

Historical Reconciliation in East Asia and Europe

동아시아와 유럽의 역사화해

Date and time: 2017. 6. 1, 16:40 ~ 18:10

Venue: ICC Jeju 201B

Organizer: Northeast Asian History Foundation

일시: 2017. 6. 1, 16:40 ~ 18:10

장소: 제주국제컨벤션센터 201B

주관: 동북아역사재단

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Program

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II. Presentation

/ Presentation 1 /

The Comfort Women Issue and the December 2015 Agreement
- Difficulties of the History Problem in our East Asian Context -

Haruki WADA (Professor Emeritus, Tokyo University)

Japan waged a series of aggressive wars against China during 50 years in 1894-1945 and extended colonial rule over Korea for 40 years in 1905-1945. In 1945 Japan surrendered to the Allied Powers and closed finally her 50 years of aggression and colonial rule. Japanese Emperor immediately declared the establishment of “Peace State” as a new State vision. With the promulgation of a new Constitution Japan managed to become a democratic Peace State. But it took another 50 years for such Peace State Japan to express overtly remorse and apology toward her past of aggression and colonial rule .

On the other hand, in Germany Hitler’s Nazi Party won the 1933 election and realized its revolution to create a Nazi party State. In the World War II Hitler lead Genocide strategy to annihilate all Jews everywhere. In 1945 Nazi Germany lost the last battle and perished finally, while Hitler committed suicide. Federal Republic of Germany was newly born in 1949 under US., British and French occupation. This state came to possess armed forces in the frame of NATO, but has made continuous efforts to accuse remaining Nazi War criminals and pay compensation to victims of compulsory labor from East European countries.

To both countries national task about history is different. It is admitted that the problem of apology toward colonial rule is more complicated and more difficult in comparison with the problem of accusation against Nazi Genocide. Yet Japanese post-war State which was successor of former War State was inherently reluctant to take responsibility toward its own historical past. Therefore Koreans’ criticism and constant persuasion were precious to Japanese. Yet it took a long time for Japanese to stare and tackle their own history problem. And the results which were obtained proved to be always ambiguous.

Nevertheless, today overcoming the legacies of colonialism is one of the most pressing and vital problem of the mankind. So the joint experiences of our peoples are very meaningful and beneficial.

The Comfort Women issue which became a social problem first in 1990 has been thought to be the most important problem to both our peoples. In theses 25 years in the ROK and Japan sincere efforts have been made incessantly. In the

movement to resolve the Comfort Women issue there have been three rounds.

The first round began in 1990 when the Korean women's organization that later became Chongdaehyop raised 6 Comfort Women demands. After the "coming out" of halmoni Kim Hak-sun in 1991 the Japanese government began to investigate the problem and in 1993 issued the Statement of apology by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kono. In 1995 Prime Minister Murayama set up the Asian Women's Fund(AWF) and started a process of apology and atonement. However, the AWF could not use government funds in order to pay atonement money to victims. Korean victims and support organizations opposed this basic concept of the AWF, demanding an end to it. Chongdaehyop raised 7 demands, including the punishment of those responsible, the recognition of legal responsibility, and the payment of legal reparation. As a result, the AWF was able to accomplish the atonement process to 211 Filipina and 79 Dutch fairly well, but in the ROK and Taiwan only 60 Korean and 13 Taiwanese, about one-third of the registered victims accepted the AWF process. In 2007 the AWF was wound up. Another more positive measure was needed from the Japanese government.

The second round began with the birth of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government in 2009. Then, the Japanese movement groups organized a "National Action 2010" to seek legislative resolution for the Comfort Women issue. However, the DPJ government did not respond to these demands. Amid this despair, the Korean Constitutional Court in 2011 ruled that the Korean government's inaction concerning the Comfort Women issue was in breach of the constitution. The Wednesday demonstrations in front of the Japanese embassy [Seoul] passed the 1000 mark in December of the same year and the Chongdaehyop set up the statue of a girl-victim there. At the Japan-Korea Summits' meeting a few days after that, President Li Myung-bak made strong representations to Prime Minister Noda to resolve the Comfort Women issue .

