emphasized improving literacy through education. Yan would rarely return to China or Taiwan, where the JCRR moved after 1949, and communications with JCRR were rare, much less to speak of intellectual exchange.⁵⁷

Unfortunately, despite the great anticipation for possibilities that JCRR entailed with American funding and Chinese government priority, like the UNRRA, the JCRR made little inroad in China before it was forced to leave. With the Nationalist government losing control of the mainland, it moved the government administration to Taiwan. And as American support followed Chiang's Nationalist government, so too did the JCRR follow Chiang as he fled to the island of Taiwan, a "temporary" relocation until the mainland could be won back from the Communists. However, for the scientists of JCRR, Taiwan became their new home and mission.

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ Correspondences between Shen Zonghan and Yan Yangchu, three letters total, from March 8, 1950 to April 27, 1966; Folder 03400000367A; Yen, James; Shen Zonghan Letter Drafts; Council of Agricultural, Executive Yuan Collection; Academia Historica Archives, Taipei, Taiwan.

In Taiwan, JCRR would eventually make astounding strides in agricultural productivity, simultaneously resolving its former trade deficit by becoming one of the world's leading sources, for example, of canned mushrooms, and transitioning its labor markets from predominantly agricultural to industrial.

US officials increasingly traversed across Asia during the postwar period, spending resources and time with JCRR in Taiwan, Supreme Command Allied Powers (SCAP) under General MacArthur in Japan, Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) and its successor missions in Korea, etc. Famous US postwar development experts like Wolf Ladejinsky, one of the key architects behind redistributive land reform in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam, spent much of his time abroad, and worked with former Northeast Asian missionaries (and ECA officials) like Raymond Moyer. These networks were further strengthened by the Cold War, as the Communist threat bifurcated the developing world and forced increased American attention to the economic and social well-being of peasants in allied states like Korea and Japan.

Ultimately this history has shaped the nation-states that exist in Northeast Asia today. The trans-Asian networks fostered by US experts and knowledge created deep knowledge and practice bonds in the scientific and development communities. Green Revolution methods of high yield cultivars, increased chemical fertilizer, and application of pesticides, for example, were mirrored across nearly all US-aided areas in Asia. Moreover, the similarities in East Asian rural development had created a model of economic growth that focused on basic and applied scientific research, knowledge dissemination, and social engagement. This model became the much debated basis for the miracle economies of the Asian tigers, including Japan, Korea, and more recently, China, spurring the transformation from agrarian to industrial economies, and now from industrial to high technology. Insofar as these states continue to pursue economic

growth as one of their governing ideologies, regional order in Northeast Asia will at least in part depend on the transnational ties that were responsible for their earlier success in agricultural and industrial development.

From Pre-modern to Modern History among China, Japan, and Korea and Its Implications for 21st Century Northeast Asia

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1. Introduction

- There were a myriad of diverse events and issues during the transition period from pre-modern to modern in world history. In Europe, the transition was triggered by the industrial revolution, while America and France experienced civil wars and bourgeois revolutions. Russia and China experienced different movements in the proletarian revolutions in the first half of the twentieth century. All of these countries sought to transition into modern societies through the initiation of domestic events.
- On the other hand, most developing countries experienced this transition under colonial rule. The modern capitalist system in these countries was formed through entrance into the international market as a part of an empire. Since modernity was transferred from the core country, not only economic but also cultural legacies from this era have been at work in these former colonies even after emancipation from their respective empires in the latter half of the twentieth century.
- Different features can be found in East Asia. While Korea, Japan, and China have a similar history with other periphery countries in that they met modernity shortly after the forced opening of some ports, these three countries also experienced internal revolutions, reform, and uprisings which were similar with events in Europe and America. Although entry into the international market was triggered by the opening of their ports, internal flow to respond to western style modernity could not be ignored during the transition era. Furthermore, East Asian countries experienced wars within the region.
- This presentation tries to analyze which characteristics of the various countries in East Asia during the transition period from the pre-modern to modern eras resulted in a specific type of East Asian regional order.

2. Wars during the Great Transition Period

- Opening of ports in East Asia was forcefully carried out through the threat of military force from the outside. China experienced the Opium Wars, Japan was threatened by America's black ships, and Korea was pried open by the Japanese gunboat Unyo. This process was very similar with other developing countries in world history.
- At the same time, three countries faced very serious internal strife at the moment of opening. The Taiping Heavenly Kingdom Rebellion (1851) in China, the Satsuma Rebellion (Seinan War, 1877) in Japan, and the Donghak Peasant Uprising (1894) were internal conflicts caused by the necessity to change domestic social structures.
- As a result, movements to reform domestic systems to align with the transition in international order were initiated. In Korea, an enlightenment group emerged, which succeeded the Northern Learning group in the late 18th century. In Japan, Yoshida Shoin in Choshu played a role as a pioneer to train new leaders for the Meiji Restoration. Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao in China were key intellectuals for the Hundred Day's Reform in the late 1890s which was succeeded by the Self-Strengthening Movement in 1960s Beijing.
- Although the Meiji reformer's group came from the Sonno Joi (Revere the Emperor, Expel the Barbarians) group, they overthrew the Tokugawa Bakufu and initiated top-down reform in Japan. In Korea, the radical enlightenment group, with encouragement from Japan, implemented a coup to change the political and social order in 1884. However, without financial and military foundations the coup quickly failed after 3 days.
- The Korean and Chinese cases were conflicts between reformists and conservatives, while in Japan there were cleavages between different reformist groups. This resulted in the otherization of both groups in their respective domestic societies because there was no winner. Thus the conflicts extended into the early twentieth century in Korea and China, while a consensus on reform was forged in Japan in spite of the conflict.
- Another important fact deserving attention is that the foundation of nation-states in East Asia was not accomplished by modern reforms, but through wars within the region. In particular, the First Sino-Japanese War played the crucial role of building nation-states in

East Asia. The primary impact of the war was on China who was defeated by Japan. Chinese intellectuals paid attention to the formation of a Chinese identity since China was defeated by a country who had previously been a small bullet-sized tributary state. Of course "Chinese" identity was anything but simple given the composition of the ethnic groups. At that time, Qing China's leaders were not from the majority but from one of the many minorities.

- In that sense, there is a very interesting exhibit in the First Sino-Japanese War museum located in Weihai, Shantung Province. Among the historical remains, Kang Youwei's calligraphy was impressive. He wrote that the "nation" of China emerged after the war. The majority Han Chinese people, in the end, found their national identity even under the rule of a minority through hostility toward Japan.
- Japan's nation state was strengthened through wars against China, Russia, and the US. In particular, the Triple Intervention in 1895 and the Russo-Japanese War played a role in building nationalism through otherization of the West.
- Just as the Chinese experienced, the Korean people first conceptualized the idea of a nation during a crisis instigated from the outside in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. While the first catalyst was provided by the Treaty of Shimonoseki which defined Korea as an independent country separate from the Chinese world, the assassination of Queen Min in 1895 and the Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty in 1905 provided another occasion to strengthen national identity through antagonism toward Japan.
- Thus the three East Asian cases of forming a nation-state during the transition from the pre-modern to modern era shows that the impact of wars within the region was more serious than internal modernization reform movements. Furthermore, Korea and China experienced other significant shocks from the annexation of Korea by Japan in 1910 and the Manchurian Incident in 1931, while the total war system beginning in 1937 became another impetus in Japan. For Korea and China, Japan was the other, while the West was the other from the Japanese perspective.

3. Characteristics of Nation Building as Effects of the Wars

- The fact that the process of forming nation-states was accompanied with wars within the region and civil wars beginning in the late 19th century means that hostility and otherization between different groups was internalized in the three countries. This sentiment made it difficult to build normal diplomatic relations within the area.
- However, the otherization to create identity in East Asia was not simple. The main psychological structure in East Asia was based on the perception of being victimized (Korea and China) and victimizing (Japan). Additionally, there is another 'other' from the Korean and Chinese perspectives in that Japan was an exemplary character of Asian style modernization and seen as a unique member of the rich countries club.
- Between the pre-modern and modern eras in East Asia, young intellectuals considered Japan to be an ideal case to benchmark for modernization and self-strengthening. Since they believed that the East Asian system and values were very different from that of the West, Japan could be an appropriate model that they could follow. A lot of pioneers and vanguards studied in Japan and learned communism as well as the Japanese system and values.
- In that sense, a double standard toward Japan developed in China and Korea. On the one hand, Japan had victimized China and Korea, while two late comers also wanted to learn from Japan's experience.
- The simultaneous existence of delicate and hostile feelings in Korean and Chinese civil society toward those who collaborated with Japan in the pre-1945 period shows this double standard. In spite of normalization of relations in 1965 (Korea and Japan) and in 1972 (China and Japan), this kind of complex perception of Japan still exists.
- Another significant point is that for Korea and Japan, China is a country who tries to expand its hegemony over neighboring countries and the region. The threat from China has persisted since the ancient period in East Asia. This is also a rationale for the US containment policy in Asia beginning with the Korean War, through the Vietnam War, and even in the present. The US-Japan and the US-Korea alliance with US forces present in both countries has been maintained even following the collapse of the Cold War system in part because of the Chinese threat.
- Another critical issue in East Asia is that Korea and China experienced the process of nation-building internally through civil war. China had two different identities: nationalist

and communist. And two Koreas materialized during the Korean War. Civil wars against the background of the Cold War resulted nation-building taking place through antagonism and otherization between two internal hostile groups. The Chinese case is even more complex due to another conflict between native Taiwanese and mainland Chinese in Taiwan since 1949.

- Of course, Japan also experienced the nation-building process internally through wars between the late nineteenth century and 1945. However, this proceeded under external rather than internal antagonism.
- Considering history from the pre-modern to the modern period in Korea and China, double otherization emerged; otherization internally and externally. Both encouraged hostility in each society as well as within the region.
- This multiple otherization process has caused several problems in East Asia. First the influence of internal politics in international relations in the region is quite potent. Despite the fact that the foreign policy should be considered in the context of the national agenda, it is heavily affected by domestic political interests, resulting in an excessive two level game.
- On the other hand, conflicts in international politics have contributed to the integration of domestic society. Anti-Japanism is a uniting factor in Korea and China, while the fear of China consolidates society in Japan and Korea.
- In sum, the hostile atmosphere has existed domestically and regionally since the transition from pre-modern to modern. This kind of double hostility made it very difficult to foster cooperative relations in East Asia. The reason why conflicts between East Asian countries in international organizations as well as within the region occur is due to this sentiment and perception in the region. And even major foreign policy decisions have been heavily politicized since the nineteenth century.

4. Conclusion

- As I mentioned above, the hostile sentiment between countries in East Asia contributed to the construction of nation-states through the formation of national identities. And this

sentiment played a very critical role in strengthening identity domestically.

- Due to this condition, politicians in each country sometimes try to utilize mutual hostile sentiment for their own political gain. While cooperative gestures contribute to the popularity of politicians on the one hand, aggressive policy and rhetoric with each other is more effective with the public. The fact that this two level game was largely absent during the era of the authoritarianism shows this phenomenon very well.
- Furthermore, the different statuses of the three countries in the early twentieth century, as a core empire, as a colony, and as a victim of invasion, made it difficult to create consensus in historiography within the region. Due to that, it is not possible to jointly publish and use history textbooks and disputes over history textbooks are frequent occurrences in East Asia.

DIVERGENT MEMORIES AGAINST COLLECTIVE COOPERATION:

AMBIVALENT RELATIONS IN NORTHEAST ASIA:

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On November 1, 2015 Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang and Korean President Park Geun-hye wrapped up the Six Trilateral Summit meeting. The leaders from the three countries emerged radiating handshakes and warm cordiality. Their official statement celebrated the fact that "... steady progress has been made in trilateral cooperation in various areas." The statement went on to detail a list of fifty-six areas where the three countries had agreed on plans for future cooperation. Among other things they agreed to "...encourage a more active promotion of over 50 intergovernmental consultative mechanisms, including about 20 ministerial-level mechanisms, as well as numerous cooperative projects, and promote the creation of new intergovernmental consultative mechanisms, including ministerial-level mechanisms." As well, the three leaders further "...decided to make joint efforts to achieve the common goal of building regional trust and cooperation." And they went on: "we will make full use of the high complementarities and great potential of the three economies and bring to higher levels our cooperation in various economic and social fields." Moreover, they declared: "We will further strengthen economic and trade relations and deepen the convergence of interests." Reflecting such multifaceted agreements the three concluded that "we shared the view that trilateral cooperation has been completely restored on the occasion of this Summit."¹ President Park, in a joint news conference with the other two leaders, captured the cooperative symbolism of their meeting: "This summit meeting carries a historic significance because it

¹ <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2015/11/01/0301000000AEN20151101003900315.html>. Accessed March 17, 2016.

restores a system of cooperation among the three countries, which in turn is an important frame of peace and prosperity in Northeast Asia.”²

The upbeat promises sought to project a renewed spirit of collegiality that would portend all three leaders would move forward in a spirit of cooperation, pursuing the advancement of trilateral ties, unbinding the roots of such cooperation that had recently been hindered from growing further by trilateral tensions. Admittedly, relations among the three remained ambiguous. It was by no means clear, for example, beyond the photo-op and the final communiqué, how much substantive cooperation is likely to result from the Summit. Certainly no painful commitments, no explicit rules, and no promises of reversals of past practices were agreed to, nor were any officially anticipated. Yet the broadly cooperative messages of the Trilateral resonated with the increasingly expanding economic interdependence among their three countries. Cross border trade and foreign direct investment, a cooperative investment agreement, regional production networks, export free zones, along with enhanced communication and transportation links have woven China, Korea and Japan into an ever richer tapestry of trilateral interdependence. Such enhanced economic ties have worked to offset the legacy of brittle fragmentation that often divide the three, a battle between cooperation and division that have long marked relations among the three. In recent memory, their experiences during the late 19th and early 20th centuries, World War II, Cold War divisions and the inward-

² Choe Sang-hun, “China, Japan and South Korea Pledge to Expand Trade at Joint Meeting,” *New York Times*, November 1, 2015 at <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/world/asia/china-japan-and-south-korea-conduct-first-trilateral-meeting-in-3-years.html>. Accessed March 17, 2016.

focused processes of nation-building have generated a constant ebb and flow of attractions and repulsions among the three.

The sanguine spirit of the Trilateral Summit was the most recent marker of trilateral attractions. But it stood in striking contrast to the tense relations among the three countries in evidence over the preceding several years. China and Japan had been locked in a testy quasi-military standoff over competing sovereignty claims in the East China Sea. As well, during 2012, mass violence against Japanese-owned businesses were carried out in numerous Chinese cities bolstered by minimally veiled official support. In early 2014 the government introduced two anti-Japanese national holidays that further inflamed anti-Japanese sentiments. Korean and Japanese officials published starkly contrasting views on the sovereignty of Dokdo/Takeshima; vicious anti-Korean protests, led by right-wing thugs, occurred on multiple occasions in a number of Japanese cities eliciting at best perfunctory condemnation from government officials. Socotra Rock in the Yellow Sea is subject to competing territorial claims by all three countries, each arguing that it lies within their Exclusive Economic Zone. In June 2015, China suddenly announced an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) that asserted Chinese claims to maritime features under both Korean and Japanese sovereignty. And as a backdrop to such territorial disputes the three were divided over many of the tawdry aspects of Japanese military actions during the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Membership in competing free trade and investment institutions pulled them into different economic directions. Netizens in all three countries maintained a steady stream of intemperate attacks against one another. The Asian Barometer surveys underscore the widespread mutual distrust among the general populations of these three

countries.³ Chinese nationalism has also been fused with official ROK criticisms of Japan as manifested, for example, in the two countries' collaboration to erect a statue and memorial hall in the VIP lounge at Harbin railway station for anti-Japanese Korean nationalist, An Jung-geun, on a site where An assassinated Ito Hirobumi, architect of Japan's constitution but also the overseer of Japan's colonization of the Korean peninsula a century earlier.⁴ Also China's massive military celebration of the 'victory over fascism' (read Japan) was attended by only one leader of a political democracy, Korean President Park Geun-hye.

The above represents but a smattering of the trilateral tensions capturing headlines just prior to the 2015 Trilateral Summit. Indeed, relations had deteriorated to such an extent that the Summit, which had been held annually from 2008 was postponed for three and a half years before finally being resumed in 2015. Although numerous issues divided and/or united them in their long histories, most of the tension can be traced to resurgent national narratives concerning issues involving their shared and often contentious historical relations as well as the competing territorial claims rooted in those competing historical narratives. This paper attempts to shed light on the links between the current mix of cooperation and contestation on the one hand, and the often competing historical narratives that underlie them.

³ Takashi Inoguchi, S. Okada, A. Tanaka, T. Dadaev. (2006). *Human Beliefs and Values in Striding Asia*. Tokyo Akashi Shoten, pp. 482-485.

⁴ Asahi Shimbun, "China sets up memorial for Korean anti-Japanese activist," January 20, 2014 available at <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201401200074>.

COMPETING NARRATIVES OF NINETEENTH AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY EAST ASIA

History involves of course a complex matrix of facts and events, but, just as those panning for gold or mining for coal quickly learn, separating what is valuable from what is worthless dross is the key to what one takes away. And obviously, historians are rarely in full accord as to what to hold onto and what to discard. No less is this true regarding the historical experiences and narratives surrounding East Asia.

To the extent that there is any broadly accepted history of prewar Japan, the story centers on different responses to Western imperialism and its efforts to advance an agenda of Asian economic and often territorial subjugation. By the later part of the 19th century, most of Asia had been carved up or economically enfeebled by imperial powers--Britain, France, the Netherlands, Russia, Portugal and the United States being the most prominent. As Stephen Krasner astutely observed, these Western powers advanced across the region under an umbrella of "organized hypocrisy." Nominally they defended the Westphalian system of state sovereignty and respect for the equality of national rulers as well as notional commitment to mutual non-interference in the domestic politics of other countries. In practice they refused such acknowledgments to the Asian (and other non-Western) countries they encountered. Simultaneously, as Krasner points out, both China and Korea were locked in their own ideological hypocrisy with leaders unprepared to change longstanding and ideologically embedded practices in an effort to ward off the predations of the Wes. Instead, they resisted modernizing their antiquated political systems in the service of the presumptive imperial hierarchies embedded in Confucianism. Essentially they ignored the intruding Westerners and their technologies as simply the amusing antics of lower

ranking barbarians. Japanese leaders, by way of contrast, quickly jettisoned their country's past national practices as essential to Japan's survival under independent rule.⁵

The most popular historical narrative for Japan's subsequent course continues as follows: realizing that national autonomy meant domestic Westernization and industrialization, while also concluding that global politics could be reduced to a contest between 'imperialists' and 'colonies,' Japanese leaders carried out blitzkrieg political and economic transformations while simultaneously marching along a path of territorial expansion. The Japanese military won a stunning sequence of wars and led a colonial enterprise that became self-validating while vastly expanded the country's territorial reach. By the 1920s and 1930s the domestic reform and foreign policy expansion had advanced Japan to being one of the world's five great powers as recognized during the Washington and London Naval Conferences in the 1920s and 1930s. And while expanding, in this Japanese version of events, its colonial rule was far more benevolent to those ruled than those of its Western counterparts, as Japanese rule brought modernization, meritocratic and technologically sophisticated government, advanced education, complex banking, cadastral surveys, and a host of other benefits to Korea and Taiwan.⁶

An important subtheme in any such Japanese narrative was the issue of a blatant racial hierarchy imposed by the West. Though Japanese leaders saw themselves as successfully imitating the Western powers by playing a successful military the message of their purported

⁵ Krasner, Stephen D. "Organized hypocrisy in nineteenth-century East Asia." *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific* 1.2 (2001): 173-197.

⁶ Cumings, Bruce. "The origins and development of the Northeast Asian political economy: industrial sectors, product cycles, and political consequences." *International Organization* 38.01 (1984): 1-40. T. J. Pempel, "The Developmental Regime in a Changing World Economy," In Meredith Woo-Cumings (ed.) *The Developmental State* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999), esp. p. 177.

racial superiority came in the form of the “unequal treaties” and later by having their gains after the Sino-Japanese War (1894-95) partially stripped away by the triple intervention of Russia, France and Germany. Efforts at inserting a statement of racial equality into the Versailles Peace Treaty ending World War I found Japan’s efforts blocked by Britain and the United States among others. Japan’s conquest of Manchuria was condemned in the League of Nations even though to many Japanese leaders the takeover was precisely the kind of land grab from China that the other imperial powers had been engaged in for decades. Japanese perceptions of a Western imposed racial hierarchy was the backdrop to Japan’s self-justificatory advance of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, i.e. the unification of all the “yellow peoples” of Asia under Japan’s leadership in a collective effort to break the stranglehold of the constraining Western powers.

Clearly this narrative is not without its vigorous critics. Many Japanese on the political left reject the emphasis on modernization, industrialization and regional liberation as masking labels for the domestic oppression and foreign subjugation advanced under an Emperor system that in Maruyama Masao’s felicitous phrase ultimately spawned ‘fascism from below.’⁷ And of course Korea and China as victims in this drama join in round castigation of its self-serving nature. For most elites and a vast majority of the populations in these two countries, regional historical story pivots instead on national humiliation, widespread military abuse of the local populations both during periods of peace and even more viciously during wars. Subjugation under Japan was, in this view, at best marginally less brutal than that endured by peoples under

⁷ Maruyama, Masao. *Thought and behaviour in modern Japanese politics*. Ed. Ivan Morris. Vol. 291. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969; See also Kasza, Gregory J. "Fascism from Below? A Comparative Perspective on the Japanese Right, 1931-1936." *Journal of Contemporary History* 19.4 (1984): 607-629.

the colonial thumbs of Britain, France and the other Western powers. And none in their eyes were morally justified or even congruent with asserted Western values.

THE EARLY POSTWAR PERIOD

World War II upended the prevailing order across East Asia in sweeping ways. Most fundamental was the demise of a world and regional order predicated on empires and colonies. In its place arose a system predicated on the forces of nationalism and national independence. Although local Asian efforts at national independence were initially challenged by many of the former colonialist powers anxious to reestablish their former empires on the ashes of the war. But the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu signaled the conclusive military failure by a European power to reclaim its imperial prerogatives when confronting budding nationalist forces able to mobilize widespread popular support. As part of this nationalist upsurge, the two Koreas gained national autonomy albeit as two divided halves. China's long and painful civil war ended with the communist victory and consolidation of mainland control in 1949 while Japan and the U.S. reached a mutually accommodative end to the Allied Occupation and a resumption of Japanese sovereignty, albeit over a much smaller territory than had been under its suzerainty in the 1930s.

A second thread emerged out of WWII however, namely the Cold War and the global and regional bipolarity it engendered. Importantly for subsequent developments, the Cold War advanced along two competing if reinforcing dimensions—security and economics. Both the U.S. and the Soviet Union vied for the allegiance of governments across East Asia. Although this competition revolved around military alliances and assistance; the competing economic strategies of the two super powers were equally critical. Direct economic aid and competing trade and financial programs sought to foster two alternative paths of development, communist

or capitalist, and in the process to shape the foreign policy allegiance of their prospective partners.

Economic and security alignments were initially reinforcing. Countries traded with others in their ideological bloc but rarely across the bipolar abyss. Japan thus was deprived of its prewar economic links with China, becoming instead highly dependent on privileged access to U.S. markets. China, while never fully accepting Soviet preeminence over the 'communist world,' remained cut off from pro-Western markets, technology and businesses, oscillating instead between economic links to other communist states and periodic embraces of autarky. The two Koreas discovered their economic and security linkages similarly shaped by Cold War bipolarity, with the North heavily dependent on 'friendship prices' from China and the U.S.S.R. while the South, like Japan, avoided links to China, relying instead on U.S. military protection, foreign aid, and market access, along with tentative links to Japanese markets as well.