Seeing this situation, in February 2012 Hanafusa Toshio, joint representative of the "National Action 2010," called for a political resolution through discussion at an inter-governmental level and proposed three points:

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- 1) an apology that would resonate in the hearts of the victims;
 - 2) “atonement money” to be provided from a government fund
 - 3) refusal of any idea of humanitarian aid

This was conveyed to Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Saito Tsuyoshi and on 28 December agreement was reached with the Korean special presidential envoy, Li Dong-gan:

- 1) agreement to be reached at the level of the leaders of Japan and Korea and published as a Communique from their talks;
- 2) the Prime Minister’s new apology to include the expression “recognize responsibility” (without the word “moral”);
- 3) the resident ambassador [of Japan] to deliver the Prime Minister’s apology and the atonement money from the national treasury to the victims;
- 4) a Third “Japan-Korea History Joint Committee” to be set up with a Comfort Women sub-committee, and the truth of the Comfort Women problem to be clarified at the inter-government level.

President Li approved of this agreement, but Noda rejected it and the occasion passed.

The third round followed the birth of the Abe Shinzo cabinet at the end of 2012. The history revisionist Abe, having won government after calling for re-investigation of the Kono and Murayama Statements and started to move in this direction once elected. However from the outset US criticism was severe. And when President Park Eun-hee became president in March 2012 she put pressure on him by refusing any Japan-Korea leadership talks so long as Prime Minister Abe did not change his thinking. For that reason, the historical revisionist camp in Japan organized a campaign in the weekly magazines to vilify President Park and Japan-Korea relations sank to a dangerously low level. US President Obama then intervened. Prime Minister Abe in March 2014 was forced to make clear his honoring the Kono Statement. At this time, the 12th Asian Solidarity Conference adopted a proposal for resolution of the Comfort Women problem. It was based on joint proposal from the new Japanese coalition “National Action” and the Korean

Chongdaehyop:

- 1) a resolution based on acceptance and furtherance of the Kono Statement;
- 2) an apology that recognized the responsibility of the Japanese government and the facts of aggressive nature;
- 3) compensation as a token of apology;
- 4) clarification of the truth and prevention of any recurrence.

It was a proposal that called on President Park to persuade Prime Minister Abe to accept such a resolution. It did not include any reference to legal responsibility or punishment of those responsible.

In April 2015, Prime Minister Abe visited the US and spoke of the mobilization of comfort women in terms of “human trafficking.” After that secret negotiations with the Korean side seem to have begun between Yachi Shotaro, Secretary general of Japanese NSC and Li Byung-gi, former Head of Korean State Information Agency. In November, Japan-Korea Summits were held in Seoul and came to an agreement to seek an early solution. And suddenly, on December 28, a Foreign Ministers’ meeting was held in Seoul and an agreement announced.

This agreement meant that the Japanese Abe government finally responded to the demand of Park Geun-hye government and that it expressed anew apology and remorse about the Comfort Women issue and that it promised to contribute one billion yen through its budget to heal psychological wounds of all former victims. The expression of apology contained a new element. The Japanese government first admitted its responsibility straightly without limiting it by adjective “moral”. And payment of one billion yen is a completely new measure of the Japanese government for the victims. All this step could be understood as enforced by Park government upon Abe government.

But in Korea the victim Halmonis and the Chongdaehyop reacted strongly against the announcement of the settlement without prior consultation and showed anger over the fact that the Japanese Prime minister’s apology had not been made directly. Both ordinary people and movement people in Korea reacted strongly against

Japan's attempt to get rid of the statue by providing a one billion yen payment. Some in media and academic circles looked to move towards resolution by implementing the agreement, and the government aims to set up the Foundation.

In Japan even many experts did not anticipated such a concession from Prime Minister Abe. Political parties and media without exception supported the agreement. But Abe's right-winged followers were so unhappy to denunciate overtly Abe's "sin". Movement organizations too, astonished that Abe had made such a decision, at first tended to accept the agreement. But, from the start, criticism was strong over the fact that Abe's apology was not done by himself, but just conveyed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Ordinary Japanese people basically welcomed this agreement, supporting the payment of one billion yen for the victims.

Prime Minister Abe made every effort to minimize the impression of his enforced apology and atonement payment of his government. His efforts appeared in various forms. He himself only once phoned to President Park Geun-hye to read words of apology only partly. And he never allowed to print his words of apology in the form of his letter to the victims. It is natural that Korean victims and movement people all resisted against such attitude of the Japanese government. But you cannot deny the significance of the December 2015 agreement totally.

The Japanese government handed one billion yen to the Korean government and the newly formed Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing gave cure money to 35 out of 45 victims- survivors. No one can deprive victims of their right to receive atonement money from the Japanese government.

What is necessary from now on is to memorialize Japanese Prime Minister's new apology for ever in public form. It is advised that the Foundation for Reconciliation and Healing would construct a memorial monument for the deceased victims, former Comfort Women together with the new President government. Monument epitaph should contain Abe's words of apology. Then the Japanese government's apology and atonement will be irreversible and also applicable to the cases of remaining victims of other countries. Japan has not done anything for the victims -comfort women in China and North Korea. It is said that in the DPRK over 200

victims-comfort women were registered and that majority of them passed away already. If the Japanese government is going to tackle the Comfort Women issue in North Korea with the 2015 standard, it should pay at least 400 million yen with words of apology to North Korean victims and their families.

It is no doubt that the Comfort Women problem itself can never end with the December agreement. But there are a number of history problems which are waiting for their turn. Victims of compulsory labor have already spoken out. Now is the time for us to take some steps forward.

I can enumerate several remaining history problems easily. The problem of disagreement about the interpretation of Article 2 of the Japan-ROK basic Treaty is existing. As everybody knows, the Japanese government takes the view that the Annexation Treaty had validity from the time of its agreement, but that it ceased to have validity from the time of establishment of the ROK in 1948. The ROK, on the other hand, takes the view that the unjust and improper treaty was the “product of past Japanese aggression and null and void (totally invalid) from the outset.” This disagreement should be conquered at last. The second problem is the problem of Dokdo-Takeshima. This problem should be resolved through diplomatic negotiations finally.

Our history problem, the problem of the Japanese colonial rule over Korea is an eternal problem to our peoples. We are to live together in peaceful cooperation for ever. Therefore we should move forward toward reconciliation through apology and persuasion.

/ Presentation 2 /

The Process and Implications of Historical Reconciliation between Poland and Russia

Mirosław FILIPOWICZ (Professor, John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin /
Director, the Institute of East-Central Europe)

Mirosław Filipowicz
Institute of East-Central Europe
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin

The Process and Implications of Historical Reconciliation between Poland and Russia

History might be treated as a source of positive inspiration
and as a burden, as well.

In the history of Polish – Russian relations tragic and **negative elements** seems to
prevail over positive experiences:

- * Historical rivalry;
- * Difference of dominating confession (orthodox Russia and Roman-Catholic Poland)
- * Difference of social and political ways of development;
- * Russian domination over large part of Poland after the partitions of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth;
- * XIXth Cent. history legacy: Polish uprisings brutally suppressed by Russia, attempts of Russification of Poland;
- * XXth Cent. history legacy: 1920 Polish-Russian (Bolsheviks) war; Ribbentrop-Molotov pact of August 1939; Soviet aggression of 17 September 1939, Katyn massacre of 1940
- * Yalta and its consequences: Poland not a Soviet republic but a satellite state
- * Strong anti-Russian (or anti-Soviet) resentments in Poland

Historical development of Poland and Russia:



Mediaeval Poland around 1138: 250 000 km²



Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth around 1620: 990 000 km²



Contemporary Poland: 312 000 km²


Historical development of Russian territory

- * Russia after Ivan the Terrible death (1584): 324 000 km²
- * Russian Empire in the XIXth Cent.: 22 800 000 km²
- * Contemporary Russian Federation: 17 075 400 km²

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth in the eve of partitions



Partitions of Poland 1772-1795



1989/1991 and new chances

Despite that historical legacy, Polish option for NATO and EU membership made Poland stronger and gave a chance for better relations with Russia, without a fear of Russian domination over Poland.