Contributing as well to today's situation, a number of territorial issues remained unresolved at the end of World War II, frozen in divisive ambiguities exacerbated by Cold War contestation. The Korean peninsula, for example, was explicitly divided with one half resting in each camp. Communist consolidation in China's civil war was short-circuited by divisions across the Taiwan Straits. And a host of maritime islands, rocks, islets, and reefs in Northeast Asian waters continue to be subject to competing claims, most of which are rooted in irresolution in 1945.

A decline in Cold War bipolarity and the rise in the penetrative capabilities of global capital and corporations undercut this bipolar division of Northeast Asia. Deng's political and economic reform program followed quickly on diplomatic normalization with China's prior enemies, marking China as the first major country to break away from bipolar rigidities. The

1989-91 collapse of the USSR along with its Eastern European client states sealed the end of the bipolar world. The governments of China, Japan and South Korea quickly began adjusting to these major external changes in most instances building new bridges over previously divisive ravines.

Even if recent years have seen an escalation in trilateral tensions and a resurgence of mistrust toward neighboring countries, it is essential to highlight the initial adjustments of all three countries impelled them toward economic interdependence, regional multilateralism, and reduced conflict. As a result, while the territorial and political maps of East Asia have remained largely intact since the end of World War II, any map of commercial ties, communication linkages, transportation webs or institutional networks would show massive alteration. On any of those dimensions today's East Asia's regional order is vastly more integrated, enmeshed and interdependent.

Regional reorganization along these dimensions can be traced to a host of changes. But a valuable starting point was the continued demonstration of economic vitality by countries that opted for versions of capitalism over those that held to the communist ideal of state-owned enterprises and top down planning. Japan led the way, embarking on a radically different path than it had pursued in the prewar period. Abjuring external expansion, postwar Japanese leaders, under a domestically focused conservative regime, committed the country to a strategy that combined low military spending with a concentrated effort at industrial reinvigoration, export-led growth, and reconciliation with many of the victims of its prewar expansion. Reparations, foreign aid and technological assistance along with membership in numerous multilateral

organizations allowed Japan to project an image of itself as a peaceful trading state.⁸ Domestic political democracy under the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) sustained domestic support for the country's path. So did the security guaranteed by the U.S.-Japan Alliance along with the regional presence of U.S. troops. Japanese political elites had long been divided into several major clusters on questions of security. Nevertheless the broad policy of limited defense expenditures and a concentration on economic development drove foreign policy from the late 1950s into the mid- to late-1990s and still exerts residual influence today. This broad grand strategy eponymously labelled "The Yoshida Doctrine" continued to shape Japanese actions for forty or more years.⁹

Equally vital to adherence to this course of action were the constraining powers of both Japanese public opinion and the organized political left. Both exerted sustained pressures that limited major deviation from the national commitment to the so-called 'peace constitution' and a minimal-to-non-existent security role for the Japanese Self-Defense Forces.

As Japan's economy rocketed forward during the 1970s and 1980s two critical changes took place across the region. First a number of other countries in the region began, to a greater or lesser extent, to emulate the Japanese emphasis on economic development married to a minimization of military contestation. Japan's economic success was ultimately followed by South Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore; then eventually by Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia in

⁸ Rosecrance, Richard N. *The rise of the trading state: Commerce and conquest in the modern world*. Vol. 386. New York: Basic Books, 1986.

⁹ Kosaka Masataka. 1968. *Saishō Yoshida Shigeru* [Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru] Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha; Pyle, Kenneth B. *Japan rising: The resurgence of Japanese power and purpose*. Public Affairs, 2008. Richard J. Samuels, *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2007), pp. 109-132.

Southeast Asia; equally significant, starting in 1978 for China and 1986 for Vietnam, two major communist regimes opted for accommodation with their own versions of capitalism. The consequence was that across East Asia leaders from numerous different regimes began to pivot their legitimacy less on military prowess and confrontations with geographical neighbors and more on national economic development and improved living conditions for their citizens. The consequence has been a rather comprehensive “East Asian peace” manifested in a dramatic drop in state-to-state conflicts and the virtual elimination of battle field casualties.¹⁰

Building out from such internally-focused strategies of national economic development countries began to invest, trade, communicate with, travel to, and produce goods in ways that blurred, if not completely ignored, previously rigid national boundaries. Consequently, for most of the 1990s and well into the early 2000s, East Asia generally, and Northeast Asia in particular, saw increasing economic interdependence, a deepening multilateralization, and a reduction in military clashes and threat levels. It is hard to deny the significance of Japan’s postwar historical redirection in catalyzing this region wide transformation.¹¹

Aiding this canonized focus on economics Japan’s economic success included a soaring rise in the Japanese currency that stimulated the country’s firms to invest heavily abroad. Asia, including South Korea and China, were major destinations. A torrent of official Japanese yen loans, grant aid and technical cooperation also benefited governmental coffers across Asia, including heavily into China. All of this resulted in a boom in Japan’s regional influence and a cementing of its position as the de facto leader of East Asia’s economic miracle. But equally significant was the jump in the value of the Korean won and the Taiwanese new dollar leading

¹⁰ On this peace see the special issue of *Global Asia*, Vol 10, #4 (Winter, 2015).

¹¹ For an elaboration see: Pempel, T. J. (2005). *Remapping East Asia: the construction of a region*. Cornell University Press; Pempel, T. J. "The race to connect East Asia: an unending steeplechase." *Asian Economic Policy Review* 1.2 (2006): 239-254.

companies based in both of these countries to emulate the Japanese moves abroad, all triggering today's complex matrix of regional production networks and economic interdependence.¹²

Of particular note for China-Japan relations, over the three decades following diplomatic normalization in 1972, Japan was consistently the largest aid donor to China. Private sector investments were also extensive so that by 2007, China and Hong Kong combined hosted 9.1 percent of Japan's total FDI overseas stock. Only the US (31.9 percent) and the Netherlands (11.7 percent) garnered larger shares of Japanese FDI. In 2005 China outstripped the US to become Japan's major trade partner

Improved relations between Korea and Japan also advanced most conspicuously with the historical visit to Japan of President Kim Dae Jung in October 1998, a visit highlighted by an apology from Prime Minister Obuchi for the suffering Japan had caused its former colony. In turn Kim praised Japan for its postwar achievements and promised to "put history behind us" and to look to the future in shaping bilateral relations. The joint ROK-Japan hosting of the World cup in 2002 and the explosion in cultural exchanges between the two countries was further evidence of the increasingly positive bilateral ties.

The above represents a historical sketch of postwar Japan and the formation of a new regional order that prevailed into perhaps the mid-to-late 1990s. Most would find this narrative broadly palatable as a reflection of the central historical tendencies across the region as a whole and relations among the three key countries in Northeast Asia in particular. How then did such embryonic positive ties become overlaid, if not reversed, in the last decade or so?

¹² John Ravenhill, *Production Networks in Asia*, "Oxford Handbook of the International Relations of East Asia", pp. 348-368.

HISTORIES IN CONTENTION

Although there might be nuanced modifications of the above narrative of Japan's peaceful and regionally constructive postwar role, most historians and political leaders would agree that the above story provides at least the broad outlines of agreed upon and critical facts. At the same time, such centripetal moves toward multidimensional regionalism and trilateral cooperation—to some extent driven by Japanese actions--by no means obliterated the power of nationalism in the region. At the same time once the unifying glue of existential Cold War bipolarity was removed, many latent historical memories and territorial revanchist claims resurfaced. Today Northeast Asia is therefore simultaneously the home of widening economic interdependence and closer regional cooperation on a diversity of issues on the one hand but the rise of often xenophobic nationalism on the other. Competing nationalist narratives, once dampened by the Cold War have been resurrected with particular ferocity in Northeast Asia. This has been most notable around territorial disputes left unresolved since World War II, along with competing historical narratives about the war itself, how it developed, what it means, and who was most brutally victimized. Like most historical debates a great deal depends on what one uses as a starting point to the narrative. There is no shortage of fingers pointing accusingly in all directions to account for the rising discord.

Chinese and Korean Fingers Pointed at Japan: From both a Chinese and Korean perspective, trilateral tensions trace most directly to Japan. For those two countries, Japan's domestic political regime has been freed up to move in its natural rightwing direction as the consequence of the electoral decimation of the once formidable left. Never more than a one-third minority in parliament, the Japanese left had provided an ongoing, if limited, check on Japan's ruling conservatives, hindering efforts to alter the postwar constitution, stressing the dangers of war

and potential entrapment in U.S. security maneuvers, and endeavoring to keep the citizenry attuned to the darker aspects of Japan's prewar history. Electoral reforms in 1994, however, and the prime ministership of JSP leader Murayama Tomiichi (1994-96) spawned a series of actions that wound up scrapping virtually all of the longstanding positions of his party, leading in turn to the party's electoral collapse in the 1995 election, a defeat from which the collective left has never recovered. For many Korean and Chinese this shift has been followed by an increasing right-of-center ideological impetus and efforts at historical revisionism by Japanese conservatives.

Central to the narrative laying primary blame for deteriorating relations on the Japanese doorstep was the administration of Prime Minister Koizumi Jun'ichiro (2001-2006). Koizumi oversaw a reinvigoration of Japanese defense and security policies, largely in keeping with the goals of the combined defense establishments of Japan and the US. He boosted the status of the Defense Agency, provided Japanese military forces for US actions in Iraq and Afghanistan, enrolled Japan as the first foreign participant in America's missile defense system, and enhanced the interoperability of Japanese and U.S. equipment. Also changed was a new military outline in 2004 that broke precedent by explicitly identifying China and the DPRK as potential security concerns to Japan.

Even more troubling to China and Korea, Koizumi undercut the longstanding, if implicit, agreement between Japan and China put in place by Prime Minister Nakasone (1982-87), that Japanese prime ministers would not visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. The shrine, as is well known, is a memorial to the Japanese military that enshrines, among thousands of Japanese military dead, several leaders of Japan's World War II expansion who had been executed after the Tokyo War Crimes Trial as Class A war criminals.

In a blatant attempt to garner the votes of the right-leaning War-Bereaved Families Association during his campaign for LDP president, Koizumi promised that, if elected, he would visit the shrine on August 15. His recurrent Yasukuni visits were supplemented by those of numerous cabinet members and LDP legislators, along with other gestures to the ideological right such as government approval of textbooks that denied large segments of Japan's aggression during World War II, downplaying the significance of forced prostitution to serve the Japanese military and pushing Japanese claims over Dokto/Takeshima (long under ROK administrative control). In these and related ways, Koizumi and the LDP tapped into a lodestone of latent nationalist frustration over Japan's cascading economic decline and China's corresponding rise in regional political and economic stature (most demonstrably driven home when China's GDP surpassed that of Japan in 2010).

A host of events reflected the deteriorating ties: anti-Japanese demonstrations at soccer matches in Chongqing China in July 2004, a Chinese submarine intrusion into Japanese waters in November 2004, a statement by US and Japanese officials in February 2005 that Chinese officials took as hostile, protests at the Japanese Embassy in Beijing in April 2005, cancellations of visits by Chinese and ROK leaders to Japan, and both Korean and Chinese opposition to supporting Japan's bid for a seat on the UN Security Council, to name but a few items.

Subsequent LDP Prime Ministers Abe and Aso did a number of things to further sour relations. They welcomed back to the party a number of hard core conservatives purged by Koizumi and accelerated Japan's rightward and security moves, thus swinging their party further to the ideological right. Their combined nationalist push included a drumbeat of criticism about the dangers of China's rise and North Korea's failure to account adequately for various Japanese citizens abducted by the DPRK program in the 1970s.

Such moves to the right were interrupted by the LDP's replacement by the more centrist Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government that took office in 2009. Seeking to improve Japan's relations with China and South Korea the DPJ sent a major business entourage of several hundred Japanese business and political leaders to China as Prime Minister Hatoyama floated a proposal for Japan to create and lead an "East Asia Community" that would include China and Korea but not the U.S.

If the DPJ embraced greater regional cooperation on the one hand it was also responsible for a key rupture in relations between Japan and China. For decades, Japan and China had operated on an implicit, if not always publicly acknowledged, agreement to avoid squabbles over the contested Senkaku/Daiyu islands. Among other things, custom dictated that if Japanese official vessels seized Chinese fishermen in those waters they and their ship would be held for a few days and returned to China minus the catch. Following a 2010 incident in which a Chinese fishing trawler rammed two Japanese Coast Guard vessels, newly-installed and novice Foreign Minister Maehara spurned precedent and declared that the captain would be subject to Japanese law. This triggered a violent series of anti-Japanese demonstrations in China, the tit-for-tat arrest of four Japanese businessmen in China, and China's freezing the export of rare earth materials—a critical component in many high tech Japanese goods. The DPJ and the Foreign Ministry quickly backed off and returned the captain to China but not before triggering a major rupture in bilateral ties.

Relations soured further under the DPJ when Prime Minister Noda took what he apparently thought was the tension-reducing move of purchasing three privately owned islands in the Senkaku group as a way to forestall their sale to the right wing mayor of Tokyo who had threatened to use them for right wing, anti-Chinese propaganda purposes. Rather than welcoming Noda's actions as conciliatory, China chose to interpret them as an official effort to upend the status quo and to bolster Japanese sovereignty claims. The result has been several years of a testy cat-and-mouse game by Japanese and Chinese maritime vessels and aircraft attempting to outmaneuver one another in ways that might assert or refute competing claims of sovereignty.

The drubbing of the DPJ in 2012 ushered in the second prime ministership of Abe Shinzo which to many in both China and Japan has been the culminating chapter in what they saw as a long move by Japan to resurrect and link back to many of its prewar roots. Winning office with promises to revitalize Japan's languid economy through a mix of policies labelled "Abenomics," the returning Abe proved slow to deliver economically but quick to advance his deeply held nationalist agenda. Abe had made numerous promises during the LDP presidential election campaign in 2012 that were widely regarded as part of a distinctive right-wing tilt—revising the Constitution, visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, reexamining the basis behind the Kono statement that had been the most prominent governmental apology for Japan's military enslavement of the so-called "comfort women."

Abe followed through on many of these once in office by forging a cabinet rife with right-of-center parliamentarians. His 2014 cabinet reorganization for example involved 15 out of a total of 19 cabinet officials, including Abe, who were members of right-leaning organizations. Furthermore, he appointed historical revisionists to key posts in an attempt to rein in criticism from Japan's public broadcasting network, rammed through a secrecy bill that would essentially prevent public whistle blowing, endorsed text book revisions that whitewashed wide swaths of Japan's wartime behavior, regularly promised constitutional revision, made a public visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine, and also flashed his own widely photographed 'thumbs up' while sitting in an SDF fighter plane with the conspicuous number 731 written on the side. A coincidence, perhaps? But *for* many who saw the photograph the links to the notorious biological experimental Unit 731 was unmistakable. It was such actions that led both China and Japan to suspend Trilateral Summit meetings for that three and a half year period.

Japanese Fingers Pointed at China: While there is strong criticism of a resurgent right wing tilt in Japan as the source of recent problems, for many Japanese, the story really begins, not in

Japan, but in China in the aftermath of Tiananmen. In its effort to legitimate continued Communist Party rule, the CCP rushed to shore up both mass support and leadership cohesion through a new program of officially sanctioned nationalism.¹³ The administration of Jiang Zemin launched “patriotic education” in the 1990s, centering on a somewhat new (and certainly dubious) narrative of Chinese resistance against the Japanese invasion and its ultimate defeat in 1945. With it came the painting highly negative portraits of Japan among the Chinese people. Patriotic fervor emerged as “an official doctrine of state nationalism by the CCP,” the rubric under which to promote national unity and to strengthen its ruling power. Xenophobic museums, patriotic school education, patriotic chat networks and popular demonstrations all became part of a party-driven nationalist agenda designed to legitimate the centrality of the CCP to China’s independence and security. This has since been bolstered by a cognate nationalist narrative focused on the need to eradicate “a hundred years of national humiliation” that paints the West and particularly Japan as longstanding and ever-ominous threats. Yet the excesses of nationalism have periodically been kept in some check by the party leadership in its efforts to maintain close economic links with Japan and other economic partners.

Equally troubling to Japanese policymakers have been the potential strategic and diplomatic implications of China’s rapid economic growth and Japan’s decades of economic sluggishness. Nervous about Chinese expanding military budgets, including the development of blue water navy and the search for enhanced energy resources in maritime areas claimed by both countries, Japan in October, 2001 reduced and redirected its ODA to China in recognition of the country’s rising economic success and “diminished need.”

¹³ Susan Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 35-78.

Years of stoking anti-Japanese flames had ebbed and flowed but it took on a new dynamism over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands that began with the ramming of Japanese Coast Guard cutters by a Chinese fishing boat noted above. But from the Japanese perspective China overreacted to the captain's subsequent arrest. The offsetting arrest of four Japanese businessmen, widespread citizen attacks on Japanese companies and property in China, and an outpouring of anti-Japanese vitriol from suddenly uncensored 'netizens' were followed by the introduction in early 2014 of two anti-Japanese national holidays that further inflamed anti-Japanese sentiments. None seemed evocative of appreciation for all of Japan's prior economic assistance.

Chinese nationalism has also been partnered with official ROK criticisms of Japan as manifested, for example, in the two countries' collaboration to erect a statue and memorial hall in the VIP lounge at Harbin railway station for anti-Japanese Korean nationalist, An Jung-geun, on a site where An assassinated Ito Hirobumi, architect of Japan's constitution but also the overseer of Japan's colonization of the Korean peninsula a century earlier.¹⁴ As noted above, such cooperation seemed also evident in President Park's agreement to a preeminent presence in China's 2015 military celebration of what emerged as China's role at the center of an international movement to defeat fascism, as most visibly seen in the crushing of Japan's invading armies.

As economic growth has slowed and popular protests have mounted, China's new leader Xi Jin-ping has periodically stoked the fires of often xenophobic nationalism as a companion to

¹⁴ Asahi Shimbun, "China sets up memorial for Korean anti-Japanese activist," January 20, 2014 available at <http://ajw.asahi.com/article/asia/china/AJ201401200074>.

his risky efforts to fight official corruption (and eliminate intra-party rivals). While economic development remains the CCP's key priority, official rhetoric is often embellished with nationalistic flourishes suggesting a policy shift toward enhanced military assertiveness directed at Japan, Southeast Asia and the United States. Moreover, given the increased perception among Chinese elites about U.S. weakness as well as Japanese self-isolation, a broad Chinese policy shift toward the rest of the region appears to be on the march. This has been manifested in plans for "One Belt, One Road," the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), and the so-called BRICs bank, among other moves perceived in Japan as elements of economic policies implicitly directed at showcasing China as the region's new de facto leader offsetting the declining economic wherewithal of Japan and the U.S.

Japanese Fingers Pointed at Korea as well: Nor has Korea been without its castigators in Japan. Forty-five years of harsh colonization has left the Korean public simmering with negative attitudes toward Japan. At the same time, normalization and financial aid in 1965, the two countries' ties to the U.S., their simultaneously rapid economic growth and democracy, their domestic economic systems, expanding tourist, educational and cultural exchanges along with explicit governmental efforts to improve ties often dampened such criticisms.

Japanese-Korea relations had been set on a largely positive course during the two progressive presidencies of Kim Dae-jung and Ryo Moo-hyun. Bilateral relations between Japan and the ROK continued to be warm under overlapping conservative administrations of Lee Myung-bok and Japanese Prime Minister Aso Taro. The two met on the periphery of larger meetings such as ASEAN Plus Three and the G-20; they also held a sequence of individual summits. Between the last quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 Aso and Lee met as many as eight times, indicating very warm bilateral ties. Additionally in early 2009, Japan and South

Korea signed their first formal defense pact covering military cooperation measures in a wide range of areas. Both also participated in joint military exercises with the U.S. along with the exploration of a bilateral free trade agreement.

Meanwhile, at the Shangri-la Dialogue in Singapore, Defense Ministers Lee Sang-hee of South Korea, Hamada Yasukazu of Japan, and Robert Gates of the U.S. held their first trilateral defense ministerial talks. The ROK and Japan also reinvigorated suspended talks for a bilateral FTA. Equally important, Japan and South Korea joined with China in the first Trilateral Leaders' meeting in Fukuoka in 2008 that subsequently became institutionalized with annual meetings and a secretariat in Seoul. Yet Lee was not above playing to his own domestic nationalists as he demonstrated by making a sudden visit to the island of Dokdo/Takeshima (the first by a Korean president, and one roundly criticized by Japan) in the run up to Korea's 2012 presidential elections.

Moreover, in his efforts to distance himself from his progressive predecessors, Lee's administration had swung right on the issue of Korean history, contending that school texts promoted under the Kim-Roh regimes had denigrated the democratic and economic achievements of earlier leaders (such as military ruler Park Chung-hee, father of the current president). In the words of Chung-in Moon Moon Lee saw earlier revisions by the progressives as having "adopt[ed] an anti-market, anti-liberal democracy, anti-American, and pro-North Korean stance."¹⁵ Lee's moves exacerbated the already wide left-right gap domestically and moved toward the instilling of deeper nationalist sentiments in Korea.

The overlapping administrations of Abe and Korean President Park Geun-hye saw bilateral Japanese-Korean relations spiral further downward. After taking office her

¹⁵ Chung-in Moon "South Korea in 2008: From Crisis to Crisis," *Asian Survey*, 49, 1: p. 125.

administration boosted U.S.-ROK links while softening Lee's tough line toward the DPRK. She also worked to improve ties with China. But she and Abe have overseen the stunning collapse of the previously warm Japan-ROK links. For Park the 'comfort women' issue triggered her powerfully personalized rejection of Abe.

Since its inauguration, moreover, the Park administration has joined China in relentless criticism of the Abe administration and his ongoing embrace of multiple right-wing positions, most sensitive of which to Park personally has been the broad wink-and-nod skepticism Abe and his administration have demonstrated regarding the Japanese government's responsibilities for the wartime military system of "comfort women." Frostiness between the two leaders was evident in the fact that the first post-inauguration phone call between Abe and Park did not come until March 2013, in the numerous previously-scheduled high level meetings cancelled by the ROK, and by Park's unrelenting refusal to meet bilaterally with Abe, describing him as failing to have a correct understanding of history. Following Abe's visit to Yasukuni, Korean public opinion of him plummeted to a level below that of Kim Jong-un.¹⁶

Park was finally strong-armed into a three way sit-down among herself, Abe and President Obama, in March, 2014, the U.S. being distressed over the deterioration of ties between its two most important Northeast Asian allies in and the risks of poisoning America's broader regional goals. Nevertheless, the bitterness of Korea-Japan relations under Abe and Park, despite the strategic logic pressing for cooperation, continues to underscore the driving power of domestic politics.

From the Japanese perspective, all claims against Japan by Korea, including the "comfort women" had been "solved" whereas for the Park administration the agreement had been

¹⁶ Asan Institute, "Challenges and Opportunities for Korea-Japan Relations in 2014," available at <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/challenges-and-opportunities-for-korea-japan-relations-in-2014>.

negotiated in a time of Korean economic weakness and lack of full awareness of the plight of the remaining Korean “comfort women.” Hence the 1965 agreement left the issue open for further examination and resolution.

Perhaps the most persistent criticism of Korea by Japanese officials of late has been that despite a long list of apologies of varying depth and self-abnegation, the Koreans “keep moving the goal posts” and demanding new phrasing or a reaffirmation of prior apologies. Regardless, the Korean version of events, as heard by many in Japan, is seen to have contributed heavily to recent fissures.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the past several years, a wave of competing nationalisms and finger-pointing accusations have derailed what had previously been a herky-jerky but nonetheless clear trend toward reduced tensions and greater cooperation among China, Korea and Japan. As was noted above, nationalism has had deep roots and recent watering in all three countries. Hostility toward Japan has ebbed between latent and inflammatory in Korea and China for decades. Meanwhile, within Japan, a burgeoning and often chauvinistic nationalism has been evident since the bursting of the economic bubble in 1990-91. Yet, to many in Japan, neither Korea nor China show sufficient appreciation of the long and positive contributions made by Japan’s peaceful behavior and economic contributions to their own subsequent successes. A festering animosity toward China was visible as early as 2000 when a Chinese naval reconnaissance ship sailed around the Japanese archipelago along with subsequent intrusions into undisputed territorial

waters as well as with the two countries' mini-trade war of 2001.¹⁷ Yet for most of the first decade of this century tensions were tamped down and mass political xenophobia was checked by political leaders in all three countries. All appeared to stress collectively the positive benefits of cooperation over the competing national interests threatening to push them apart.