- * 1993: Russian troops were withdrawn from Poland, after the collapse of the USSR.
- * 10 April 2010: Smolensk crash
- * Its consequences: poisoning the Polish-Russian relations for many years, mutual mistrust and conspiracy theories;

What is to be done?

Polish-Russian diplomatic and political relations are in a deep crisis; Strong Russian lobbies in Europe accuse Poland of traditional Russophobia;

So what to do?

- * We should not reduce Russia to the Kremlin government;
- * We should try to find partners for dialogue among Russian intellectuals and experts;
- * On historical ground we should stop to think there is only one true, universal version of the history; every nation has its own sensibilities and idiosyncrasies, so we should start to think of history in the spirit of mutual empathy. It does not mean we should take the other's version of history, but we need to respect the sensibilities of the other. And, first of all, we need to get to know them.

Some positive examples:

- * 2008: a Polish-Russian Group for Difficult Issues, under the chairmanship of prof. Adam D. Rotfeld and prof. Anatoly Torkunov. It's very fruitful activity; publishing a "White spots – black spots" book on difficult matters in Polish-Russian relations 1918-2008.
- * 2017: a renewal of the Group by Poland. We are still waiting for Russian positive reaction.
- * 2012: the beginning of the historical dialogue between Polish and Russian historians and teachers of history. The partners: Institute of East-Central Europe and Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences. The result: publication of three-volume edition of essays and historical sources on the history of Polish-Russian relations.

History is not black and white

"The relationship of a perfect villain to a perfect victim is a rather rare occurrence in history, especially when the issue continue over hundreds of years and include some of the most complicated situations in the annals of mankind"

Prof. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, Berkeley

Univ.

"Veritas et dulcis est et amara. Quando dulcis est, parcit; et quando amara, curat" [Truth is both sweet and bitter. When it is sweet, it spares us; when it is bitter, it cures us"]

St. Augustinus, Letter 247

We need both critical and positive look at our own history: only that way we can be really proud of our great achievements.


Some historical examples:

- * Feldmarshal Alexander **Suvorov** can be both a Russian national hero and a person guilty of a massacre of Polish civilians in Warsaw (Praga district) in 1794;
- * **Katyn** massacre of 1940: a great war crime, according to some even an act of genocide, but at the same time only a drop of blood in the Stalin's crimes bloody ocean;
- * XIXth Cent. Polish **insurgents** against Russia: many of them were punished and sent to Siberia, but at the same time many of those who survived, took active part in **modernising Russia**,
- * Not all Russians in the XIXth Cent. were just oppressors from Polish point of view. Some of the Russian imperial officials, even during the worst times of Russification, had a very positive impact on Polish affairs. Example: Sokrat **Starinkevich**, Russian Mayor of Warsaw 1875-1892, initiated the construction of municipal water works and tramway and telephone networks in the city.

Both Poland and Russia have their own **patriotic visions of history**, often contradictory to one another

One example: 1581-1582 siege of Pskov by Polish king Stefan Batory as depicted by Russian XIXth Cent. painter Briullov and Polish painter Jan Matejko:





If we are still victims of the XIXth Cent. historical imagination,
nothing would change for better.

/ Presentation 3 /

(With Apologies to John Lennon)··· Give History a Chance

Alexis DUDDEN (Professor, University of Connecticut)

North Korea, Japan, and the United States have chosen brinksmanship as the path to a peaceful future in Northeast Asia. South Korea has just had a historic election, and the occupant of the Blue House has an unprecedented mandate to articulate why and how the history of modern Korea informs the successful peace of the future of the region.