Leadership efforts that long skirted the worst excesses of domestic nationalism in the interest of regional economic improvement have been outstripped in recent years by three leaders willing to stoke the flames of mutual suspicion. Ongoing shifts in the regional order, as well as the recent flare-up in maritime security tensions has made it tempting for leaders to hunker down behind national walls, pointing accusatory fingers at neighboring countries while ignoring flaws in their own back yards. Yet it is important to acknowledge that the recent tensions and expressions of cross-border animosity have powerful roots in domestic politics.

Prime Minister Abe has made no secret of his broad scale efforts to bolster national pride among the Japanese citizenry and to erase what he claims has been a postwar penchant for national self-abnegation and apology. Korean President Park has been wary for domestic political reasons of appearing too sympathetic to Japan since her father has long been criticized for his collaboration with Japan during the colonial era and as the man who, in 1965, signed away Korea's rights to official apology and reparations from Japan for 35 years of colonization. And surely the Abe administration's efforts to rewrite the well-established historical record on sex slavery feeds Park's efforts. And stoking anti-Japanese flames in China is undoubtedly helpful to President Xi as he attempts to consolidate his rule, crack down on CCP and other official corruption, deal with the slowing pace of economic development, erase the 'hundred

¹⁷ Akio Takahara, "A Japanese Perspective on China's Rise and the East Asian Order," in Robert S. Ross and Zhu Feng (eds.) *China's Ascent: Power, Security, and the Future of International Politics*, (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2008): p. 220, 226.

years of national humiliation, and in the process improve relations with South Korea as a possible wedge in the U.S. alliance structure in East Asia.

The current situation of uncertainty and diminished cross border trust and rising animosities may well be temporary. After all economic and financial links continue at a blistering pace and regional institutions, mil-mil cooperation and the like continue beneath the negative headlines. We may well see leadership-led moves to reduce tensions as has frequently happened in the past and as appears to have motivated the 2015 Trilateral. Yet the present situation poses serious risks. As governments jostle to ensure themselves the greatest possible influence over the evolving regional order, the chances for inadvertent mishaps are high. Ships maneuvering for position in contested waters; aircraft scrambling to meet erstwhile challengers; military vessels attempting to spy on nearby military maneuvers and calculate how much is “routine,” how much is “probing,” or how much is provocatively “hostile;” top leaders refusing to meet; and the mutual exchange of nationalistic vituperations: all these are freighted with the potential for unwanted clashes or miscalculations. The risk of accidental and unintended military interactions rise when emotions run high, leaders fail to meet, and military forces operating in close proximity carry the bulk of the burden for foreign diplomacy. Rabid nationalism among the populace makes it difficult for even witting leaders to back off from potentially tense security situations far harder. The central task facing political leaders across the region today is reducing the danger that such interactions will escalate into more serious and irreversible spirals into conflict. Instead it would be welcome to remember the long and generally positive ties that have linked the three countries, particularly since the end of bipolarity.

History and Politics in Northeast Asia Workshop Discussion Minutes

I. Origins of Contemporary Northeast Asian Order

- In-taek Hyun's comments on Jame's Lin's presentation
 - Since I'm discussant for James Lin's paper, I'll comment on his. I'd like to congratulate you on nearly finishing his dissertation. But it's a little lengthy. I'm neither history or China expert, so I don't know if I'm the proper person to comment. Dr. Lin successfully and elegantly traces the history of US involvement in China from 1922 to 1949. This history of how individuals and institutions contributed to China's rural and educational development is fascinating. Nanking-Cornell Program, Rehabilitation, etc. these are also very fascinating and interesting. Not all were successful, but there were at least systematic efforts. In his paper, Dr. Lin mentions very interesting educational missionaries. According to him, there is a case mentioned about Korea which attracts my attention. Since Dr. Lin focuses mainly on China, and since the rest of the paper is about Korea, I don't know whether Reisner's theory applies to Korea. There are 3 different paths for China, Japan, and Korea in terms of US involvement and economic and agricultural development. During the same period in Korea, there were not many Americans who tried to help Korea before Japanese colonialization.
 - When the Japan-Korea protectorate treaty was completed, the US embassy was the first to leave Korea. Korea was almost forgotten country in terms of US involvement. But individually the missionaries (several hundred) were very actively working in Korea and contributing to Korea's education and public health. Their contribution is the foundation of Korea's enlightenment in part.
 - There was stronger European involvement in Japan than that of the US. After Meiji Revolution, Japan received modern tech and industry from various European countries. Japanese navy follows the model of the UK, even the weapon system and official manner. Japanese army follows the French army. The imperial constitution came from Germany. Japan became an advanced country in this region. Japan didn't need US involvement.
 - However, after WWII, the situation became quite different. Again, 3 different paths. Here, Japan comes first, then Korea, then China. Japan was under the SCAP by General MacArthur for 7 years. Nearly all of Japan's system became reformed and it was the beginning of modern Japan.
 - In Korea, after Korea was liberated from Japan, the US forces ruled it for 3 years, but was a half-success. Korea was divided. Nonetheless, South Korea became a strong US ally after the war.
 - My question for James Lin is what happened to the individuals in the era of Republican China you mentioned? At any rate, despite Pres. Nixon's visit to China, since then the US became a major importer of Chinese commodities and this could have been the beginning of modern Chinese industry. Here, I think we have 3 different models in Northeast Asia.
- Daniel C. Sneider's comments on Tae-gyun Park's presentation
 - He addresses central questions in terms of the issue of formation of national identity and why you have the rivalry and tension between 3 actors in NE Asia and to what degree they shape the relations.

- He looks at the tension between the duality of Japan's historical role in the development of NE Asia, which I think accounts for this rivalry. Japan was a model for modernization and for dealing with the threat of Western imperialism in NE Asia on one hand. Meiji Revolution and reforms were in many ways the example that Koreans and Chinese reformers used and looked to motivate their own reform processes. But on the other hand, Japan's other role was to emulate Western colonizers.
- What was missing in the paper was that there was a deep division within Japan on this question. Japanese argued which path they will take. Will they be imperial emulators? That reminds me of the discussions that went on in the US. The notion that US should be a model but not impose system on others and should withdraw from other European imperialist powers vs. the actual decision to go down that path is the discussion that went on. Similar and ongoing discussion in Japan although the defeat from WWII ended this partially.
- Fukuzawa endorsed Sino Japanese War and the takeover of Formosa. So he was in the first camp of not going down the imperialist road. But he still felt the pressure from within Japan. That faithful decision shaped Japan's national identity. It also determined the faith of modern Korea. The creation of Manchukuo and the decision to widen the war, these events are very central to Chinese identity. Not just a manipulative decision by the politicians. They really shaped their identity.
- You can argue that they are in some degrees trapped by the past history because the formation of identity has been so deeply shaped by these events that it's impossible to escape the political consequences of that. It remains defined by the understanding of these events.
- To make a more hopeful point/question is that, yes, you're trapped by the past and how history was absorbed, but does that stay forever? I think it changes. The understanding of the past and the creation of historical perception is a plastic process and constantly changing. You can't change fundamental events but can change how people understand them. We see this in all these societies. I wrote about this repeatedly with Dr. Shin. There is evolving history.
- To what degree does the process of discussion in popular culture and on intellectual level give the opportunity to reshape these events?
- It's important to address the duality of Japan's role. If we look at Japan as the only aggressor, we miss what is a much more complex history.
- James Lin's response
 - Regarding the question about what happened to the individuals and institutions. For the Chinese, the select leads continued their paths in the KMT regime in Taiwan. But many technicians stayed in China. Many of their ideas from prior periods actually persisted. Ideas such as agricultural education and selection and breeding of high yield crops. The trend continues under the larger currents.
 - For the US, few remained (like Clinton). But many actually went onto the SCAP in Japan and later in Korea. In 60s and 70s, throughout the rest of the developing worlds. What happened in NE Asia repeated elsewhere.
- Tae-gyun Park's response

- Beginning of my presentation, I tried to simplify the pictures. I have to give 15 minute presentation so I think I oversimplified. I totally agree with the first question about Japan. I think not only in the late 19th and early 20th century, but post 1955 in Japan. That part I have to add to improve my paper.
- Second question about the changes in NE Asia. Actually, 2 years ago I had an interesting presentation in Harvard about nowadays in NE Asia. I gave paper about food culture in 3 countries. Despite hostile sentiments, we can find so many izakayas in Korea. There are so many South Koreans who enjoy Japanese food and alcohol. So many Koreans love Chinese Qingdao beer. I found it in my classes that the young generation is exhausted about the hostilities.
- However, not hopeful for changes in the near future. Politicians and mass media still report very negatively on the 3 countries' relation.
- I didn't mention Japan's duality because nowadays I was talking about Korean media's perception.
- Hopefully, I'd like to change Korea's consensus. I don't think there will be changes in the near future.
- Q&A
 - Tae-gyun Park to James Lin
 - Question: I had an interesting session in AAS last Sunday about colonial legacy. We tried to reexamine colonial legacies in Korea and Taiwan. You mention interesting American legacy in China and Taiwan. Most scholars (in Taiwanese case) they emphasize Japanese role, not US. Similar in Korea. Minnesota Plan to improve Korea education under the contracts of ICA. So why do they just focus more on colonial legacy? Any ideas about the two very important factors in East Asia?
 - Response: It's a question I thought about. I think what's important is the main contributions of Japan in Taiwan was very significant. Disseminate top down knowledge in terms of farming and agriculture. All these ideas from chemical fertilizers, breeding, and selection were remarkably similar in Japan and US. Circulation of environmental science. In that way, they are almost inseparable, it's that Japan just had a very head start in Taiwan. I think it's similar in Korea.
 - Yul Sohn to Tae-gyun Park
 - Question: You wrote that anti-Japanese sentiments are the unifying factor in Korea and China, and the fear of China is in the other two countries. Otherization of Japan seems quite clear to me. But the otherization of China in Korea and Japan and in particularly the fear for China... Japan makes China the other throughout history (Tokugawa). Modern Japan is making China the other threat or retarded society as well. But Korea, vis a vis China, I'm wondering if Koreans identify with Chinese. There's a dual sentiment. How do you assess China as the other but also opposed to China as the one that you identify with and emulate?
 - Response: You're right. China is the protector of Korea in history. China sent troops in 1597, etc. However in Korea there are still legacies of the Korean War. Korean society had controversial dispute about Xi Jinping. During the colonial period, many Koreans lived in the northeast region of China and there were so

many clashes between Korean peasants and Chinese. Lots of media coverage. 1930s, very strong anti-Chinese sentiments in Korea. Late 19th century and colonial period, Koreans had typical perception of China. They had critique of Japan, but at the same time they were scared of China in the NE area. Dual perception of China among the Koreans.

- Young-sun Ha (Moderator) to Daniel C. Sneider and Thomas Gold
 - Question: There are many comparisons between 19th century and now. Japan successfully adapted to new standards of modernity in 19th century. But in 20th, they went too far with imperialism. But China and Korea very hesitated because they considered tiensia as the standard. Now in 21st century, we're very much talking about the new standard and hybrid of tradition and postmodern. Who will lead the new modernization in the region, including the US?
 - Gold's response: Profound question. Up until last year, there were many countries looking to China. The Beijing consensus. The new path towards development. Improving the standard of people and status in international relations. I think just over the last year, much of the world has turned sour because of China's economic problems that they're not handling very well. But also because what is seen by many other countries. Unnecessary provocation? If China's a model, why do they have to go out of their way to attract hostilities? And the US is also radically plunging with the presidential elections.
 - Sneider's response: All these societies are facing the same challenges (globalization). We see the responses to globalization in Donald Trump or Chinese and Korean nationalisms, all these attempts to form national identity that are separate from the global civilization. Yet they are all failures because the only way both the economy and society can grow is if they figure out the forces of cross-borders. Everyone is struggling with this. Immigration, higher-ed reform, income equality, etc. There is no civilizational model people have to follow. But in defense, US has been more successful in its ability to absorb the impact of globalization. Immigrant-friendly and able to absorb people from all over the world. Neither China nor Korea nor Japan is doing very well, but they have to face this because they have slow population growth. Interesting question to look ahead and figure out the future challenges.
- Euiyoung Kim to Steven Vogel
 - Question: Japanese heyday as a model is over. I think Japan certainly lost the battle. The Washington consensus has evolved. In terms of Japan itself being the model, the first question is the economic crisis and it's awkward for them to tell others to follow. Japan's problems: 1. Economic crisis, 2. Relations to neighbors. The ideal moment for leading has passed.
- Tae-gyun Park's comment
 - How to overcome crisis? How to overcome financial crisis? They're more interested in solutions and that's my idea for the future.
- Moderator's comments
 - Right after arriving in SF, we went over to the Asia Art Museum. Very lucky for us to see the Mateo Ricci world Map which was made in 1602. So far we have only 6 maps in the

world. That map in SF is the clearest depiction of the map. The reason I mention is that actually that map was made with close collaboration between Mateo and Chinese scholar Li. Wonderful collaboration. For the first time, the real world map with western and eastern knowledge. When we look at the future, we should follow this discussion and discuss how can we collaborate and meet east and west just like 500 years ago.

II. Relevance of History to the International Relations of Northeast Asia

- Insun Kang's comments on Tae-hyo Kim and Daniel Sneider's presentations
 - Reading the two papers reminded me of the days when I was in Washington as a correspondent during the Bush administration. Once in 2002 I was invited to a discussion on how to resolve Japan-Korea conflicts. We talked about many things. We talked about suggestions on how to improve the situations. The Americans to my surprise said that we two countries need more conversation and informal education. I told them this is not like doing business. I don't think you really understand the nature of the historical disputes. You knew the facts but you don't understand how deep rooted they are, how emotional, how explosive it can be.
 - Now I see clear changes in the papers. The US sees the situation in a different way. 10 years ago, they regarded the history disputes as headache, strain between the two countries who are the two most important US allies in East Asia.
 - Now the US sees the situation in the view of US strategic interest. Dr. Sneider pointed out that the comfort women case shows how important the role of the US was in making an agreement.
 - I used to think that Korea-Japan relationship was just bilateral, but now it looks like a trilateral thing. And behind the scene is the China factor.
 - History dispute itself is complex, but it gets more difficult because you need to put other factors into consideration.
 - Comfort women case is a remarkable case that shows the US can play a role. The time is running out because comfort women are dying.
 - I have a concern that comfort women agreement has a feeling that it was done by the rush of the US. The two leaders needed to agree on that issue for the sake of US strategic interest (shared by Korea and Japan)
 - According to Dr. Kim's presentation, the most frustrating part is the pessimistic prospect of the Japan-Korea relationship. As he worked in the Blue House and worked with the issue directly, he knew how hard it was. People are slaves of their experience. That makes him more pessimistic than Dr. Sneider.
 - Dr. Sneider, do you think you can apply US strategic interest stretching to other countries just as in the comfort women case? We knew that the US was very important in that agreement, but when I listen to your presentation, it sounds like they initiated the process.
 - Other small thing is that 10 years ago, the US gov't was not interest in East Asian issues that much. What made them more aggressive?
- Michael Nacht's comments on Tae-hyo Kim's presentation
 - Not really about the direct subject of the paper. It reminds of a kitchen drawer with knives stuck. The drawer's half open but it's permanently stuck. To me it seems as

though the historical differences that are so deep are really unresolvable. There can be minor progresses or more than that, but the drawer partly stuck is a given. But life goes on and with China arising and NK provocative, things can change. Couple questions: If you had a meter to measure US role for Korea's security, is it still very strong and credible in the Korean eye? Pres. Obama has been accused of being not assertive enough. Another aspect is "rebalancing to Asia." Does it have tangible meaning? What is the tangible evidence? Is it meaningful to Koreans or is it just a nice slogan?

- Tae-hyo Kim's response
 - US rebalance strategies prefer bilateralism and makes China uncomfortable. The US attack and realignment with Japan and tying Korea and re-orchestrate South China Sea countries, etc. These are now in competition with China's multilateral institution. This is the difficulty of Obama's rebalancing. Korean's understanding of US support is still strong especially in case of full attack from Pyeongyang. In case of limited surprise attacks, Koreans have problems with US mentality. They think that US is worried more about spillover effect, not about South Korean security. They don't like rational approach.
 - Very sharp comment from Kang. I'm slave of my experience. But I can find "objective" factors to support my argument. Single term 5 year Korean presidential administration is too short. To make a breakthrough, it's too short. First year, you're busy learning. Next 2-3 years is too short to persuade mass media and congress. The last years are lame duck. So the leaders take easy way and emphasize nationalism to win public affection.
 - The problem is that all 3 countries feel that they are victims. Japanese social cultural message is that they lost to the US in the Pacific War and they're victims of nuclear bombing. It's difficult to make a breakthrough. Abe and Park made an irreversible agreement on comfort women. This is a problem, because Koreans still have problems about other things like history textbooks, Yasukuni, etc.
- Daniel Sneider's response
 - I don't want to say that the comfort women agreement is a product of US pressure. It's been under discussion for a long time. But I do think that the American pressure on both governments (both public and private) played a role. US making a public statement is very rare and it reverberated widely. Generally, the US deals with Japan in quiet diplomacy. The reality is that the agreement wouldn't have happened if the two countries weren't already in discussion. The US played a bridging role.
 - Can the US do more? Yes. I'm a believer in reconciliation. You see that Germans and French and Poles, they are deeply imbued with historical sentiments. But you can make progress towards reconciliation that allows for normalization. Removes history as an obstacle. There are many things that can be done. Ex. Joint textbook. These allow students to see what others are being taught.
- Q&A
 - Jung-hoon Lee
 - It seems that the focus has turned to the role of US in East Asia and if you're looking at US role in 20th century, it's always been push and pull isolationism vs. interventionism. If you really look at when US intervened, ex. SF treaty, US after having delay in peace treaty, they are compelled to conclude the SF treaty. The background for US to push the two countries to normalize, it's Vietnam and the

need for two allies to cooperate. The question is, when you look at US policy, I think the external factors are there for US to take a very strong interventionist approach. But on the contrary to the previous developments, it's maybe the opposite. Even the rebalancing and pivot to Asia, if you took a cynical angle, you could say that this is a major strategic retreat. Retreat from global military engagement. It's a nice way of phrasing. My question is that the circumstances call for very strong US interventionist policies, if you look at past patterns, which coincide with the delicate situation about rise of nationalism, What is the NE Asia order? Sinocentric order? Japan prosperitist sphere? There is no order to go back to. We're in a process of reshaping.

- To Tae-hyo Kim: Your reference is that hasty nature of the normalization treaty. The question is, say it takes place in 1975, what would have been different?
- Han-kwon Kim to Daniel Sneider
 - When South Korea, Japan, and the US talk about cooperation in NE Asia, US always says to separate historical issues and military security issues. To some Koreans, historical factors are deeply related to military security, so if we separate them, the lack of trust will make the normalization very superficial. What do you think of the historical factors and military issues in NE Asia?
- Young-sun Ha
 - It's my position that the next US president should change the word "rebalancing." It's a backward concept. I have very much sympathy with regional public of Japan because when I mention the question in the first question, in 19th century, Japan relatively successfully adapted to the new standards of modernization, but in 21st or 22nd century...
 - Final question: The US has some responsibility in Japan being the new standards of civilization. After the Pacific War, US won the demilitarization of Japan. US should play a role of healer for Japan in the future.
- Tae-gyun Park to Tae-hyo Kim
 - I'd like to ask, based on your experience, what do you think is pressuring US decision?
- Tae-hyo Kim's response
 - In 1965, when Korea decided to normalize with Japan, Pres. Park's role was fundamental. In the following 5-10 years, the national power difference narrowed. National power and economic power all intertwined in my sense. Japanese leadership regards the bronze statue of comfort women as humiliation against their face. But Koreans ask that they face it.
 - Japan's collective self-defense with the US is not the kind of US military threat. This is diplomatic. Majority of Koreans came to believe that Japanese collective self-defense is a military one. This is misunderstanding.
 - How do I regard US approach? Of course, I respect American's care and philosophy and future vision of alliance. But if you engage with very specific and sensitive issues, in that case, you have to persuade the Pentagon first before going to the White House. Each institution is strong voiced. Each different enemy in Washington DC.

- Daniel Snieder's response
 - President Park's mistake in bilateral meeting. I think there is an interesting gap between what US think Japan will do and what Japan plans to do. Americans always view Japan as the escort. We get nervous when Japan thinks in other terms.
 - I want to address rebalancing. The rebalance to me is that the US spent a long time to rethink about what our security role would be post-Vietnam. The president has some interesting and clear points. These questions will not go away. These discussions are not going to change. We just have to think about what role the use of force plays in American foreign security policy.

III. Relevance of History to the Politics of China, Japan, and Korea

- Steven Vogel's comments on the ROK presentations
 - What strikes me is the overwhelming amount of mutual interests. In trade and commerce, but also in peace. I'll start by talking about Professor Son's security and identity nexus. Then Professor Choi's.
 - One of the critical questions is identity. Is it an independent driver or is it a reflection of deeper economic relationship? I think the answer is sometimes yes and no.
 - Even Japan sometimes uses history as a tool for punishment. Sometimes, the deeper security issues reassert themselves. There are two ways to interpret what's going on between Korea and Japan. 1. How history divides them, 2. How they are trying to come together. Sometimes history goes beyond this. Common interest is so overwhelming. I'm suggesting that we need to take a step further.
 - I really like Dr. Choi's framing of history as a constant variable.
 - Starting with China (Dr. Kim's paper), the Chinese gov't has partial ability to arouse and calm the situation. It's a variable. Could get worse or better. Also seems like the way Chinese plays the history card is different from that of its target. There's the US. The way it uses history issues is very different from the US and Japan. Chinese are a little more willing to play with fire when it comes to Japan than the Americans.
 - On the Japanese case, there's an excellent case for history as a variable. Abe ministration. Japanese position on history has dramatically changed depending on who's in power. So something might change with a new leader.
- Stephanie Kim's comments on the ROK presentations
 - My background is not in political science or history, but in education, so I'll bring my own education angle to this discussion.
 - The papers that we have heard today conceptualize the relationship between politics and history as a stark binary to each other. On one hand, you have politics as the rational decision-making processes of international security and economy. On the other, you have history concerned with the emotional affective factors of memory and trauma.
 - Professor Kim's paper argues that we can understand zhonghua nationalism as in opposition to ethnic minority nationalism. If zhonghua nationalism can be understood through the economic rationale of modernization theory, then ethnic minority nationalism can be understood through ethno-symbolism stemming from the identity politics and

postcolonial schools of thought of the 1980s and 1990s. While zhonghua nationalism began to take on elements of ethno-symbolism in order for the PRC to better incorporate ethnic minorities into its fold, specifically by using Benedict Anderson's conceptualization of an "imagined community" in order to overcome differences amongst its citizens—this is presumably done in order to push forth a nationalist agenda to unify an otherwise fractured nation. Indeed, central to Professor Kim's paper is the underlying assumption that nationalism is something distinct from an understanding of history.