This is arguably a first in South Korean history. For President Moon to boldly claim this role would do much to clarify the significance of modern 20th century Korean history to the region — as well as the broader picture of Japanese imperialism and its lingering aftermath. I do not mean as some sort of “Historian in Chief” but rather the opposite: as a fellow student of the past together with fellow citizens.

Above all, South Korea’s new president has the real potential to “de-weaponize” the region’s so-called history wars and to return history to its preferred place in society as a useful analytic body of knowledge that helps guide a better future.

To be sure, people do not need (or want) history lectures to get on with their lives: they need jobs; they need education; they need a chance for their children’s futures. And yet, the past few years in this region have been particularly toxic with regards to something that politicians on all sides call “history” In so doing, all have used history as a weapon to shore themselves up. Compounding the problem, there has been a Washington-led perception that the people in the countries of Japan’s historic imperial and wartime aggression — especially Korea and China — are collectively playing the history card to stall cooperation and maximize their own domestic support. Notwithstanding Chinese bellicosity, there are disturbing aspects to this dynamic that end up “blaming the victim for the crime.”

Attention should center instead on Japan as the inheritor of the perpetrator state in this nexus. This is not an “anti-Japanese” statement, and the reason is simple. As countless studies of reconciliation have demonstrated, it is incumbent on the leaders of former perpetrator states to repeatedly acknowledge the truth of the history of the past injustices most often invoked and to repeatedly acknowledge that the collective and lingering suffering among injured groups in any society may never go away (among these examples would include discussions ranging from South African apartheid, the legacies of African-American slavery in the United States, the

“disappeared” in Argentina, the ongoing Jewish aftermath of the Nazi regime and many others, which now deeply inform one another). As Danish philosopher Thomas Brudholm’s compellingly observed in his study of Jean Avery: “anger is a virtue.” In other words, like the selective remembering and forgetting elemental to forging a nation, so, too, selective forgiveness can be socially productive.

Nations are not trauma wards, yet trauma is fundamental to any collective process of belonging, and the onus remains on the inheritor of the perpetrator of the injustice to move society forward. Moving forward, however, when state leaders summon history to legitimate themselves (as all do) they need recognize that the “us” versus” them approach to national organization simply no longer works for very long. It never really did, only now with so much more instantaneous information this strategy’s weaker points are far more immediately felt (and broadcast everywhere).

This is true domestically and internationally, and yet since 2012 in the Northeast Asian context, the administration of Abe Shinzo has gone out of its way to undermine hesitant steps towards progress that had been occurring until then. Again, this observation is *NOT* a form of Japan-bashing; rather, quite the opposite. Right now it is critical for the region’s ability to move forward that regional leaders see the Abe administration’s machinations not only in terms of “Korea versus Japan” or “China versus Japan” but more essentially in terms of “Japan versus Japan.” The division in Japanese society today over how best to narrate and shape itself is as great as it was in the 1860s when its leaders rewove Japan into the modern nation it became.

A way to understand this “Japan-Japan” divide is to begin by understanding that the Abe administration’s preoccupation with history runs contrary to Japan’s economic and security interests (something that makes explaining its policy implications very difficult to do). Since late 2012 the broader aims of the current administration make clear a willingness to erase the “Asia” component of the “Asia-Pacific” reconciliation efforts. Why? It is difficult to have a firm answer, yet several of the Abe administration’s interrelated policies of the Abe administration ranging from the comfort women to territorial issues and also (most important ultimately) the constitution of Japan make clear that for Abe and his supporters the history of the Japanese empire in Asia is irrelevant to the creation of Japan today.

Thus, concerted efforts and policies to erase or distort its history and meaning for contemporary Japanese society are underway, causing intense friction throughout Northeast Asia.

To understand this better, it is good to consider important statements by former Prime Minister Kan Naoto in August 2010 and by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo in August 2015.