- Professor Sohn's paper also posits a split between what he calls the security-economy nexus and the history-identity nexus. Security-economy is outward focused, and history-identity is inward focused. Governments use conceptions of history as a way to strategize their international relations and foreign policy decisions. Though Professor Sohn's paper acknowledges that international security and historical identity can be intertwined, this is primarily due to a spillover effect rather than any true integration.
- And Professor Choi's paper conceptualizes the interplay of politics and history as, on the one hand, bilateral relations, military cooperation, and international security decisions, and on the other hand, historical interpretations and antagonisms that are responsible for the political blunders of the governments of South Korea and Japan.
- However, I wonder whether politics and history can be conceptualized not as separate forces at odds with one another but as the same thing. For example, can't state governments manipulate or otherwise shape people's conceptions of homeland and national identity (i.e., their own history) that then inform the state's foreign policy agenda as elected officials cater to their constituents' emotional needs and desires? As someone who specializes in education research, I have done my own projects on how Korean textbooks can shape definitions of multiculturalism that ultimately shape government policies on ethnic and linguistic minorities.
- Indeed, education is often used as a vehicle through which state governments can calculatedly orchestrate citizens' behaviors and emotions that determine what people care about, what policies are enacted, and ultimately who or which party gets elected. The recent textbook controversy in South Korea where the government is attempting to nationalize history education certainly shows how obvious it is that the nation-state can not only use history for his political agenda, but actually *create and write* its own history.
- So my question to the authors is: Can we reframe this afternoon's discussion of politics and history not as intertwining-but-ultimately-separate realms but as part and parcel of one another? Politics *is* historical, and history *is* political. There is no clear boundary between the two, and certainly education is a realm in which this blurred boundary is revealed.
- History as a generational issue?
- Laura C. Nelson comments on the ROK presentations
 - I think that many papers all focus on issues of images and identities, the place of history and politics, how it mobilize to create politics in a way. Politics is made by actual people in their various contexts. The people who make policies are a very particular group of people and different from the political domain. So polling is a stand-in for those domain people in a way (Taeku Lee's paper). To what extent is history made by the elites and to what extent is it not?

- There has been a lot of mention of comfort women. Had women themselves been part of the process? Clearly, they weren't consulted.
- What about generational difference? Comfort women issue plays very differently for younger Korean feminists and older people.
- On Han-kwon Kim's paper on zhonghua nationalism: What is the relationship in a diverse state? I think you discuss in an interesting way the primordial vs modern perspective.
- On Yul Sohn's paper: It's alarming that more than 50% of Koreans think that war with Japan is possible when it's so much lower in Japan. Who manipulates this? Again, generational understanding is also very important.
- On Woondo Choi's paper: I wonder whether changes in the DPRK stance create different positionality about ontological security and how Korea situates itself.
- Jung-hoon Lee's comments on the US presentations
 - Gold's paper: I agree 100% with everything you say. 2 main points: First, historically, if you look at 19th century, one of the most significant phenomenon that influenced regional order is how China responded to western imperialism and how Japan reacted to western imperialism. We understand the humiliation China suffered for a century since the Opium War. Is there any Chinese academic who studies actual principle analysis? Or is it all just party line historical revision?
 - Second aspect, why is the CCP doing this? We talk often about North Korean regime's survival. They feel insecure because not much about communism appeals to the people. So NK caters to nationalism. The problem with the Chinese party is that it also opened up its market. Strange mix of communism and capitalism. The more people join capitalism, the more they are bound to ask for democracy. Another dilemma for China is that it has an inverse relationship. It wants to be a global leader and compete with the US at least in the Asia-Pacific context. But it has its limitations because it's not a soft power. How does China cope with this dilemma in the next century?
 - TJ Pempel's paper: I just want to hear your take on Mr. Abe. If you talk to Japanese scholars, people think that Abe is a moderate, at least during his first term. Is there some good in Abe that we can pull out to improve the bilateral relation?
- Euiyoung Kim's comments on the US presentations
 - My discussion will be more questions than comments.
 - Gold's paper: Very informative. I really like the Ah Q mentality. Two questions: 1. Chinese people and others in the region don't buy the principle victimization anymore. Then what do the Chinese need to do now? What is their future strategy? 2. You clarified two principles in principle victimization (sovereignty, unity). Reading your paper, I realized one more element. It's glorification. In other countries, they take Chinese action as provocative. It's a rejuvenation of national/civilizational glory. The Chinese tries to play the role of benevolent hegemon. Then, it's principle of both victimization and hegemonic.
 - Pempel's paper: Assuming the principle of glorification is there... You identified two tensions in the region. But maybe is there any change between China and Korea? Chinese argued that Koguryo was China. There could be new tension between Korea and China.

- Taeku Lee's paper: You put forward two concepts but you touched on participatory democracy and deliberative democracy. What about other types of polling?
- Euy-sang Yoo's comments on the US presentations
 - Pempel's paper: You didn't mention US involvement. If you were the senior advisor, would you advise President Park to realign the relationship between US and Korea, and to Abe to realign between Korea and Japan?
- John Campbell (Moderator)'s overall comments
 - It's interesting that for Chinese and Korean governments' dealing with Japan, they draw on nationalism as an easy method. They make legitimacy in domestic context. But it's hard to turn off nationalism. It's difficult to control but easy to turn on. It strikes me in thinking about Japan that the whole notion of nationalism is different and can't be used well politically. Japanese don't have fundamental historical grievance with China or Korea. But they have it with the US. US unfairly treated Japan, etc. Does anybody really want to start anti-US sentiments in Japan? The picture we have of nationalism in Japan is different in that we see it's the leaders (Kishi to Abe) whose secret desire is to be more militaristic and do identity politics, security.
 - Are we going to drift along? Or is something major going to happen? How would it change things if Abe gave up Dokdo? It would change NE Asian politics a lot.
- Q&A
 - John Campbell to Thomas Gold
 - When I read the last sentence of your paper, I thought that it was the Chinese who didn't buy it, but maybe you were talking about Southeast Asian reaction? I wasn't sure on that. [Gold's response: I meant both.] Okay, then what could be the Chinese reaction to that? Do you rethink the strategy?
 - Gold's response cont'd: It relates to the generational issue mentioned by Laura Nelson. In terms of young people, I think they buy into nationalism. I'm not historian so I haven't talked to Chinese historians. But James might tell us, when Chinese grad students come to the US, do they speak more openly about this? I think they are really trapped. It's like the relationship between China and Taiwan. They acknowledge that Taiwan consciousness exists, but so what? They say Taiwan is still part of China. They are also pushing for this very nationalistic, patriotic education as well.
 - James Lin's comments
 - Zhonghua nationalism is not new. The Qing absolutely used it to rule China and incorporate all minorities under one civilization. There's a chance that the CCP's use of zhonghua nationalism can backfire because some argue that that's what's caused the fall of the Qing dynasty.
 - Daniel Sneider's comments
 - I spent a lot of time talking to Chinese historians of the wartime period, and there is a lot of debate that goes on in the Chinese academic circle. One of the big issues is when the CCP opened the door to the discussion on who actually fought the Japanese. Stories started to circulate from Chinese historians and even reached media about how the whole story of anti-Japanese war was false. They

published statistics and specific battle accounts, etc. The CCP did this because they needed to acknowledge the KMT's role.

- Thomas Gold's comments
 - They don't know how to get out of it, so they just stop talking about it. On the history, there has been a lot of revisionist history within China regarding the republican era that it wasn't all disaster and that the KMT did good things. They try to win over the hearts of Taiwan, but it's another shooting themselves in the foot.
- TJ Pempel's comments
 - There were several questions raised to me. To what extent is identity something that can be manipulated? My own perspective is that it is far more often a variable than deeply embedded. But obviously leaders can only push this if only there's bedrock of support.
 - Has Japan's move in the direction of greater nationalism been simply action of Abe? I think it's clearly linked to Japan's perspective that China is passing economically and that Japanese economy has now moved down to second tier. And there are US security issues linked to this as well. I think it's mostly Abe and the absence of critical left.
 - On China-Korea issue, there is also some territorial issue. This reinforces my perception that it's something that the leaders can manipulate. Different political leaders have said we can move beyond something.
- Young-sun Ha's comments
 - All afternoon we used the term nationalism so many times. We all know that the concept of nationalism was invented. Up until the end of 18th century, we used the term patriotism, not nationalism. Because of this, when East Asian began adopting this nationalism, they wondered what it is exactly. Until now, we have some trouble understanding the western concept of nationalism.
- Yul Sohn's comments
 - The identity in the form of anti-Japanese sentiments is resilient. Some use those sentiments for political and economic purposes. The questions have made me think about how identity and security economics are interrelated.

IV. Roundtable: Issues and Remedies for the Peace of Northeast Asia

- TJ Pempel: The first issue I want to raise is, is identity something that can be manipulated by political, economic interest or is it really deeply rooted? Second thing is, it seems that recent history-related tensions are driven by domestic political considerations. It's less of security question or economic competition but more of specific political constituencies in 3 countries to provide a new basis of their own legitimacy. The big question here is, to what extent is political legitimization process strategically, economically, or identity driven vs. driven by domestic politics? Lastly, is it true or false that China's actions are still influenced by the memory of itself as a civilization (Sinocentric identity)?

- Woondo Choi: I see identity as variable. Manipulation is just a tool. All politicians should be shrewd enough to manipulate this. I'm not denying realist perspective. In addition, we need to look at identity as part of ontological security.
- Han-kwon Kim: When I prepared my paper, I heard it's limited to history and Chinese politics. James is right. Zhonghua nationalism is not new. Zhonghua nationalism was a primordial concept. In the modern days, when the Chinese mentioned zhonghua, it was when they were building the state. But after the Cold War, they reemphasized zhonghua to unite people. When China negotiates with the US politically, the dilemma is that the negotiation makes China look like it's taking a political retreat from international issues. Nationalistic factors have been manipulated and used politically.
- Daniel Sneider: I resist the idea of history as variable. It's all true but politicians and leaders didn't create these forms of historical memories. There are complex ways in which people form memories. They are powerful. They are not easily manipulated. In the case of CCP, many drew from personal stories and not from party ideology. It's true that they can exacerbate this. I don't think the Americans think about themselves in this regard. For example, the images of the Civil War live on in our minds. We need to recognize that identity is really old.
- TJ Pempel: On the Civil War, you're right it's there but it's hard to say. When you think about the Vietnam War, it's absent from the political talk. It's very alive for people who experienced it but we don't see too many politicians referring to that war.
- Hong Yung Lee: Many problems and no solutions, because of lack of understanding between China, Korea, and Japan. With the coming of the West, Japan was the most successful, and then Japan regards China as some kind of barbarian.
- Young-sun Ha: What's China's final goal in the 21st century? How can we make new architecture in this region?
- TJ Pempel: This is a great transition to the second question. What are the remedies? I'm one of those people who think that national interest changes. There's a lot of manipulability in national interest.
- Tae-hyo Kim: There are global-level solutions and regional-level solutions. Two major variables. The US can try to democratize China so that the Chinese people can elect their own leaders. I think it's the only solution. China thinks it was humiliated by Japan and the US. China has to invent alternate criteria to cooperate. North Korea and Korean reunification is another criterion that can make a fundamental change in the region.
- Euy-sang Yoo: Korea and Japan tried to issue common textbooks and failed. It resulted in so many differences. Good lesson for us. Common textbook might be a good idea, but not really... We need to use mass media. For example, izakayas in Korea are successful, but Korean restaurants in Japan do poorly because of bad media image of Korea. Media is powerful.

Uses of History, Geopolitics, and the ROK-Japan Relations

Yul Sohn (Yonsei University)

Introduction

Changes in the East Asian regional order have been predominately explained in the context of US-China relations, from China's "peaceful rise" to the US "pivot to Asia" to the "new model of great power relations". Sino-US relations are indisputably important, but not the only independent variables in the East Asian regional order. With the reemergence of Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, Japan's presence and influence has been on the rise. Considering that Japan's military capabilities are basically unchanged, the realist theory of international relations, which posits that a shift in balance of power between countries would threaten the security, fails to explain Japan's challenge to regional stability. Mainstream liberalist theory cannot account for Japan becoming a game changer in the regional FTA race because its economy remains highly integrated through trade, investment and financial networks. However, when we also factor in a complex mixture of forces like emotion, memory and identity, the pieces of the puzzle start to come together. This means that, at a theoretical level, there exists a security-economics-identity nexus where endogenously constructed identity shapes national security/economic interests or directly the security/economic policies of states (Katzenstein 1996). Likewise, economies vary substantially for noneconomic reasons that affect both institutions and agents' interests, while institutional elements of agents' environments shape its identity (Abdelal, Blyth, and Parsons (2010).

Because security, economics and identity spheres are intertwined, the three-way nexus can generate either positive or negative spillover effect. In the post-war Western Europe, security competition was alleviated by economic prosperity arising from deepening

interdependence that in turn drove the formation of regional collective identity. Such a virtuous cycle has not been replicated in East Asia, however. Although the Cold War ended while at the same time economic interdependence deepened, inter-state security competition remains resilient. Active people-to-people exchange has hardly created a regional identity.


NO better case is explained by the negative spillover effect than ROK-Japan relations. ROK resists any meaningful military cooperation with Japan as it is highly sensitive to Japan's new security posture including new guidelines. Likewise, the country has let the bilateral currency swap program expire in 2015. The program was established in 2001 and had grown to as much as \$70 billion at its peak. Susceptible to currency crisis, the country nevertheless allowed an economically irrational policy. Viewed in the perspective of the security-economics-identity nexus, such action is understandable: South Korea is highly sensitive to PM Abe's policies regarded as an attempt to create a sense of national identity in a way that whitewashes the past history. In that way, the recent clash of identity between the two countries has centered on the so-called "comfort women" issue. The road to the December 2015 agreement reached by South Korea and Japan demonstrates why history is of supreme importance in establishing and maintaining a sense of identity, how security and economic relations are intimately intertwined with identity formation, and more specifically how the uses of history structures the ways geopolitics operates, and how geopolitics mediates identity politics.

Identity Clashes

Ever since PM Abe and President Park came to power, the two countries' public sentiments toward each other significantly deteriorated. The annual survey jointly carried out by the East Asia Institute (EAI) and Genron NPO between 2013 and 2015 shows that the percentage of Japanese people with negative views who answered an "unfavorable" or "relatively

unfavorable” impression of Korea rose over the course of the three year survey from 37.3 percent to 52.4 percent while the percentage of people with positive view of Korea dropped to 23.8 percent in 2015 (Figure 1).

[Figure 1] Japanese Public Image of Korea



B. Relatively Favorable Impression

C. Relatively Unfavorable Impression D. Unfavorable Impression

E. Neither


F. No answer

One step further, there is a significant gap in perceiving the identity of each other. In a 2015 joint public opinion survey conducted by the East Asia Institute of South Korea and Genron NPO of Japan, 57% of the South Korean public characterized Japan as militaristic, while 34% said it was statist.¹ On the other hand, 56% of the Japanese public views South Korea as nationalistic and 34% as statist. Despite the fact that both South Korea and Japan are

¹ East Asia Institute and Genron NPO, “Survey on Mutual Recognition of Korea and Japan,” http://www.eai.or.kr/type_k/p2.asp?catcode=1110181400

allies of the United States, a large majority of South Korean respondents indicated a high-level threat perception toward Japan. Likewise, another recent joint public opinion survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, the East Asia Institute, Genron NPO, and Horizon demonstrates the striking fact that more than half of the South Korean respondents (54%) believe that there is a possibility of military conflict between Japan and South Korea.² Viewed as such, ROK government finds it difficult to make any meaningful security cooperation with Japan.

[Figure 2. Perception of the Other's Social and Political Identity]



The clash of identity has been generated at least partly by PM Abe's belief that "Strong Japan" requires patriotism boosted by a new national identity. According to historical

² Karl Friedhoff and Dina Smeltz, "Strong Alliances, Divided Public: Public Opinion in the United States, Japan, South Korea, and China," Chicago Council on Global Affairs, October 2015.

revisionists like Abe, since patriotism has been almost dead because postwar settlement belittled the meaning of the War and enforced “victor’s justice,” negative impressions of Japan as an aggressor in the wars of the twentieth century run so deep that postwar Japanese have been unable to see their modern history and accomplishments with pride. To escape such crisis in national identity, he asserts that a correct national history has to be created.

PM Abe uses history in ways that seek to forget a war of aggression and remember the glory and honor of modernization (i.e., Meiji’s drive to great power status that includes colonization of Korea). While he does not subscribe to some of the propaganda under the wartime Japan, one that engaged in a legitimate war of liberating Asia from Western oppression, he finds it absurd to single out Japan as sole bearers of responsibility for the outbreak of the War in Asia and the Pacific.

But the majority of the Korean public tends to interpret Abe’s remarks as being representative of deep trends, although Abe speaks of the death of patriotism in his country. While acknowledging that a significant number of Japanese population admit a war of aggression, they are worried that right-wing Japanese politicians including Abe are likely to hijack the Japanese state and turn into a dangerous direction.

American Intervention

The soured relationship between ROK and Japan has increasingly become a liability to the United States as Obama administration’s “rebalance to Asia” centers on its ability to reinvigorate and leverage traditional alliances for a stronger and enhanced role in the region. Following the economic recession and fiscal retrenchment restraining U.S. military expenditures, Japan and South Korea were asked to share increased financial burdens and new operational roles and missions in alliance management. In December 2010, the trilateral agreement was reached, which went beyond mutual bilateral responsibilities to deal effectively

with common security threats, including from North Korea, and underscored the importance of strengthening trilateral cooperation on economic, political, and security issues, bilateral relationship. And yet, South Korea, even under a pro-U.S., pro-Japanese Lee Myung-bak leadership, had been reluctant to engage in any meaningful military cooperation with Japan.

Since the election of Shinzo Abe and Park Geun-hye in December 2012, the political divide between the countries has not only reached its worst mark as Park declared the resolution of the comfort women issue as a precondition for normalization (means holding a summit). But it also produced significant structural opportunities for China to drive a wedge in the trilateral alignment in a way that has brought Seoul closer to Beijing while distancing it from Tokyo. While a state visit to South Korea in June 2013, President Xi Jinping urged South Korea to align with his country to denounce Abe's stance on Japan's historical legacies of colonialism and war, which the Japanese press has branded the "Korea-China alliance against Japan on history." It was around this time when Washington decided to intervene proactively in the history affairs by mediating during the next two years to help bring Abe and Park closer together. Alarmed further by the Chinese declaration of the establishment of an air defense zone in the East China Sea that overlapped Japanese and Korean claims, Vice President Biden visited Seoul in December and pressed Park to agree to a summit meeting with Abe (Sneider 2015).

[Figure 3: US-Japan-South Korea Summit]

"We Want This To Be A Match Without An Audience"



Trilateral Summit
(3/26/2014)

By March 2014, President Obama persuaded the two to sit together in a trilateral setting on the sidelines of the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, which was the first top-level meeting between South Korea and Japan since Park and Abe took office. By American mediation, the comfort women became a touchstone for history reconciliation and foreign ministry officials meeting started. On a separate track, the United States persuaded a reluctant ROK to join talks on a trilateral arrangement for sharing military information (a memorandum of understanding on sharing intelligence on North Korean issues), and to participate in trilateral defense ministerial meetings. But there was the lack of political will at the top from both sides. Park's adamant stance on Abe and a high bar placed on the comfort women deal had seldom relaxed, despite the changing atmosphere within the Korean policy circle that called for a parallel-track approach (or "two-track" approach).

By February 2015, America's mediating role went one step further. In her remarks at the Carnegie Endowment, Under Secretary of State Wendy Sherman, after pointing to several disagreements that relate to Japan's colonial past, stated that "nationalist feelings can still be

exploited, and it's not hard for a political leader anywhere to earn cheap applause by vilifying a former enemy. But such provocations produce paralysis, not progress.” (<http://carnegieendowment.org/2015/02/27/wendy-sherman-on-northeast-asia/i2sw>) her comments received sharp criticism by Seoul for failure of understanding the region's history. But as a high-ranked foreign ministry official wondered if there is any change to US's previous stated position on history matters, the remarks were apparently an alarm to Seoul because the US criteria on the history issues was indicated: history should not be used to arouse nationalism.

US/Japan versus China

Abe made a shrewd move to win the American minds. It continued close consultation with the United States over the contents of Abe's speech before US Congress speech in April. His strenuous endeavors for passing security bills and strike the TPP deals, along with the efforts to avoid provocations in the wordings of history, were demonstrated and well appreciated by Washington. The upshot was a historic step forward in transforming the U.S.-Japan partnership:

Through the United States' Asia-Pacific Rebalance strategy, and Japan's policy of "Proactive Contribution to Peace" based on the principle of international cooperation, we are working closely together to ensure a peaceful and prosperous future for the region and the world. We recognize that the security and prosperity of our two countries in the 21st century is intertwined, inseparable, and not defined solely by national borders. Our current and future commitments to each other and to the international order reflect that reality (<https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/04/28/us-japan-joint-vision-statement>)

Now that the US welcomed Abe's speech and his statement on war anniversary (or Abe Statement) as well as alliance transformation, pressure was put on South Korea. Worse, easing of the tense Sino-Japanese relations was another source of pressure. The Xi-Abe meeting on

the sidelines of the APEC in Beijing, followed by another gathering at the 60th anniversary of the Bandung Conference in April, meant that both parties wanted to improve ties. Felt isolated by a strengthened US-Japan tie and an improved Sino-Japanese relations, Seoul began to take a conciliatory stance toward Japan. This was expressed at her remarks on the commemoration of the 50-year anniversary of diplomatic normalization held in June. In other words, Park's policy shift was pressed by structural change in the regional strategic landscape: Park's use of comfort women history was confronted and constrained by the development of the "US/Japan vs. China" rivalry, along with Japan on the rise. Park's decision to attend the controversial China's military parade did not work to her advantage. She was hoping that her Beijing Visit would consolidate China's support for Korean unification in South Korea's favor. But South Korea's move hosted questions from the US side that echoes Japan's assertion: would South Korea tilt toward China? It pressed Seoul to be conciliatory toward the US demand that Seoul resolve the history issues. In a series of subsequent summit meetings, South Korea was underdog in terms of the balance of bargaining power vis-à-vis Japan.

In December, Park and Abe reached a breakthrough that may open the road to improve the bilateral relationship after both sides agreed to "finally and irreversibly" resolve the long-standing issue of Korean comfort women. It is too early to tell, however, if they succeeded in removing the biggest obstacle to the beginning of a new era of bilateral relations. Prime Minister Abe expressed sincere apologies and remorse to the comfort women while also conceding that Japanese military authorities played a role in the sexual enslavement. Tokyo offered to set up a fund of one billion yen (\$83 million), paid directly by the government, and to provide care for the comfort women.

The South Korean public is divided over the developments driven by structural forces. Many continue to protest against the Japanese government for refusing to admit legal responsibilities for these crimes. There also remains strong opposition to the removal of the

statue of a girl symbolizing the comfort women that is installed in front of the Japanese embassy in Seoul. Along with the opposition party and NGOs, the general public turned against the resolution. On January 8, a joint survey conducted by the Korean Broadcasting System, the national public broadcaster in South Korea, and Gallup Korea revealed that 26% of the South Korean public supports the agreement, while 56% opposes it. 72% of respondents say that Japan refuses to apologize fully, while only 19% were satisfied by the apology. An overwhelming percentage of the public (72%) is opposed to moving the comfort woman statue to somewhere else.³

To conclude, history is of supreme importance in establishing and maintaining a sense of identity for both Japan and South Korea. Abe's uses of history aims to shaping the identity of a new Japan and Park's is no less different. These two clash where the comfort women has been a focal point. Viewed in the context of regional geopolitics, the clash of identity has been mediated by strategic calculations of, and interactions by, major powers. In this process, either the process of identity formation can easily be distorted, or can strategic relations be over-securitized. The two countries need to seek ways that establish positive spillover effects from the security-economics-identity nexus, and ultimately promote the co-evolution of the two in order to moving in the direction of shared identities (Ha and Sohn 2015).

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