To commemorate the 100th anniversary of Japan's annexation of Korea, in August 2010, then Prime Minister Kan Naoto declared:

Precisely one hundred years ago, the Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty was concluded, making the beginning of the colonial rule of thirty six years. As demonstrated by strong resistance such as the *Samil* independence movement, the Korean people of that time was deprived of their country and culture, and their ethnic pride was deeply scarred by the colonial rule which was imposed against their will under the political and military circumstances. I would like to face history with sincerity. I would like to have courage to squarely confront the facts of history and humility to accept them, as well as to be honest to reflect upon the errors of our own. Those who render pain tend to forget it while those who suffered cannot forget it easily. To the tremendous damage and sufferings that this colonial rule caused, I express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and my heartfelt apology.

By contrast, Prime Minister Abe's August 2015 speech commemorating the 70th anniversary of the end of the war made clear the entirely different worldview this administration holds:

The Japan-Russia War gave encouragement to many people under colonial rule from Asia to Africa.

With this, Abe abundantly made clear that his administration's views would run counter to decades of analytical debate in Japan and throughout the Asian region that aimed to address Japanese state responsibility for the history of empire and total war during the first half of the 20th century. Moreover, Abe's

remarks here about 1905 demonstrated that he was not concerned with improving relations with Japan's closest neighbor, Korea (the country having become a Japanese "protectorate" as a victory spoil of this war).

Fast forward to 2017 when Prime Minister Abe himself prolonged Japanese Ambassador Nagamine's return to Seoul because he remained so incensed about the peace statues dedicated to the comfort women in Seoul and Busan, which appear to cause him so much anguish. As a result of the Abe administration's really odd behavior concerning several bronze statues once again history is a regional security threat — no small feat while North Korean missiles currently fly on a regular basis.

Two successive conservative South Korean administrations refused Japan's request that the statue vanish, making all the more alarming Tokyo's reports on the heels of the now widely contested December 28, 2015 accord that the success of Japan's coming to terms with this history is contingent on the statue's disappearance.

Today, it is commonplace for groups around the world to demand the removal of statues of perpetrators of what are now criminal acts: In the United States, Woodrow Wilson is in the crosshairs for supporting racial segregation; the name of a prominent college at Yale University changed to that of a descendant of African-American slavery in lieu of the slaveholder's name it had had; and Cecil Rhodes is being toppled for a litany of horrors in Britain and throughout the former empire. Only Japan is seeking the removal of a statue of a victim of its nation's past crimes.

This is additionally strange coming at a moment when Japan seeks to redefine its security posture to allow troops to engage militarily abroad for the first time since 1945, which brings us to focus on the deeper issue of the "Japan versus Japan" moment: the Constitution of Japan. Most of the attention revolves around the question of the nation's famous war-renouncing Article 9. This is far from a new trend, however, and began among some Japanese politicians almost as soon as the 1947 constitution went into effect. While one vision for Japan now regularly labels the constitution "masochistic" and an "American" imposition, for many others including leading constitutional law scholars such as Komamura Keigo, despite the American occupation origins of the law document it and very much Article 9 are axiomatic to Japanese identity.

In his most recent book, *Birth of a 'Peace State': Origins and Shifts in Postwar Japan*, Professor Wada Haruki powerfully makes the point about the immediate and unwitting costs for Japanese society involved with establishing Japan's peace state in 1946 without debating the meaning of the "peace" at the time. Dovetailing with Wada's personal experience with the intentional erasure of the world that had only just immediately surrounded him — one of total war — University of Pittsburgh sociologist Akiko Hashimoto has lucidly explained what this "peace" would entail in real terms for several generations of Japanese to come. Writing in her recent book, *The Long Defeat*, Hashimoto argues that:

Over time, [a] kind of emotional socialization that taps into instincts for self-preservation turns into "feeling rules," with which children learn to internalize how they are *supposed* to feel about war in a pacifist country. Clearly, this choice of strategy is not geared toward raising nascent critical thinkers who would assume responsibility for past atrocious deeds of their forefathers as in a culture of contrition like Germany, but focused instead on *not* raising the type of Japanese people who could perpetrate another abhorrent war in the future.

Fast forward to Hirohito's 1989 death when public discussion within Japan about the emperor's guilt and responsibility came into renewed focus, bookstores throughout Tokyo gradually added shelves and then entire sections of "War Responsibility" studies and "Peace Studies." New academic degrees and positions developed to match.

Of equal importance, in no small way Japan's internal 1989 coincided with the cracking of dictatorial orders throughout the areas of the nation's former formal and informal empire — not in any causal way or in any planned direction — but in real terms meaning that here in Korea, for example, it would become socially possible for Kim Hak-sun in 1991 to publicly declare her own life as part of modern Korean history *and of* Japan's history of empire in the 20th century.

Ironically, to many Japanese, wartime Emperor Hirohito's direct descendants, his son, Emperor Akihito, and grandson, Crown Prince Naruhito, best represent the

antiwar chorus in this unfolding play.

Constitutionally barred from political action, Japan's current emperor has devoted his life, since ascending the throne in 1989, to quietly atoning for atrocities Japanese troops committed in his father's name during the Second World War. For his part, Naruhito pointedly urges the need to "look back humbly on the past."

Necessarily understated, such behavior radically contradicts that of current Prime Minister Abe Shinzo and those who long to break Japan free of the constitutional proscription against waging war abroad.

Imperative now for all throughout Northeast Asia and beyond who seek to build a peaceful and stable future for the region is to work with Japanese scholars and politicians and activists seeking to preserve the universalisms inherent to Japan's standing constitution, as well as how they intersect with more globally-tuned understandings of modern history. No nationality is "denialist" by nature — it is genetically impossible. Education is critical as is leadership, and the need to engage Japan with Asia has never been more important. And please, give the region's history a chance to teach, not divide.

III. Participants' Profile (in alphabetical order)



Alexis Dudden, Professor
University of Connecticut

Alexis Dudden is professor of history at the University of Connecticut. She publishes regularly about Japan and Northeast Asia, and her books include *Troubled Apologies Among Japan, Korea, and the United States* (Columbia, 2008) and *Japan's Colonization of Korea* (Hawaii, 2005). Her work frequently appears also in *The Huffington Post*, *Dissent*, and *The New York Times* among other venues. Dudden received her BA from Columbia University in 1991 and her PhD in history from the University of Chicago in 1998. She has lived and studied for extended periods of time in Japan and South Korea, with awards from Fulbright, ACLS, NEH, and SSRC and fellowships at Princeton and Harvard and is the recipient of the 2015 Manhae Peace Prize. She is currently completing a book about Japan's territorial problems and the changing meaning of islands called, *The State of Japan: Islands, Empire, Nation*, and is an advisory council member of Harvard University's Reischauer Institute for Japanese Studies' Research Project on Constitutional Revision. She is currently the Fulbright U.S.-R.O.K. Alliance Visiting Professor at Yonsei University.



Mirosław Filipowicz, Professor
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland

Mirosław Filipowicz, Professor of history at John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Poland. Since 2013 he is also a Director of the Institute of East-Central Europe, a research institute supervised by Minister of Foreign Affairs. Since November 2016 – a Plenipotentiary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Polish-Russian Group for the Difficult Issues and Polish co-chairman of the Group. He specialises in Russian history and historiography, American-Russian historiography and history of Polish-Russian relations. Since 2012 prof. Filipowicz coordinates a Polish-Russian scholarly project entitled Poland-Russia: is it a fatalism of enmity? Towards a new historical approach, prepared by Polish and Russian historians and teachers of history. The Russian partner of the Institute of East-Central Europe is Institute of World History, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow. Privately, Prof. Filipowicz is a great lover of classical music, Kyung-Wha Chung and Myung-Whun Chung performances included.



KIM Nam-Kook, Professor
Korea University

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
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